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Most economic activities take place on “uneven playing fields” (ECLAC, 2003) which are 
characterized by asymmetries in various dimensions. These asymmetries strongly 
determine available strategies of decision makers, or more generally, the basic 
conditions of economic interaction. Furthermore, they are decisive in determining the 
likeliness of ultimate economic success of countries, companies, groups, and individuals. 
Asymmetries in the economic sphere are rather the rule than the exception. Due to this 
omnipresence, asymmetries should be reflected in all economic disciplines. In 
macroeconomics, international and regional asymmetries in terms of income, economic 
growth, the business cycle, and socio-economic differences, among many others, should 
be considered in the analysis of economic and cooperative relations. In microeconomics, 
it should be considered that market participants encounter informational asymmetries 
with respect to myriad properties, have different wealth at their disposal, possess 
asymmetrical preferences, differ in their bargaining and market power, and face diverse 
cost structures etc. throughout their economic interactions. However, economic theory 
and analysis regularly focus on symmetrical situations. Such situations are easier to 
model mathematically and offer through their simplicity a seemingly better access to 
complex issues. Often the assumption of symmetry, however, at best provides a raw 
approximation to the asymmetrical reality (Scitovsky, 1978). 
A multitude of real-life situations involve “unequal” settings. For example, financial 
markets are the playground for market participants with highly diverse information and 
financial skills. The question is, whether the prices, which are generated by these 
markets, correctly reflect the underlying fundamentals in the face of these asymmetries. 
Given the numerous observed real-life bubble phenomena (as, for example, the recent 
U.S. housing bubble of 2007) this is often at most questionable. A further example, in 
which asymmetries play a major role, is the still ongoing and stalled bargaining on the 
global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These negotiations take place among 
parties with highly diverse interests and economic backgrounds (to mention only two of 
the differences). The variance in characteristics of the involved parties strongly 
influences the respectively held point of view and thus impedes a global agreement on 
individually binding commitments concerning the reduction of emissions. 
These two short examples indicate that it is necessary to incorporate asymmetries in 
economic analyses for a better understanding of the economic and social world around 
us. The abstraction from asymmetries in economic and social contexts definitively 
reduces the ability to make proper behavioral predictions and hence limits the 
meaningfulness of economic and social studies. 
In this vein, the present dissertation strives to unravel the impact of two dimensions of 
asymmetry in two different economic situations by the experimental examination of a 
laboratory asset-market and a public-good game. Given the experimental-economic 




laboratory and which impact could otherwise hardly be investigated in real-life settings. 
The game-theoretic modeling of situations which involve economic decisions allows the 
variation of all constituent features of a game and to establish asymmetries in three core 
elements: The set of strategies which is available to each player, the set of information 
which is known to each player, and the payoff function of each player. This dissertation 
studies the two former.  
The dissertation comprises four studies, which are presented in the following four 
chapters. Chapter II deals with informational asymmetry on an experimental asset 
market. Chapters II to V deal with the asymmetry in endowments in public-good game 
settings. 
“Informational Asymmetries in Laboratory Asset Markets with State-Dependent 
Fundamentals”1 (Chapter II) 
This study examines asymmetry in the set of information which is available to each 
player in an experimental asset market. More concretely, it considers an asymmetry in 
information about the fundamentals of the traded asset. Such asymmetries, although 
widely present on financial markets and decisive for the market-price formation on 
these markets, are hard to study in real markets. The unknown and uncontrollable 
information distribution among market participants and the blurry nature of asset 
fundamentals renders a meaningful investigation almost impossible. 
The study investigates how the asset-price formation process and trading profits of 
(differently informed) traders are affected by the content of information in a market in a 
new experimental setting. The setting is innovative in that it combines two literature 
strands. The first strand contains asset markets with multi-period assets which are 
characterized by declining fundamental values (see, for example, the seminal paper of 
Smith et al. (1988)). The second strand contains asset markets with one-period assets 
which are characterized by state-contingent and trader-type dependent fundamentals 
(dividends), and in the cases where insider information is investigated, asymmetric 
distributions of state information (see, for example, Camerer and Weigelt (1991)). The 
presented setting involves multi-period assets in an environment with uncertainty 
about market fundamentals which are determined by two possible states of nature. The 
study analyzes how informational aspects, including the presence of inside knowledge 
(which is defined as the knowledge of the state), influence market performance and 
trading profits. Thereby, price formation in markets with and without an informational 
asymmetry about the true state of nature is compared. 
More concretely, the experiment involves assets which pay a dividend in each of the 15 
trading periods. The dividend has four possible values and is the same for all traders. 
However, in each period, the dividend is stochastic and its distribution function depends 
upon one of the two possible “states of the world”. The “state of the world” is 
determined at the beginning of the experiment and stays the same over all periods. 
                                                        





Traders generally do not know the state, and hence fundamentals, but are informed that 
the ex-ante probability of each state is 50 percent. In some markets an informational 
asymmetry is established via the random assignment of cost-free information about the 
true state to some inside traders. Based on the observed dividends during the 
experiment, however, also uninformed traders are theoretically able to update the ex-
ante probability of both states, and hence the assessment of fundamentals, according to 
Bayes’ rule. 
In this study, we are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of 
traders who are informed about the true state (insiders), and/or (2) the impact of the 
provision of Bayesian updates of the assets’ state-dependent fundamental value to all 
traders. Additionally, we ask all participants in every period to state their market price 
expectations for the current and all future periods. 
The main results of the study can be summarized as follows. With respect to the focal 
informational aspects we find that markets with asymmetrically informed traders 
exhibit smaller price deviations from fundamentals, implying higher market efficiency, 
and that the provision of BFVs has little to no effect. The first finding can possibly be 
explained by the fact that uninformed traders act more prudent in order to avoid being 
exploited, when they are aware of the fact that some traders have an advantage. The 
second finding in contrast is puzzling. Probably the mere assistance in the assessment of 
the state is not sufficient to improve market performance because participants are 
already able to intuitively anticipate BFVs. 
As expected, behavior of in- and outsiders clearly differs in early periods but converges 
over the course of trading as a result of revelation of the state information over time. 
The differences in behavior materialize in lower (higher) average limit buy/sell prices of 
outsiders in the “good” (“bad”) state compared to the limit buy/sell prices of insiders. 
Consequently, we find that outsiders on average hold less (more) assets in “good”-state 
(“bad”-state) markets which enables informed traders to exploit their superior position 
and to earn higher profits. With regard to the elicited price expectations, we find that the 
precision of forecasts of outsiders seems to be impeded by the presence of insiders, 
while the provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on forecast quality. 
Since the higher market efficiency in markets, where insiders are present is based on the 
expense of outsiders, we support the position of proponents of insider trading 
regulation to maintain the confidence in the fairness of financial markets. Without the 
implementation of laws against insider trading, it is likely that deprived market 
participants would lose faith in the securities’ markets and conceivably withdraw all or 





Studies on Endowment Asymmetries in Public-Good Games (Chapters III – V) 
The three studies, presented in the third to fifth chapter, deal with the asymmetry in the 
set of strategies, which is available to each participant, in a public-good game framework 
that constitutes a social dilemma. We more precisely examine the impact of asymmetries 
in endowments, which can be distributed between two investment alternatives (a 
private and a public investment), on cooperation. Numerous studies investigated 
cooperation in symmetrical public-good experiments, in which all players possess the 
same endowments. Studies that examine public-good games with asymmetric 
endowments are relatively rare, though. How cooperation in these games is affected by 
inequalities in the wealth level, which is represented by the exogenously given 
endowment, is, however, not completely understood. 
The study “The Social Costs of Inequality – Heterogeneous Endowments in Public-
Good Experiments”2 (Chapter III) examines cooperation in a linear public-good 
experiment in which contributions under a symmetric, a weakly asymmetric, and 
strongly asymmetric distribution of endowments are compared. This study is innovative 
in that in the strongly asymmetric situation one player (a super-rich player) has no 
interest to achieve the group optimum. 
As the study shows, contributions by players seem to follow a “fair-share” rule with 
equal contributions relative to the endowment, as long as all players have an interest in 
the social optimum. This result seems to be quite robust for contributions in linear 
public-good experiments (see, for example, also Hofmeyr et al. (2007)).3 
Furthermore, total group contributions are on average not statistically different 
between the cases with symmetric and weakly asymmetric distributions of 
endowments. This result is also consistent with the study of Hofmeyr et al. (2007). In 
contrast, we observe in the strongly asymmetric setting, in which the super-rich player 
has a higher endowment than the three other players together, that group contributions 
are on average significantly lower than in the other two settings. This super-rich player 
does contribute on average the same amount as the other players and thus a much lower 
proportion of his endowment. We interpret this difference in the behavioral patterns 
between the weakly and strongly asymmetric settings as a shift in the contribution norm 
from a relative to an absolute equality of contributions. 
  
                                                        
2 Joint work with Claudia Keser, Martin Schmidt, and Cornelius Schnitzler. cege Discussion Paper, No. 217, 
University of Göttingen, October 2014. Download: http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~cege/Diskussionspapiere/ 
DP217. 
3 Whether this “rule” is, for the case of weakly asymmetric endowments, also robust to variations in the 





The study “Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogeneous Endowments, and 
Voluntary Public-Good Provision”4 (Chapter IV) investigates if the previously 
mentioned “fair-share” norm may be influenced by different, potentially norm-changing, 
enforced minimum-contribution schedules with a fixed distribution of asymmetric 
endowments. These schedules meet some desired and reasonable criteria such that an 
increase in group contributions cannot solely be attributed to the required minimum 
contributions but must be caused by a behavioral norm shift of the participants. In 
particular, we employ a treatment which involves no enforced minimum contributions, a 
treatment which requires the same absolute minimum contribution from all players, a 
treatment which requires the same minimum contributions relative to the endowment 
from all players, and a treatment which imposes a progressive minimum-contribution 
schedule with higher minimum contributions for wealthier players. 
The main results from this study are the following. The mandatory minimum 
contributions seem to exert a norm-giving character (“expressive power”). That means, 
they are able to coordinate individual beliefs, express a certain level of “fair 
contribution”, i.e., break the usual “fair-share” norm of equal relative contributions, and 
thus lead to an increase of average group contributions. The progressive minimum-
contribution schedule performs best. It increases average group contributions by more 
than 30 percent above the baseline treatment. 
On the individual level, we find that average absolute contributions rise with the 
endowment in all treatments. We confirm the “fair-share” rule for the treatment where 
we impose the same relative minimum contribution on all participants. In contrast, we 
find for the treatment with the same absolute minimum contributions that average 
relative contributions are higher for less wealthy players and in the treatment with the 
progressive schedule that average relative contributions are higher for more wealthy 
players. In the latter two treatments players seem to follow a modified “fair-share” rule 
of equal relative contributions of the disposable endowment. Furthermore, we find that 
in the treatment with the progressive schedule contributions of the medium-wealthy 
player, for which mandatory contributions are the same in all three mandatory 
contribution treatments, are highest. 
  
                                                        
4 Joint work with Claudia Keser and Martin Schmidt. cege Discussion Paper, No. 224, University of 




The study “Recommended Minimum Contributions in a Public-Good Game with 
Heterogeneous Endowments”5 (Chapter V) supplementary augments the preceding 
investigation in that it refrains from the imposition of obligations. Instead, it uses 
recommendations concerning minimum contributions with a slight moral framing in the 
same setting. We focus on the progressive minimum-contribution schedule from the 
previous study, as the most promising environment. This schedule performed best in 
terms of the increase of group profits in comparison to the baseline treatment. By using 
this schedule, we test whether the transformation of the mandatory minimum 
contributions in mere recommendations is similarly able to increase average group 
contributions. At least, we expect that the recommendations increase group 
contributions in comparison to the baseline setting without any obligations or 
recommendations. 
The main results from this study are the following. In contrast to the progressively 
staggered minimum contributions in the study in the fourth chapter, we find that the 
progressively staggered recommendations in this study do not exert a norm-giving 
character. Group contributions in the experiment, when recommendations are given, are 
not statistically distinguishable from the contributions in the baseline treatment 
(without recommendations or obligations) and significantly smaller than in the case 
when progressive obligations for contributions are imposed. 
On the individual level, we confirm the “fair-share” rule for the treatment with the 
progressive recommendations. Thus, while the progressive obligations have a “positive” 
impact on the “fair-share” norm, recommendations fail to exert this desired effect. On 
the contrary, contributions in the case with progressive recommendations are smaller 
than contributions in the case of progressive obligations for all player types. In 
comparison to the baseline treatment, contributions of the poor players are significantly 
lower, while contributions of wealthy and rich players are statistically indistinguishable, 
when the recommendations are given. Furthermore, while recommendations reduce the 
proportion of zero contributions in comparison to the baseline treatment, they also 
exert a negative effect on full contributions. 
Our results suggest that when it comes to “issues of cooperation” policy makers should 
rely on stronger institutions than pure recommendations to achieve more favorable 
social outcomes. However, this advice should be treated with caution; our findings 
should not be overgeneralized. Further work has to be done to cross-check our results in 
other environments. Given the differences of our results to other studies which analyze 
recommendations in public-good game settings, we at best conclude that the impact of 
recommendations is strongly context dependent; also the level of recommendations 
seems to play a crucial role. 
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state and/or (2) the impact of the provision of Bayesian updates of the assets’ state-dependent 
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traders. The provision of BFVs has little to no effect. Behavior of informed and uninformed 
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(“bad”-state) markets. Informed traders earn superior profits. The precision of market price 
forecasts is impeded by the presence of insiders. 
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Financial markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries. This is 
probably particularly true in times of market uncertainty following economic 
turbulences or in the wake of stock market launches (IPOs). Although insider trading is 
prohibited by law in all major financial markets, insider information is often a 
prominent cause of informational asymmetries.1 Given that the allocative efficiency of a 
market crucially depends upon the correct pricing of its assets, insider trading could 
theoretically be seen as a positive. The more information the market price reflects, the 
higher is the informational and thus also the allocative efficiency of a market. As insiders 
potentially bring critical information to the market, the proponents of insider trading 
presume potentially positive effects on market efficiency. Opponents of the regulation of 
insider trading, however, counter that the integrity of financial markets is at stake, when 
no barriers on insider trading are imposed.2 
In this paper, we study asset-price formation and the consequences of insider trading in 
a new experimental setting involving multi-period assets in an environment with 
uncertainty about market fundamentals. Specifically, we consider the existence of two 
possible states of nature. We compare price formation in markets with and without 
insiders that have information about the true state. We investigate to what extent our 
financial markets are informationally efficient and how informational asymmetries (due 
to insider information) impact market-price formation. Such an investigation would 
hardly be possible (if not impossible) on real market grounds, due to the blurry nature 
of underlying securities’ values and the uncontrollable and incalculable information 
distribution among market participants. In the experiment, we can control the 
information available to market participants and the securities’ fundamentals. Although 
the expectation formation of market participants remains difficult to grasp,3 we can 
explicitly control the informational asymmetries between market participants, including 
the number of informed participants (henceforth also inside traders or insiders) relative 
to the uninformed (henceforth also outside traders or outsiders). We neither claim nor 
aim to resolve the debate between proponents and opponents of insider trading 
regulation but strive to fuel the discussion with the provision of new experimental 
evidence. 
                                                        
1 Bris (2005) even finds, by using acquisition data from 52 countries between 1990 and 2000, that the 
introduction of laws that prohibit insider trading increases the occurrence and profitability of insider 
trading. 
2 In the ongoing debate, to date, neither efficiency nor fairness and equity arguments can mutually 
persuade the debating parties (Bainbridge, 1998; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). 
3 How the available information disseminates through the market and is processed by the individual 
traders to build individual expectations remains a tremendous source of uncertainty. It resembles Keynes 
(1936) view of the stock market as a “beauty contest” in which traders are more concerned about the 
beliefs of others than about their own valuation based upon all available information. As good as the 
experimenters can control for the market parameters, as bad they can control the endogenous beliefs of 
participants about other participants’ behavior (Noussair and Plott, 2008). 
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Since the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988b) (henceforth, SSW) countless studies 
have investigated common stock valuation in experimental asset markets with multi-
period assets characterized by declining fundamental values (FVs). However, relatively 
few studies consider informational asymmetries. If (experimental) markets are efficient, 
the market value should equal the risk-adjusted present value of the rationally expected 
future financial benefits conditioned on all available information. Asset price changes 
should only occur when new information is brought into the market, which changes 
expectations about the income stream (Shiller, 2003). Deviations from fundamentals, if 
at all, should be only temporary until the risk-adjusted expectations converge. Such kind 
of markets would approximate what Fama (1970), the originator of the efficient-market 
hypothesis (EMH), called “efficient”. However, SSW-type markets predominantly resist 
showing efficiency and persistently exhibit bubbles, which hardly can be explained by 
differences in preferences or risk aversion. The observed bubble-and-crash 
phenomenon is found to be strikingly robust to changes in the experimental 
environment.4 The only factor that fairly reliably impairs this widely observed pattern is 
experience (in the sense of repetition). Dufwenberg et al. (2005) have shown that even a 
fraction of experienced subjects in an experimental market is sufficient to reduce the 
occurrence of bubbles. However, this seems to hold only if the market environment 
(initial endowments and dividend structure) remains unchanged during the trials 
(Hussam et al., 2008). 
On the basis of Dufwenberg et al. (2005), Sutter et al. (2012) hypothesize that, in 
addition to experience, an asymmetric distribution of information about an asset’s 
imminent future dividends among the participants might serve to reduce mispricing, i.e., 
the magnitude of bubbles. They conjecture that the main driver of this alleviating effect 
might be the common knowledge of the existence of better informed or experienced 
traders. Implementing a SSW framework, they find information asymmetries to 
significantly reduce the size of price bubbles, implying higher market efficiency. 
Moreover, they do not detect a significant difference in profits between traders with 
different information levels. However, in an earlier study, King (1991) finds no evidence 
for asymmetric distribution of information to eliminate price bubbles in a SSW 
environment. In his study informed traders, likewise, could not capitalize their 
informational advantage through higher profits; they were just able to recoup the costs 
for the acquisition of the private information.5 
Another experimental literature strand studies asymmetric information using an 
approach different from SSW. It is based on one-period Arrow-Debreu assets with state-
contingent and trader-type dependent dividends, and in the cases where insider 
information is investigated, asymmetric distributions of state information (e.g., Forsythe 
et al. (1982; 1984), Plott and Sunder (1982; 1988), Ang and Schwarz (1985), Camerer 
                                                        
4 See, e.g., King et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1994), or Palan (2013) for comprehensive and salient 
reviews of the experimental “bubble” literature. For an overview of bubble definitions see, e.g., Siegel 
(2003). 
5 Unlike the work of Sutter et al. (2012), which uses randomly assigned and free private information, King 
(1991) investigates costly private information that is auctioned off before the markets start. 
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and Weigelt (1991a), Sunder (1992), Friedman (1993), Ackert et al. (1997), and Ackert 
and Church (1998)). The studies in this literature strand focus on the test of the “prior 
information equilibrium pricing prediction model” (PI) versus the “fully revealing 
rational-expectations equilibrium prediction model” (RE). Both prediction models will 
be explained in more detail in Section 3 below. In summary, this literature strand shows 
that markets are generally able to aggregate information quite successfully. PI 
predictions seem to be a good benchmark for trades in earlier repetitions of the market, 
whereas the RE predictions appear more accurate in later repetitions. Plott and Sunder 
(1988), for example, argue as follows: “Rational expectations can be seen either as a static 
theory of markets (e.g., in the efficient market literature in finance) or as an end-point of a 
dynamic path of adjustment.” (p. 1104) 
Our experiment is novel in that it combines both literature strands and introduces state-
dependence in the SSW framework. In our new framework, insider information is 
defined as the knowledge of the state. The aim of our study is to analyze how 
informational aspects, including the existence of inside knowledge, influence price 
formation and market performance. 
In our experiment, the dividend paid by an asset, in each of 15 periods, has four possible 
values and is the same for all traders. However, in each period, the dividend is stochastic 
and its distribution function depends upon one of two possible states of the world. In 
other words, the state determines the probabilities with which the respective dividends 
are drawn. The “state of the world” is determined at the beginning of the experiment 
and stays the same over all periods. Traders generally do not know the state but are 
informed that the probability of each state is 50 percent. This is the prior belief, which 
determines the ex-ante expected fundamental value of the assets. Based on the observed 
dividends during the experiment, this belief can be updated according to the method of 
Bayes, resulting in ex-post expected fundamental values (BFVs) of the assets. In some of 
the experimental markets informational asymmetry is established via a random 
assignment of cost-free information about the state to some inside traders. 
In this framework, we investigate how information is processed and disseminated 
trough market prices. We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) 
the role of traders who are informed about the true state (insiders), and/or (2) the 
impact of the provision of Bayesian updates of the assets’ state-dependent fundamental 
value to all traders. We compare the outcomes in markets where two traders with 
insider information about the actual “state of the world” are present (and the presence is 
common knowledge) to the outcomes in markets without any insider information. 
Additionally, in half of the markets with insiders and half of the markets without 
insiders, we provide all traders in every period with updated BFVs. In all four resulting 
treatments, to scrutinize traders’ ability to anticipate uncertain future outcomes, a key 
issue in financial markets, we elicit traders’ expectations about the future market prices 
at the beginning of each period and provide monetary incentives for the accuracy of 
their predictions. 
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Our main results are surprising in that, in all treatments, we find bubbles to occur rarely, 
even though all traders are inexperienced and have never participated in a market 
experiment before. Markets with asymmetrically informed traders exhibit smaller price 
deviations from fundamentals, suggesting higher market efficiency. The provision of 
BFVs has little to no effect. Behavior of in- and outsiders differs in early periods but 
converges over the course of the markets. On average, we find outsider limit buy/sell 
prices to be lower (higher) in the “good” (“bad”) state and outsiders to hold less (more) 
assets in “good”-state (“bad”-state) markets compared to insiders. Insiders manage to 
exploit their superior position and are able to earn higher profits. With regard to price 
expectations, we find forecasts and actual market prices to be highly correlated. 
Forecast precision, however, seems to be impeded by the presence of insiders, while the 
provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on the quality of the forecasts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the 
experimental market design and describes the experimental procedures. Section 3 
introduces two behavioral models and provides testable hypotheses. Section 4 reviews 
these hypotheses in the face of the experimental results. Section 5 gives a summary and 
concludes. 
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2. Laboratory Markets and Experimental Procedures 
 
We conducted the computerized experiment in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral 
Economics at the University of Göttingen, Germany, based on the z-tree software package 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
A total of 240 subjects participated in 40 markets with six traders, each. Participants 
were student volunteers recruited for a decision-making experiment via ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004). All participants were bachelor or master students in business 
administration or international economics at the University of Göttingen and thus had 
some background in economics. 
Each subject assumed the role of a trader in an asset market. Six participants 
(henceforth traders) participated in a market lasting 15 periods. Each experiment 
session involved two or three independent markets. At no time, traders did know the 
identity of other traders in the market. A market lasted 15 periods and involved trading 
in call auctions (for buying and selling) in each period. 
The experimental sessions were conducted in two parts. In the first part, risk 
preferences were elicited using lottery choices following Holt and Laury (2002) (see 
Appendix A for more details). Trading in the call-auction market took place in the 
second part. For both parts traders were given detailed written instructions. For the first 
part, written instructions were individually provided. For the second part, instructions 
were read aloud in a briefing room and supplemented by a presentation of screenshots 
which included all screens traders encountered during the experiment. Instructions are 
provided in Appendix C. The whole process before the call-auction market started lasted 
on average about 45 minutes. During the entire session traders were not allowed to talk 
to each other. 
 
2.1 Characteristics Common to All Sessions 
 
At the beginning of each experimental market, each trader is endowed with 10 assets 
and 10,000 ECU working capital. We have chosen to provide the same endowment to all 
traders to prevent trading merely due to the desire to realign portfolios. King et al. 
(1993) found no significant effect of equal endowments on bubble formation. Each 
trader’s initial endowment in ECU is large enough to buy at least a quarter of the other 
traders’ assets in a market at initial fundamental values. Short selling is not permitted. 
The initial working capital has to be repaid at the end of the market session. Traders’ 
asset and working capital holdings are carried over from one period to the next. 
Prior to the trading stage, at the beginning of each period, traders have to state their 
expectations about the prospective market prices of the present and all subsequent 
trading periods. Thus, each trader has to state in each period 𝑡 ∈ (1, … , 15) a total of 
(16 − 𝑡) forecasts. To create an incentive for participants to care about forecast 
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precision, participants are rewarded (in ECU) for the accuracy of each forecast.6 If the 
forecasted price is within a 10 percent, 10-20 percent or 20-30 percent range, a 
respective reward of 5 ECU, 2 ECU or 1 ECU is paid. For less accurate forecasts no 
reward is paid. Over the course of the 15 market periods, for any period 𝑡 (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 15) 𝑡 
predictions are requested and thus a reward may be obtained up to 𝑡 times. In each 
period, after all traders have stated their predictions, trading commenced in a call-
auction market, where traders also could use their rewards from the forecasts for asset 
trading. 
Each of the 15 market periods on average lasted five minutes (including forecasts). In 
each period, assets with an initial lifetime of 15 periods can be traded. Each asset pays 
the same dividend to all its holders in a market. The dividend is randomly drawn after 
the trading at the end of each period. It can take a value of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU, or 
80 ECU. The fundamental value of an asset is determined by the dividend stream that it 
generates to its holder. It corresponds to the sum of all expected future dividends. 
Consequently, the fundamental value declines to zero in the course of a market. After the 
final payment of the dividend in the last period the asset becomes worthless. 
Since our research focus lies in the propensity of markets to aggregate and disseminate 
information, we incorporate state-dependency of assets, as in Camerer and Weigelt 
(1991a). Like in the SSW type markets, the dividend from holding an asset does not 
differ across traders. That means that markets have only one “type” of trader with 
regard to dividend value. However, the expected dividend depends upon the “state of 
the world”, which is randomly drawn at the beginning of a market. There are two 
equally likely states. State 1 is called the “good” and State 2 the “bad” state. The set of 
possible dividend values is equal in both states of the world but dividend values occur 
with different probabilities. We have chosen probability distributions of the dividends in 
order to focus the subjects’ attention on the two different expected values for the “good” 
and “bad” state and to determine two clearly distinguishable states of the world. Actual 
dividends originate from independent random draws out of the set {10, 20, 40, 80} of 
possible dividends. The expected dividend per period in a given state is given by the 
probability weighted sum of the possible dividends. Table 1 provides the possible per 
period dividend values and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence under each of 
the two states. It also provides the expected per period dividend 𝐸𝐷𝑆  in each state 
𝑆 ∈ (1, 2). 
  
                                                        
6 We use incentivized belief elicitation because it can be expected that participants exert more effort to 
forecast correctly and that these forecasts are more accurate than non-incentivized, as was, for example, 
found by Gächter and Renner (2010). 
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“Good” State (𝑆 = 1) 
Probability in 
“Bad” State (𝑆 = 2) 
10 0.1 0.4 
20 0.2 0.3 
40 0.3 0.2 
80 0.4 0.1 
𝐸𝐷𝑆   49 26 
 
In the “good” state the probabilities of the higher dividends are larger than in the “bad” 
state, resulting in a higher expected dividend value per period and a higher FV in each 
period. The expected dividend per period is 49 in the “good” state and 26 in the “bad'” 
state. In the first period, with no information about the state at hand the expected 
dividend is 37.5. This value changes after each period’s dividend draw according to 
Bayes' theorem, since the updated probability to be in one state or the other also 
changes according to this rule. For a given “state of the world”, the FV is given by the 
product of the expected dividend per period and the number of remaining periods the 
dividend is paid. Formally, the FV in State 𝑆 and period 𝑡 is given by (16 − 𝑡)𝐸𝐷𝑆, 
assuming no discounting. 
FVs in both states reduce after each period by the expected dividend per period. Given 
the ex-ante probabilities for the states and actual dividend draws Bayesian inference is 
possible due to the different drawing probabilities of the dividends in both states. The 
Bayesian fundamental value (BFV) in a given period is the probability-weighted mean of 
the FVs in the “good” and “bad” state in the respective period. The weights are given by 
the conditional probabilities based on Bayesian inference. The probabilities of dividends 
in both states of the world and the probabilities for both states are provided to all 
traders in the (read-aloud) experimental instructions and are thus considered as 
common knowledge. We additionally provided fundamental values for both states for 
participants to have common expectations about fundamentals (Cheung et al., 2014). 
To have control over the drawn dividends and to render markets comparable, we follow 
the approach of Sutter et al. (2012). We randomly draw sequences of 15 realizations of 
the dividend (one for every period) with the respective probabilities in the “good” state 
and “mirror” this sequence for the realizations of the dividends in the “bad” state. This is 
easily feasible due to the symmetric framework. Among the randomly drawn sequences, 
we choose one that does not “fully” reveal the underlying state in early periods. This 
sequence (for the “good” state, or mirrored, for the “bad” state) is used for all markets. 
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Table 2: Sequence of Dividend Draws and Corresponding Fundamentals in the “Good” 
and “Bad” State 
Period 
“Good” State “Bad” State Cond. Prob. 
for the State FV D AFV BFV FV D AFV BFV 
1 735 40 720 563 390 20 420 563 0.50 
2 686 80 680 557 364 10 400 493 0.60 
3 637 20 600 594 338 40 390 381 0.86 
4 588 10 580 533 312 80 350 367 0.80 
5 539 80 570 413 286 10 270 413 0.50 
6 490 80 490 444 260 10 260 306 0.80 
7 441 20 410 429 234 40 250 246 0.94 
8 392 40 390 376 208 20 210 224 0.91 
9 343 80 350 334 182 10 190 191 0.94 
10 294 10 270 292 158 80 180 158 0.98 
11 245 40 260 238 130 20 100 137 0.94 
12 196 20 220 192 104 40 80 108 0.96 
13 147 80 200 143 78 10 40 82 0.94 
14 98 40 120 97 52 20 30 53 0.98 
15 49 80 80 49 26 10 10 26 0.99 
Notes: FV = Fundamental Values, D = Dividends, AFV = Actual Fundamental Values, BFV = Bayesian 
Fundamental Values. 
 
In the experiment we have chosen the states in such a way that one half of the markets 
were in the “good” state and the other half in the “bad” state. Table 2 provides, for each 
state, the ex-ante expected FVs (if the state were known), the sequence of the actual 
dividend draws (Ds), the “ex-post” actual FVs (AFVs), and the (depending on the 
dividend draws) updated Bayesian FVs (BFVs). The last column of this table provides 
the conditional probabilities of the actually prevailing state at the beginning of the 
period.  
The columns displaying the AFVs in Table 2 show that the selected sequences of 
dividends are not too optimistic or pessimistic with respect to the total value of 
dividends in comparison to the FVs. It can be thus assumed that both sequences 
properly represent the fundamentals of both states. As further can be seen, the 
dividends at the beginning correctly suggest the underlying state, then by period 5 reset 
state probabilities to 50:50, and subsequently again correctly suggest the underlying 
state. Toward the end, dividends reveal the state with almost certainty. This 
characteristic of the dividend stream has the desirable property to introduce initial 
uncertainty regarding the real state as it is surely frequently present on real markets. 
Trading in the call market in each period lasts a maximum of 240 seconds. During the 
first 120 seconds traders have the opportunity to submit a purchase offer; in the second 
120 seconds they have the opportunity to submit a sale offer. Each trader may 
determine one buy and one sell limit order per period to buy/sell a certain number of 
assets. A buy (sell) order consists of the maximum (minimum) price which a trader 
wants to pay (is willing to accept) per asset and the maximum number of assets the 
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trader is willing to buy (sell) at that price. Traders are not obliged to submit buy and/or 
sell orders. In the case of a “zero order” no assets are bought and/or sold at any market 
price; traders just keep their stock of assets. At no point of time, traders get to know the 
offers of others. 
All bids and asks within a period are submitted simultaneously and are aggregated into 
market demand and supply. The call market features a market-clearing condition such 
that demand equals supply in each trading period. Markets are cleared at unitary prices 
for all transactions within each period so that the trading volumes are maximized.7 
Transactions only take place as long as there are dealers who want to sell at a lower or 
the same price than other dealers are willing to pay. The market price is determined by 
the average of the lowest limit buy price and the highest limit sale price for which a 
transaction takes place. No trader has to pay more for an asset than he/she offered and 
no trader has to sell for less than he/she asked. If the aggregated market price lies above 
the chosen sale price the trader is a seller and if the market price lies below the chosen 
buy price the trader is a buyer. If, depending on the submitted buy and sell orders, no 
transactions can take place, there is no market price. In this case we referred to the 
market price as zero. 
Ties on the demand and/or selling side are handled using an order precedence rule 
consisting of the price, quantity and entering time. On the buy (sell) side higher (lower) 
buy (sell) prices, higher quantities, and an earlier submission time are favored.8 Traders 
are instructed that they might not get all or part of their buy/sell order fulfilled even if 
they hand in an adequate price. 
During the choice of buy and sell offers, traders have to make sure that these are 
permissible. Firstly, they can never sell more assets than they have at the beginning of 
the period in their own portfolio. Secondly, never buy more assets as permitted by the 
available sum of asset holdings of the other traders in their group. Thirdly, never buy 
more assets at a certain price than permitted by the available trading capital. Fourthly, 
the limit sell order price must exceed the limit buy order price by at least one ECU. 
At the end of the trading state in each period all possible individual transactions are 
completed, the drawn dividend is announced, and the updated account of asset and 
trading capital holdings along with the dividend earnings for the current period are 
presented to the traders. Additionally, the results for the accuracy of price forecasts 
along with the associated earnings are given for the current period. Furthermore, 
traders are provided with a complete history of relevant information concerning their 
                                                        
7 The call market institution has the advantage that it yields for each trader a unique trading price per 
period for all buy and sell orders. Furthermore, Liu (1992) found that call markets are more efficient than 
continuous double auction markets in settings were uninformed traders are present jointly with diversely 
informed insiders (Sunder, 1995). 
8 Index = 100 ⋅ RpD,S + 10RqD,S + E, where RpD,S  is the price rank, decreasing with ascending (descending) 
buy (sell) price; RqD,S  is the quantity rank, decreasing in the buy (sell) quantity; and E is the entering order 
number. Lower rank numbers are favored and a lower index corresponds to a preferred offer. 
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portfolio (asset and cash holdings etc.) during both phases of the trading stage in each 
period. 
The payout relevant profit (in ECU) to a subject is determined by the available trading 
capital at the end of the 15th period minus the initial working capital. It can be 
alternatively calculated as the sum of the period profits: 
Period profit = Number of assets at end of the period × dividend per asset  
+ Proceeds from sold assets 
(1) – Expenses for purchased assets 
+ Remuneration of market-price forecast(s) 
  
Following the method of induced value theory, we expect traders to exhibit a positive 
utility for money, i.e., to maximize their earnings. Demand for (Supply of) assets is hence 
induced by a preference for (higher) earnings (Smith, 1976). 
All trading in the experiment was in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Earnings were converted into Euros at the end of the market, at a known rate of 
0.003 €/ECU. Additionally, each trader was paid a show-up fee of 3 €. A session lasted 




We conducted our experiment by using a 2 × 2 design. Firstly, the information structure 
of markets differed across sessions, i.e., the structure of informed and uninformed 
traders with respect to the true state of nature differed across markets. In the so called 
Nin(B)10 sessions no participant was given a clue about the true state of nature and it 
was announced that no trader received information about the state. In the so called 
Tin(B) sessions two participants in a market are provided on the computer screen with 
information about the underlying “state of the world” at the beginning of the market. In 
these sessions it was publicly announced (common knowledge) that there will be two 
randomly chosen informed traders in each market and that their identity will remain 
secret to all other participants. The information given to the informed participants was 
identical and perfect in the sense that it would reveal the state of nature with certainty 
(this was also common knowledge). By virtue of the design of the markets, insiders and 
outsiders were the same traders throughout the entire markets. Secondly, we 
distinguish between sessions where participants were or were not provided with 
updated conditional probabilities for both states and the corresponding BFVs. The B 
after Nin and Tin indicates that in these markets all traders were provided with updated 
BFVs in each period. 
                                                        
9 Despite of the compulsory repayment of the initial working capital, no participant actually faced a loss 
(earnings of zero). The minimum payout earned in the markets is 7.36 € (1453.5 ECU + 3 € show-up fee). 
10 When markets with or without insider information are considered together, regardless of the provision 
of BFVs, we refer to them simply as Tin(B) and Nin(B) markets. 
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Thirdly, we conducted a control treatment in that we used the same set of possible 
dividends {10, 20, 40, 80}, which were, however, equally likely to occur (25 percent). 
There was no uncertainty about the state, such that traders were in a sense all 
“insiders”. Table 3 displays a summary of the design parameters of each of our 40 asset 
markets. Specifically, it gives an overview over the underlying state, the provision of 
BFVs, and the presence of insiders in each market. 
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3. Informational Models and Hypotheses 
3.1 Informational Models 
 
Following the studies of, for example, Camerer and Weigelt (1991a) and Plott and 
Sunder (1982; 1988), we test two different models: the prior information equilibrium 
(PI) model and the fully revealing rational-expectations equilibrium (RE) model. Both 
models assume traders to be risk-neutral and give different forecasts about trading 
behavior of differently informed traders. These models can be formalized quantitatively 
and tested against each other. 
The PI-model states that traders use their prior dividend information to build 
expectations about the state but do not learn from price signals. They ignore the 
informational content of market prices (reflecting the aggregated information held by 
others) and speculation possibilities based on the actions of other traders (Palan, 2009). 
Traders only use Bayes' rule to update their expectations about the true state. 
The RE-model additionally states that in equilibrium all traders behave as if they are 
aware of the entire information of all traders in the market. Thus even uninformed 
traders have the ability to supplement their prior (“private”) information with private 
information of others via price signals from the market that entail (perfect) information 
of insiders.11 They are aware of the relationship between the market price, the 
underlying state, and their gains from trade and utilize the market price and their 
“private” information in their demand decision (Tirole, 1982). 
In our experiment we chose dividends, prior probabilities of dividends, and states in a 
manner that fundamentals and hence predictions of the PI- and RE-models clearly differ 
in both states. Table 4 shows the expected FVs per asset with respect to information, 
state, and informational model. Independent of the state, when there is no inside 
information in the market, the PI- and the RE-models both predict no trade, when 
traders have identical risk preferences. According to both models, all traders have the 
same expectations about the FVs, which equal the BFVs. There are no evident gains from 
and thus no incentives to trade. Traders with different risk preferences, however, will 
trade since the more risk-loving traders would attribute a higher value per asset than 
the more risk-averse traders, leading to an asset flow from the latter to the former. 
  
                                                        
11 The RE-model has a close connection to the efficient markets hypothesis. Bid/ask prices reflect diverse 
private information and thus induce trading actions identical to those if all traders had all market 
information (Harrison and Kreps, 1978). 
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Table 4: Expected FVs under PI and RE by Information and State 
 No Information Inside Information 
 “Good” “Bad” “Good” “Bad” 
Period PI = RE PI = RE PI RE PI RE 







































































































































Notes: Figures show for the case of insider information the known FVs for informed and expected FVs for 
[uninformed] traders. The bold figures identify the convergence period as defined in Subsection 4.1. 
 
When insider information is present, both, the PI- and the RE-model, predict different 
expectations about fundamentals of in- and outsiders. For the RE-model this is only true 
for the first period. In addition to the differences in expectations, the occurrence of trade 
requires that outsiders do not behave rationally. Rational outsiders would not trade 
since they know that trading with insiders is only to their detriment. If trade occurs, the 
market price will approximately average the expected FVs under the assumption that in- 
and outsiders are strict payoff maximizers and place bid prices marginally below and 
ask prices marginally above their expected FVs. 
Since in the first period the resulting market price is higher (lower) than the BFV of 563 
in the “good” (“bad”) state, outsiders update their prior information with this price 
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signal and are able to infer the correct state under the RE-model assumptions. Informed 
traders can thus take advantage of their superior position in the first period only. Under 
the PI-model, with traders that do not behave in a fully rational way, trade may virtually 
take place throughout all periods, assuming availability of assets on the supply side and 
sufficient trading capital on the demand side. Since market participants ignore the 
informational content of market prices, expectations about fundamentals only converge 
slowly to the true value, which leads to a more persistent superior position of insiders. 
According to both models, trading will result in asset allocations where insiders hold 
more (less) assets in the “good” (“bad”) state than outsiders, as long as traders have 
identical risk preferences and behave not fully rational. Heterogeneous risk preferences 





To facilitate the illustration of the results in the following section our analysis focuses 
around six hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Trading prices converge toward the actual FV under all treatment 
conditions but the convergence is faster in markets with insider information and markets 
where traders are provided with BFVs. 
In our markets, convergence toward fundamentals depends substantially on the 
accuracy of the probability assessment. This is a complex task, especially in an 
experimental situation, where time is limited. Markets aggregate information. However, 
it will take time for prices to track the FV.12 Following Romer (1993), the dissemination 
of privately held information and/or expectations is likely to cause lagged price 
movements. Proponents of the “efficiency camp” of insider trading argue that 
convergence of market prices toward fundamentals is faster when inside information is 
present (Engelen and Liedekerke, 2007; Manne, 1984; McGee, 2008). Sutter et al. (2012) 
and Dufwenberg et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that markets where some 
traders have an informational/experiential edge above others show a significantly 
better performance in terms of market efficiency. Since people are unlikely to carry out 
Bayesian inference by themselves (Camerer, 1999; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Rabin 
and Schrag, 1999), we expect markets where traders are provided with BFVs to 
converge faster toward fundamentals than markets that are not. 
Hypothesis 2: Bubbles occur but the introduction of asymmetrically informed traders or 
the provision with BFVs significantly reduces the occurrence and extent of bubbles. 
                                                        
12 Forsythe et al. (1984) argue that “investors bring only their private information to the market and only 
after traders have observed prices will they learn the information necessary to achieve the [fully revealing 
rational-expectations equilibrium].” (p. 973) 
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A vast literature shows that the bubble-and-crash phenomenon is strikingly robust in 
SSW markets (see footnote 4). Since the introduction of insider information is expected 
to enhance market performance in terms of the duration of equilibrium adjustment of 
market prices, we expect markets with asymmetrically informed traders to be less prone 
to bubble formation than markets with symmetrically informed traders, a result also 
observed by Sutter et al. (2012) and Dufwenberg et al. (2005). Similarly, given that 
markets that are provided with BFVs are expected to converge faster toward 
fundamentals than markets that are not, we also expect them to exhibit smaller bubbles. 
Hypothesis 3: In early periods, trading behavior of uninformed traders differs from that 
of informed traders but converges along with the market price toward that of informed 
traders. Uninformed traders learn to grasp the correct state and to trade accordingly. 
Informed traders condition their trading behavior on private information and 
uninformed traders adapt their trading behavior based on the belief that informed 
traders only trade if it is advantageous for them to do so, thereby revealing gradually the 
underlying state. In a fully revealing RE all private information held by informed traders 
is (sooner or later) revealed via the market price (King, 1991). To the same extent as 
information is revealed, we expect that an adaptation of the trading behavior of in- and 
outsiders takes place. 
Hypothesis 4: In the “good” state, we expect insiders to hold more assets than outsiders, 
and in the “bad” state, outsiders to hold more assets than insiders. 
Given the different information structures of in- and outsiders, we expect the two types 
to show a significantly different buying and selling behavior. In Table 4 above we 
calculate the FV expectations of in- and outsiders. Based on these calculations we derive 
that insiders buy/hold more assets in the “good” state and outsiders in the “bad” state, 
under both the PI- and RE-assumption. The predicted asymmetric asset distribution 
should at least hold true in earlier periods, since we expect outsiders to learn in the 
course of the market. 
Hypothesis 5: Informed traders have a trading advantage and earn superior profits. 
Given that, especially in the beginning of the markets, insiders are able to buy and sell 
their assets for advantageous prices, they should benefit from their superior 
informational position. 
Hypothesis 6: Elicited price expectations and actual market prices are highly correlated. 
Thereby, we expect predictive power to be greater in markets with inside information and 
in markets where traders are provided with BFVs. 
There is a certain circularity in the market-price development process since current 
prices depend on expectations about future prices; but both are simultaneously 
influenced by current price levels and trends (Ball and Holt, 1998). Self-fulfilling price 
expectations can render observed market prices independent of the asset's 
fundamentals, leading to bubbles, in which even rational traders get involved in the 
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expectation of even “greater fools”.13 Expectations should therefore provide crucial 
information about the market price development.  
                                                        
13 Such bubbles are referred to as “rational growing bubbles” (Camerer, 1989) or simply “rational 
bubbles” (Diba and Grossman, 1988b). They “reflect a self-confirming belief that the stock price depends on 
a variable (or a combination of variables) that is intrinsically irrelevant” (Diba and Grossman, 1988a, p. 
520). Porter and Smith (1995), however, find that “subjects report a tendency to think that if the market 
turns [when the bubble bursts] they will be able to sell ahead of the others, but then are “amazed” at the 
speed with which the crash occurs.” (p. 513) 
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4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Equilibrium Adjustment of Market Prices 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the main findings of our experiment by showing the course of the 
average equilibrium market prices in our four treatments. Each curve in the four graphs 
represents four markets under equal conditions with respect to state, insider 
information, and the provision of BFVs. All four graphs show the tendency of 
convergence toward the correct state. Most intriguing, the ubiquitous tendency of 
earlier laboratory asset markets with well-defined declining fundamental value and 
inexperienced traders to exhibit a well-known bubble-and-crash pattern is not observed 
in this aggregated examination, independent of the provided information structure. 
Strikingly, trade in both states starts, regardless of the presence of insiders and/or the 
provision of BFVs, on aggregate closer to fundamentals in the “bad” state, indicating risk 
aversion for the average trader.14 Indeed, we find slight risk aversion for the average 
trader in our risk pretests and in the personal assessment of one’s own attitude toward 
risk in the ex-post questionnaire (see Appendix A, Table A. 1 to Table A. 4). Given that 
average risk attitudes are very similar in all markets, we cannot find a significantly 
negative Spearman correlation between the average risk-aversion measure in a market 
and the 1st period market price.15 However, when counting the number of risk-averse 
(not risk-neutral, or risk-loving) traders per market, we find a slightly significant 
Spearman correlation for Risk-Test 1 following Holt and Laury (2002) (𝜌 = -.3049, 
p = .0897, N = 32). Despite the substantial initial deviations from fundamentals 
(especially in the “good” state), we observe a clear tendency of convergence of aggregate 
market prices toward fundamentals of the actually underlying state around the fifth 
period. Intuitively, convergence starts in either state somewhere between the two 
fundamentals. This implies that we observe convergence from below in the “good” state 
and convergence from above in the “bad” state. In the following we explore Hypothesis 
1. 
While markets on aggregate show a clear convergence pattern, individual markets show 
substantial diversity. Some markets perform much better than others in terms of 
convergence toward the FV of the underlying state. Ten out of 32 markets even never 
converge to it.16 We consider market prices as “converged” if they approach the 
respective FV as close as ±20% and stay in this range until the end of the market or no 
more trading takes place. For the very last periods, our definition of convergence 
requires at least two consecutive periods without trading, when market prices 
                                                        
14 Since dividend draws can be considered as lotteries, trading prices below (above) fundamentals 
indicate risk aversion (loving) of the average market participant. Hence, the ratio of the realized price and 
the fundamental value can serve as a proxy for average risk attitude in a market (Chen et al., 2004). 
15 The algebraic signs point in the intuitive direction that higher risk aversion in a market leads to a lower 
starting price. Only for “Risk-Test 2b” the sign is counterintuitive. 
16 Markets 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 21, 26, 28, 30, 32 never converged toward the FV of the actual underlying state 
using the applied convergence measure. 
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previously have deviated out of the range.17 Figure 2 shows the course of individual 
market prices for all markets in the four treatments. As seen, market prices initially 
fluctuate more erratically but converge in most cases, sooner or later, toward the 
genuine state. Table 5 presents the average convergence period by treatment and the 
individual market convergence periods for the markets that have converged. 
To test for general convergence, we count for each treatment the number of markets 
that have converged. Applying one-sided binomial tests to the number of converged 
versus the number of non-converged markets, we find a significant tendency of 
convergence only for Nin, where seven out of eight markets converge (p = .0039). The 
hypothesis of general convergence is neither confirmed for NinB nor for Tin or TinB 
markets, when analyzed separately. 
When pooling the Nin and NinB markets, we observe 13 of 16 markets to converge, 
which yields statistical significance for general convergence (p = .0106, one-sided 
binomial test). Pooling Tin and TinB markets, we observe only 9 out of 16 markets to 
converge, implying no statistical significance. This indicates that the presence of insiders 
does not enhance but rather defer market convergence. On the other hand, confidence 
intervals for the absolute deviations from fundamentals are for the majority of periods 
narrower for Tin(B) than for Nin(B) markets. Although not statistically significant, this 
suggests that the lack of convergence in Tin(B) markets is driven by the small number of 
independent markets. 
Result 1: Using our simple counting measure, we only observe a general convergence 
toward fundamentals in Nin(B) markets. Our test for general convergence indicates that 
the presence of insiders defers convergence. This result, however, might be an artifact 
produced by the relatively small sample size. The provision of 𝐵𝐹𝑉𝑠 has no effect on 
convergence. 
  
                                                        
17 This “rule” has been relaxed/adjusted in some markets, where the measure in the last five periods 
trespassed the range in only one period, but was adhered to before, so that the assumption of convergence 
seems prudent. This “correction” has the aim to obtain a more “organic” and adequate measure of 
convergence. When no trading occurs, no pair of traders is willing to trade away from fundamentals, 
indicating that all traders are aware of the actual FV and that it is common knowledge (as defined by 
Aumann (1976)). There is no opportunity to “fool” another trader. 




Figure 1: Average Market Prices 
 
The trajectory of average market prices exhibits clear differences in comparison to most 
earlier experiments that use the SSW framework. Even in Nin markets the price course 
resembles that of markets with experienced traders or markets with a composition of 
traders with mixed information or experience levels (see, for example, Dufwenberg et al. 
(2005), Haruvy et al. (2007), Hussam et al. (2008), and Sutter et al. (2012)). 
Additionally, convergence, as we have defined it, occurs on average later than predicted 
by the PI- and RE-models,18 except for NinB+ and Tin-. We thus conclude that neither the 
PI- nor the RE-model provide indeed good approximations of asset markets in our 
symmetric and asymmetric information settings. This finding stands in contrast to the 
previously mentioned literature on markets involving one-period assets and asymmetric 
information. 
  
                                                        
18 Both, the PI- and RE-models, predict convergence to occur (as we define it) in the sixth period in both 
states, when no insiders are present. The PI-model predicts convergence in the first and in the sixth period 
and the RE-model predicts convergence in the first and in the second period, in the “good” and “bad” state, 
respectively, when insiders are present. 




Figure 2: Individual Market Prices 
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Table 5: Periods of Convergence 
State 
Label 






NinB+ 5.3 3, 2, 2, 14 1, 3, 5, 7 
NinB- 10.0 10, --, --, 10 2, 4, 6, 8 
TinB+ 11.0 --, 14, 8,-- 9, 11, 13, 15 
TinB- 6.0 --, 6, 9, 3 10, 12, 14, 16 
Nin+ 13.3 11, 15, --, 14 17, 19, 21, 23 
Nin- 9.5 9, 6, 14, 9 18, 20, 22, 24 
Tin+ 7.3 11, 3, 13, 2 25, 27, 29, 31 
Tin- -- --, --, --, -- 26, 28, 30, 32 
Notes: Markets that did not converge are denoted by “--“. Averages are computed using converged 
markets only. 
 
4.2 Over- and Undervaluation of Market Prices 
 
This chapter focuses on Hypothesis 2. As mentioned earlier, bubbles didn’t occur in 
aggregated form. However, some markets exhibited patterns that, though smaller than 
in many previous experiments, could be considered as price bubbles. To gauge the 
severity of market-price deviations from fundamentals, i.e., differences in market 
performance, we employ two deviation measures,19 both developed by Stöckl et al. 
(2010). 
The applied average bias measure for a market calculates the relative deviation (RD) as 
the average difference between the market price (𝑃𝑡) and the fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡) 
normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). It measures the average relative 
distance between the market price and the fundamental value. A value of ±0.1 indicates 












   
The applied average dispersion measure for a market calculates the relative absolute 
deviation (RAD) as the average absolute difference between the market price (𝑃𝑡) and 
the fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡) normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). It 
measures the average absolute distance between the period market price and the 
fundamental value. A value of 0.1 indicates that the assets price differs on average by 
10% from the average fundamental value. 
                                                        
19 Given the high correlation of these deviation measures with other calculated “bubble” measures, we 
restrain our analysis with the focus on these potentially most reliable measures, RD and RAD. These 
measures are robust to variations in the number of market periods, the determination of the FV and 
dividend distribution/variation. 













   
Both measures are used to get a first impression of differences in price deviations from 
fundamentals between treatments. We conduct two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests with 
the null hypothesis of no difference for both deviation measures. Table 6 displays the 
results. RDs are not significantly different when compared by treatment, due to the fact 
that negative deviations in the “good” and positive deviations in the “bad” state cancel 
each other out. The comparison of RADs shows that the provision of BFVs is only 
conducive to market performance when no insiders are present. The presence of 
insiders enhances performance compared to the situation without insiders, however, 
only when no BFVs are given. The performance of markets where insiders are present 
and BFVs are given together is indistinguishable to markets where only one of these 
features is at work.20 21 
To check the robustness of the results above and for a deeper understanding of potential 
factors that influence price formation and thus over- or undervaluation of equilibrium 
markets prices, we conduct panel-regressions with markets as cross sections 
(𝑚 = 1, . . . , 32). The dependent variable is derived from the above mentioned RD 






   
where 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡  measures the difference between the market price of period 𝑡 (𝑃𝑡) and the 
respective fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡), normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
(Stöckl et al., 2010). The index 𝑚 denotes the market. 
                                                        





, which was 
introduced by King et al. (1993) and van Boening et al. (1993). ND sums up the deviations of the market 
prices from the FVs and normalizes this sum by the total number of assets outstanding in a market. Given 
that this measure yields qualitatively the same results as RAD, we refrain from a detailed presentation of 
the figures for this measure. 
21 Given the structure of our markets, it could be interesting to replace FV by BFV in both deviation 
measures. Since the results remain qualitatively very similar, we refrain from the presentation of these 
results. 
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Table 6: Relative and Absolute Deviation Measures from Fundamentals 
Comparison by Nin NinB p-value Tin TinB p-value 
Bayesa 
RD 0.058 0.074 .8336 0.015 0.018 .9164 
RAD 0.291 0.195 .0357 0.176 0.200 .5286 
        Nin Tin p-value NinB TinB p-value 
Insidera 
RD 0.058 0.015 .8747 0.074 0.018 .5286 
RAD 0.291 0.176 .0033 0.195 0.200 .7527 
 
Comparison by Nin+ Nin- p-value NinB+ NinB- p-value 
Stateb 
RD -0.202 0.319 .0209 -0.095 0.243 .0209 
RAD 0.242 0.339 .0209 0.124 0.265 .0433 
        Tin+ Tin- p-value TinB+ TinB- p-value 
Stateb 
RD -0.097 0.128 .0209 -0.113 0.148 .0433 
RAD 0.149 0.203 .1489 0.185 0.214 .7728 
        Nin+ NinB+ p-value Nin- NinB- p-value 
Bayesb 
RD -0.202 -0.095 .0833 0.319 0.243 .2482 
RAD 0.242 0.124 .0209 0.339 0.265 .2482 
        Tin+ TinB+ p-value Tin- TinB- p-value 
Bayesb 
RD -0.097 -0.113 .7728 0.128 0.148 .5637 
RAD 0.149 0.185 .3865 0.203 0.214 .7728 
        Nin+ Tin+ p-value Nin- Tin- p-value 
Insiderb 
RD -0.202 -0.097 .0591 0.319 0.128 .0209 
RAD 0.242 0.149 .0209 0.339 0.203 .0209 
        NinB+ TinB+ p-value NinB- TinB- p-value 
Insiderb 
RD -0.095 -0.113 .7728 0.243 0.148 .3865 
RAD 0.124 0.185 .2482 0.265 0.214 .3865 
Notes: Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided: a N = 16 (8/8), b N = 8 (4/4). 
 
We control for treatment effects by using dummy variables for different treatment 
features (considering Nin+ as the control group) and their interactions. In particular, we 
control for the “state of the world” (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, which is equal to one in the “bad” state and 
zero otherwise), for the provision of BFVs (𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠, which is one when BFVs are given 
and zero otherwise), and for the presence of insiders (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠, which is equal to one, 
when insiders are present, and zero otherwise). Additionally, we control for 
autocorrelation by inclusion of the dependent variable with a lag of one period (L. RD), 
for a time trend within markets by inclusion of a period variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), and for the 
trading volume (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒). Furthermore we included the drawn dividend in the prior 
period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑) and the number of risk-averse traders within a market 
(# 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) as explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 7. 
Since both regression models shown in Table 7 display qualitatively the same results, we 
focus our analysis on Model 2. The model shows that price deviations are strongly path-
dependent; a price deviation in the previous round (𝐿.  𝑅𝐷) has a significantly positive 
effect on the current price deviation. Price deviations decrease over time as participants 
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gain trading experience. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly negative effect on price deviation. 
The last dividend (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑) has a significantly positive (euphoriant price boosting) 
effect, the higher the dividend in the previous period the larger the price deviation in the 
current period. Trading activity as measured by 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 has no significant effect, just as 
the number of risk-averse traders within a market (# 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒).  
Turning to the effects of treatment features, we see that “bad”-state markets exhibit 
significantly larger price deviations than “good”-state markets, a non-surprising finding, 
consistent with the prior nonparametric analysis. The provision of BFVs has no effect in 
both states, when the utilized control variables are considered. This contradicts the 
nonparametric result. We do not expect that this lack of difference is caused by the fact 
that traders were actually able to calculate BFVs in the setting where they were not 
provided. But traders seem to be intuitively able to anticipate approximated BFVs. The 
presence of insiders is only significant, i.e., exerting a negative (price deviation 
decreasing) effect in “bad”-state markets,22 a finding that requires further analysis for a 
proper understanding. 
We are able to calculate the treatment effects (coefficients), given that treatments are 
comprised of combinations of several features. These coefficients are presented in Table 
8 in descending order in terms of the coefficient size. The calculated coefficients are 
equal to the ones that result out of a regression with treatments as dummy variables and 
Nin+ as baseline. 
Using these coefficients, we are able to disentangle differences between treatments by 
conducting meaningful comparisons which consist of three comparisons for each 
treatment: (1) a comparison with the counterpart in the “bad”/”good” state, (2) a 
comparison with the counterpart where BFVs are/are not provided, and (3) a 
comparison with the counterpart where insiders are/are not present, respectively. We 
conduct Wald tests to test for the equality of estimated coefficients for these 
comparisons. The results can be retraced via Table 9, where all possible comparisons 
are shown and significant differences are highlighted as bold figures. 
Our finding that “bad” state markets exhibit significantly larger price deviations than 
“good”-state markets is confirmed with the exception of Tin markets, where deviations 
in the “bad” state are larger, however, statistically insignificant. The result that the 
provision of BFVs has no effect is unambiguously confirmed. Moreover, as already seen, 
the presence of insiders significantly reduces price deviations in “bad”-state markets, 
leading to an improved market performance. 
  
                                                        
22 This outcome is, as explained later, driven by the fact that Nin+ and Tin+ markets are not statistically 
different. In the comparison of NinB+ and TinB+ markets the presence of insiders is beneficial. 
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Table 7: Regressions for RDs of Market Prices from Fundamentals 
Dependent Variable: 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Constant (Nin+) 6.30 -3.53 
 (5.01) (10.12) 
𝐿. 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Period -1.15*** -1.20*** 
 (0.41) (0.57) 
Volume 0.13 0.10 
 (0.27) (0.26) 
State (Nin-) 22.30*** 25.38*** 
 (7.03) (8.22) 
Bayes (NinB+) -4.75 -2.68 
 (4.08) (4.87) 
Insiders (Tin+) 4.43 4.66 
 (4.87) (5.10) 
State×Bayes 6.56 3.12 
 (6.54) (9.12) 
State×Insiders -16.39** -17.29* 
 (7.93) (10.09) 
Bayes×Insiders 8.63 6.42 
 (6.53) (7.60) 
State×Bayes×Insiders -8.06 -3.05 
 (9.41) (12.98) 
L. Dividend  0.12*** 
  (0.04) 
# Risk Averse  0.92 
  (1.68) 
   
R² .7478 .7534 
N 247 247 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regressions with heteroscedastic panels corrected standard errors and 
panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz, 1995). 32 markets as cross sections with a 
maximum of 15 observations over time (unbalanced). Only periods where trade took place are 
considered. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Treatment Effects on RDs of Market Prices from FVs in Model 2 
Treatment Effect of… Coefficient p-value 
NinB- S+B+SB 25.82 .000 
Nin- S 25.38 .002 
TinB- S+B+I+SB+SI+BI+SBI 16.56 .000 
Tin- S+I+SI 12.75 .004 
TinB+ B+I+BI 8.40 .062 
Tin+ I 4.66 .361 
Nin+ --- -3.53 .727 
NinB+ B -2.68 .582 
Notes: S = State (“Bad”), B = BFVs (provided), I = Insiders (present). 
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Table 9: Wald Tests for Differences of Treatment Coefficients in Model 2 
 NinB+ NinB- TinB+ TinB- Nin+ Nin- Tin+ Tin- 
NinB+ --- .000 .018 .000 .582 .000 .103 .002 
NinB-  --- .001 .032 .000 .942 .000 .003 
TinB+   --- .077 .062 .027 .469 .364 
TinB-    --- .000 .175 .016 .379 
Nin+     --- .002 .361 .004 
Nin-      --- .005 .087 
Tin+       --- .134 
Tin-        --- 
Notes: p-values of Wald tests for the simple linear hypothesis of equality of estimated parameters are 
shown. Nin+ is the reference category. Bold figures show significant differences at the 10 % level. 
 
Furthermore, the presence of insiders leads to an increase of the deviation measure in 
the “good” state, which, given that “good”-state markets tend to trade below 
fundamentals, leads to an improvement in market performance, i.e., deviations from FVs 
are smaller in absolute terms, when insiders are present; however, the difference 
between Nin+ and Tin+ is not significant. Thus, these findings confirm and broaden the 
prior findings of the nonparametric analysis.23 
Result 2: Bubbles occur but are infrequent. The nonparametric analysis indicates that the 
introduction of insiders reduces bubbles, measured by RD and RAD, however, only when 
BFVs are not provided. The provision with BFVs significantly reduces deviations, however, 
only when no insiders are present. The performance of markets where insiders are present 
and BFVs are given together is not distinguishable from markets where only one of these 
ingredients is at work. The panel analysis refines and demerges the previous results and 
indicates that the introduction of insiders improves market performance (measured by 
𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡) and that the provision of BFVs has no effect on market performance. 
For the sake of completeness, Figure 3 presents the course of the average trading 
volumes conditioned on information and the provision of BFVs. Each curve represents 
the average over four markets, in the “good” or “bad” state, respectively. The trading 
volume shows a tendency to decline on average with market duration. Trading volumes 
do not to differ significantly between different treatment conditions. 
  
                                                        
23 The replacement of FV by BFV in the RD measure of the regressions yields qualitatively very similar 
results, we thus refrain from the presentation. 




Figure 3: Average Trading Volume 
  
II INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES IN LABORATORY ASSET MARKETS WITH STATE-DEPENDENT FUNDAMENTALS 
36 
 
4.3 Comparison of Insider and Outsider Behavior 
 
Following the investigation of overall trading patterns, we now turn to the analysis of 
the trading behavior of in-and outsiders and explore Hypotheses 3 to 5. Figure 4 shows 
the course of average limit buy and sell order prices in the Tin and TinB markets.24 As 
can be seen, in- and outsider limit bids and limit asks differ but not substantially. Limit 
buy and sell order prices only differ clearly in the first period(s) of the Tin+ and TinB- 
markets. In these cases both prices are lower for insiders in the TinB- markets (in the 
case of limit sell order prices “irrationally” low) and higher in the Tin+ markets, 
respectively. Furthermore, the following general patterns are visible. Firstly, both trader 
types, on average, want to pay less when buying and ask higher prices when selling 
assets compared to the actual FV in the TinB+ and Tin+ markets. Secondly, both trader 
types, on average, want to pay approximately the FV to buy assets but ask more than the 
actual FV to sell assets in the TinB- and Tin- markets. 
Result 3: Trading behavior of uninformed traders at the beginning differs from that of 
informed traders but converges with the market price during the market toward that of 
informed traders. Uninformed traders are able to grasp the correct state and to trade 
accordingly to it. 
We continue our analysis with nonparametric statistical tests on first-period bid and ask 
behavior of in- and outsiders, measured by the limit buy/sell order prices and 
quantities. First-period behavior of outsiders does not differ between the two states 
(using two-sided U tests), whether BFVs are provided or not. In other words, the starting 
positions of outsider bid and ask prices and quantities are the same in the “good” and 
“bad” state. First-period behavior of insiders, on the contrary, differs significantly 
between the two states, with higher bid/ask prices in the “good” state, and also larger 
bid/ask quantities, when BFVs are not provided (see Table A. 5 in Appendix A). 
Comparing first-period behavior between in- and outsiders, we find outsider limit 
buy/sell order prices to be higher in TinB- markets and insider limit buy order prices 
and sale quantities to be higher in the Tin+ markets (using two-sided U tests). The 
differences in buy/sell order prices and quantities in TinB+ and Tin- markets are 
insignificant (see also Table A. 5 in Appendix A). 
To identify overall differences in the buying and selling behavior of in-and outsiders, we 
conduct panel-regressions with traders as cross sections (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 192). The dependent 
variable used is again derived from the RD measure (Stöckl et al., 2010), denoted in 








   
                                                        
24 Figures A. 1 and A. 2 in Appendix A additionally exhibit the average limit buy and sell prices of the 
Nin(B) and Tin(B) markets, whereby for the latter prices are averaged over both in- and outsiders. 




𝐷,𝑆 measures the difference between the individual limit buy/sell order prices 
of period 𝑡 (𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐷,𝑆) and the respective fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡), normalized by the average 
fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
We control for trader type effects by using dummy variables for the trader types under 
all treatment conditions (resulting in 𝑁𝑖𝑛 +  𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 as the reference type). 
Additionally, we control for autocorrelation by inclusion of the dependent variable with 
a lag of one period (𝐿.  𝑅𝐷), for a time trend within markets by inclusion of a period 
variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), for the bid/ask quantity (𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦), for the amount of assets 
held in the portfolio (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠), and for the trading activity in the previous period 
(𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠). Furthermore, we include the drawn dividend of the 
prior period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑), a variable that measures the individually perceived 
understanding of the market (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, elicited in the ex-post 
questionnaire, ranging from 0 to 10), a variable that measures individual risk aversion 
(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) (elicited following the approach of Holt and Laury (2002), ranging from 
-3 to 5), and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 (with women as reference category) as explanatory variables. The 
results are shown in Table 10. Given the similar results for each of both dependent 
variables, we focus our analysis respectively on the augmented Models 4 and 6. 
The regression results for Model 4 show that bid price deviations (measured by 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷) 
are path-dependent; 𝐿. 𝑅𝐷 has a significantly positive effect. Traders bid relatively more 
eagerly in later periods; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly positive effect on bid prices. Traders 
are cautious when buying, the higher the bid quantity, the lower the bidding price; 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐷) has a significantly negative effect. Current asset holdings (in the 
portfolio) and the quantity of sold assets in the prior period do not have an influence; 
Asset Holdings and 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 are insignificant. Previous buying success, however, 
reduces bid prices; 𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 has a significantly negative effect. The dividend 
drawn in the previous period has a slight price boosting effect, the higher the dividend in 
the previous period the larger the bid price in the current period; 𝐿. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 is 
significantly positive. Individual 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 have 
significantly negative effects on bid prices. Male traders bid higher prices compared to 
women; 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is significantly positive. 
Comparing the bid prices of in- and outsiders, we see that on average insiders bid higher 
prices in the Tin+ and TinB+ markets and lower prices in the Tin- and TinB- markets. All 
differences are significant, except for TinB- (see Table 11). 
  




Figure 4: Insider and Outsider Limit Buy Order and Limit Sell Order Prices 
 
The regression results for Model 6 show that ask prices (measured by 𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑝𝑆) are 
strongly path-dependent (more path-dependent than bid prices); 𝐿.  𝑅𝐷 has a 
significantly positive effect. Traders are satisfied with lower ask prices in later periods; 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly negative effect. Traders seem not to be as cautious with regard 
to their portfolio when selling; 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑆 ) and current 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 do not 
to have a significant effect. On the other hand, previous buying success reduces ask 
prices, 𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is significantly negative, and previous sale success increases 
ask prices, 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is significantly positive. The dividend drawn in the previous 
period again has a slight price boosting effect on the ask price in the current period; 
𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 is significantly positive. Individual 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 
and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 have no significant effects on ask prices. 
Looking at the comparison of ask prices between in- and outsiders we see that on 
average insiders ask higher prices in the Tin+, TinB+, and TinB- markets and lower 
prices in the Tin- markets. However, the differences are only significant for Tin+ and 
Tin- markets (see Table 11). 
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Constant (Nin+ Outsider) -18.53*** -5.78 7.47** 23.40*** 
 (6.23) (10.14) (3.06) (7.64) 
L. 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷,𝑆
 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Period 0.65* 0.62* -0.72*** -0.72*** 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.24) (0.24) 
Order Quantity (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑆 ) -0.63*** -0.73*** -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.22) 
Asset Holdings -0.14 -0.25 -0.12 0.01 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20) 
L. Bought Assets -2.17*** -2.17*** -1.20*** -1.08*** 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) 
L. Sold Assets -0.13 -0.18 2.36*** 2.55*** 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Nin- Outsider 41.83*** 43.75*** 25.94*** 26.12*** 
 (7.08) (7.18) (4.52) (4.31) 
NinB+ Outsider 9.68** 10.12** -0.17 0.09 
 (3.90) (4.05) (2.76) (3.09) 
NinB- Outsider 37.68*** 38.47*** 25.18*** 24.84*** 
 (6.84) (6.94) (4.42) (4.55) 
Tin+ Insider 4.63 10.77** 1.61 5.04 
 (4.59) (5.13) (2.77) (3.21) 
Tin+ Outsider 3.29 1.14 -0.49 -3.38 
 (3.91) (4.13) (2.93) (3.21) 
Tin- Insider 14.36*** 13.15*** 5.77 0.82 
 (4.68) (4.89) (4.39) (4.82) 
Tin- Outsider 20.65*** 21.88*** 9.63*** 9.25*** 
 (5.06) (5.40) (3.42) (3.59) 
TinB+ Insider 9.31* 10.35** 1.46 0.66 
 (4.91) (5.13) (2.82) (3.06) 
TinB+ Outsider 0.53 -2.92 0.33 -1.83 
 (4.04) (4.83) (2.85) (2.86) 
TinB- Insider 24.66*** 22.87*** 17.44*** 15.62*** 
 (7.95) (8.16) (4.48) (4.81) 
TinB- Outsider 26.44*** 25.60*** 10.91** 9.62* 
 (5.79) (5.80) (5.31) (5.40) 
L. Dividend  0.05*  0.07** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Market Understanding  -2.98**  -3.69 
  (1.29)  (1.13) 
Risk Aversion  -1.57***  -0.34 
  (0.51)  (0.53) 
Gender (Male)  8.16***  0.05 
  (2.45)  (1.99) 
     
R² .3961 .4131 .6099 .6170 
N 1597 1597 1742 1742 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regressions with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and 
panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz, 1995). 192 traders as cross sections with a 
maximum of 15 observations over time (unbalanced). ). Only cases where buy/sell offers were made 
are considered. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Wald Tests for Differences of Treatment Coefficients in Models 4 & 6 







Tin+ .0291 (>) .0280 (>) 
   
Tin- .0459 (<) .0704 (<) 
   
TinB+ .0080 (>) .4158 
   
TinB- .7135 .3083 
Notes: p-values of Wald tests for the simple linear hypothesis of 
equality of estimated parameters are shown. 
 
Aggregating the results for limit bid/ask prices, we conclude that, particularly in the 
beginning of the markets, insiders are the traders which tend to buy assets in the “good” 
state, when assets are relatively cheaply sold by outsiders and sell assets in the “bad” 
state, when they are relatively expensively bought by outsiders. Given this conclusion it 
is not surprising that asset holdings of in- and outsiders indeed differ significantly 
between “good”-state and “bad”-state markets, at least in the beginning of the markets, 
as it is theoretically predicted by both informational models (PI and RE). 
In the “good”-state markets, insiders hold on average more assets during the entire 
markets and significantly more during the first six periods. In the “bad”-state markets 
outsiders hold on average more assets during the entire markets and significantly more 
during periods 3 to 13. All differences are significant at the 5-10% level, using the 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test, N = 16 (8/8). Insiders are thus capable of 
using their superior informational position and buy relatively underpriced assets in the 
“good” state and sell relatively overpriced assets in the “bad” state. However, it should 
be noted that asset stocks of in- and outsiders align during the course of the markets in 
both states. 
Result 4: Insiders are those traders that hold more assets in the “good”-state markets and 
outsiders are those traders that hold more assets in the “bad”-state markets. 
Furthermore a concentration of assets with individual players over the course of the 
markets is evident. Over all markets the trader with the largest asset portfolio in one 
market holds on average 27.2 assets (with a standard deviation of 6.3) at the end of 
period 15. Concentration, however, is not automatically equated with a more 
remunerative trading strategy of the “hoarding” traders. Although, in eleven markets 
those traders which held the largest asset stock also earned the highest net-profit (total 
profit minus prediction earnings), a significant correlation cannot be detected between 
the asset stock of a trader at the end of a market and her/his net-profit. The Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient is 𝜌 = .0263 (p = .7174).  
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Although the behavior of in- and outsiders converges, insiders are able to benefit from 
their superior informational position. Insiders on average earn higher total profits in 
Tin+, Tin-, TinB+, and TinB- markets, though the difference to outsiders is only 
significant for Tin+ (see Table A. 6 in Appendix A). Aggregated over all treatments with 
informational asymmetry, insiders earn significantly higher total profits (6346 ECU vs. 
5565 ECU, two-sided t-test, p = .0793, N = 96, 32/64). 
Result 5: Informed traders have a trading advantage that is revealed in superior profits. 
Summarized our data definitively indicates that traders in Tin(B) markets didn’t incur 
what Camerer et al. (1989) call the “curse of knowledge”. 
Our markets are not strong-form efficient, following the definition of Fama (1970), 
because insiders are able to earn “abnormal returns” from trading on the basis of their 
private (insider) information. This result supports the findings of Jaffe (1974). 
 
4.4 Beliefs and Market Prices 
 
Since optimal trading actions depend on beliefs about other players’ decisions, which 
again depend on the beliefs of actions of others etc. (Palfrey and Wang, 2009),25 we 
examine if stated beliefs on the market price are informative about the actual market 
price. We investigate to what extent elicited price expectations and actual market prices 
are correlated. Furthermore, we are interested in how expectations change if the 
available information and distribution of information changes. 
We are aware that belief elicitation can alter decisions in the experiment. Gächter and 
Renner (2010) for example have shown that incentivized belief elicitation about 
contributions of others leads to higher contributions in a public-good experiment. 
However, the experimental asset markets investigated by Haruvy et al. (2007), who 
elicited beliefs about market prices in the same way as we do, closely resemble markets 
of previous studies without belief elicitation. Thus, we do not expect a large 
manipulation. 
In the beginning of each period, participants were required to state their expectations 
about the prospective market prices of the present and all subsequent trading periods. 
In the following we denote the elicited beliefs in the form: 𝐵𝑡
𝑓
, where 𝑡 denotes the 
period of elicitation, i.e., the period in which traders were asked to submit their price 
beliefs and 𝑓 denotes the period forecasted, i.e., the period for which the price beliefs are 
stated. 
                                                        
25 “In a world of uncertainty “fundamentals” get replaced by expectations about fundamentals” (Sunder, 
1995, p. 468). 
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Figure 5 shows the average predicted price levels by treatment. Each bar in all eight 
graphs represents the average of four markets, i.e., 24 traders.26 As can be seen, traders’ 
expectations about the price trajectory contain the belief of declining prices as 
theoretically prescribed by fundamentals. This indicates that fundamentals are clearly 
interpreted as the expected value of the future dividend stream, as emphasized in the 
experimental instructions. In contrast to Lei et al. (2001), in our framework, a common 
dividend, and common knowledge thereof, seems to be sufficient to induce initial 
common expectations that are consistent with fundamentals. In contrast, traders in 
Haruvy et al. (2007) anticipated a flat price trajectory at the beginning, followed by an 
increasing trajectory in the middle, and a declining trajectory toward the end of the first 
round of their experiment. Our findings resemble their markets with most experienced 
traders.27 
Individual beliefs for the first period (𝐵1
1) start under almost all conditions around the 
BFV in the 1st period, which is 563. A t-test for the null hypothesis of no difference shows 
only for Tin a significant difference, where the average is 465.7 (p = .0036, N = 48), 
compared to 547.4, 528.6, and 552.9 for NinB, TinB, and Nin respectively. Price 
assessments do not differ significantly by state within equal treatment conditions.  
Within the insider treatments with and without the provision of BFVs, we find that 
insider 𝐵1
1 are respectively significantly higher for the “good” state compared to the 
“bad” state (two-sided U tests, N = 16: 587.9 vs. 296.6, p = .0098; 596.5 vs. 488.8, 
p = .0712). Outsider beliefs on the other hand are, as we would expect, not significantly 
different between both states (two-sided U tests, N = 32: 548.2 vs. 595.4, p = .4677; 
431.4 vs. 423.1, p = .7773), though clearly different with and without the provision of 
BFVs. 
Applying our convergence measure, defined in Subsection 4.1, on the average last belief 
for each period (?̅?𝑡
𝑡), we find that beliefs converge more slowly toward fundamentals 
than market prices. We find 21 out of 32 markets not to converge, compared to ten 
markets for prices. Convergence time is slower for all treatments, though the difference 
is only significant for Tin (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .0487). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Haruvy et al. (2007) when traders had some experience. 
Comparing the RD and RAD measures for last beliefs (𝐵𝑡
𝑡) and market prices, we find 
that RD shows only a significant difference between beliefs and market prices in NinB, 
where it is larger for prices, while the RAD measure is significantly larger for beliefs in 
NinB, TinB, and Tin markets (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respective p-values: 
.0687, .0251, and .0357). It seems that positive and negative deviations cancel out each 
other for RD for both, beliefs and prices, but that deviations are absolutely larger for 
beliefs as revealed by RAD. Markets seem to exert a kind of synergy effect on traders’ 
beliefs that help prices to converge faster to the rational expectations equilibrium than 
                                                        
26 Figure A. 3 in Appendix A illustrates the associated between-subject standard deviations of the market-
price predictions. 
27 Participants in Haruvy et al. (2007) played four markets, consisting of 15 periods each, in a row. 
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beliefs. To further test whether better market-price predictions in a market, measured 
by the average total prediction earnings in a market, lead to lower price deviations from 
fundamentals, measured by RD and RAD, we use a Spearman correlation test. We find a 
negative, however insignificant relation for RD (𝜌 = -.1850, p = .3108), but a significantly 
negative correlation for RAD (𝜌 = -.3082, p = .0862). Better predictions thus seem to 
lower price deviations. 
Since the most important characteristic of forecasts or predictions is their correctness, 
we now turn to the ability of forecasts to make inferences about future prices. To 
estimate the informational content contained in predictions of traders, we first estimate 
if and how the price level and the average belief about the market price are “correlated”, 
using the following model: 
 𝑃𝑚𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡, (6) 
   
where 𝑃𝑡  is the market price in period t, ?̅?𝑡
𝑡 is the average stated belief for the market 
price of period 𝑡 in period 𝑡. 𝑋 is a vector of further explanatory variables, containing 
treatment dummies, a period variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), and the drawn dividend in the prior 
period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑). If short-term expectations of market prices are unbiased, then 
𝛼 = 0, 𝛽 = 1, and 𝛾 = 0 are the expected coefficients. 
Furthermore, to test the correctness of average trader beliefs concerning the 








) + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡, (7) 
   
where (?̅?𝑡
𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) 𝑃𝑡⁄  denotes the deviation of the average belief in a market from the 
market price, relative to the market price. (?̅?𝑡−1
𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−1) 𝑃𝑡−1⁄  is simply the one-period 
lag of the dependent variable and X is defined as above. If short-term expectations are 
unbiased, i.e., correct, then 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽 = 0, and 𝛾 = 0 are the expected coefficients. 
The regression results of both models are shown in Models 7 and 8 in Table 12. As can 
be seen from Model 7 price expectations and actual market prices are strongly 
“correlated” with a highly significant coefficient of 0.9, which is however significantly 
different from one (𝛽 ≠ 1, p = .0011). Model 8 shows that the forecast quality, i.e., the 
relative deviation of beliefs from market prices, is not auto-correlated since 𝛽 is not 
statistically different from zero. Moreover, as it seems, the presence of insiders rather 
impedes forecast precision than enhances it. The three largest negative coefficients of 
treatment dummies, which hint on an underestimation of market prices, are all 
attributed to treatments where insiders are present (TinB+, Tin+, and Tin-). 
This finding seems to be driven by the outsiders in the Tin(B) markets and is supported 
by the following: On aggregate over all treatments with informational asymmetry, we 
find a significant difference in prediction earnings between in- and outsiders (144.9 ECU 
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vs. 115.3 ECU, two-sided t-test, p = .0735, N = 96, 32/64).28 Prediction earnings of 
outsiders in the Nin(B) markets are, however, not significantly different from earnings 
of insiders in the Tin(B) markets; but they are also significantly larger than prediction 
earnings of outsiders in the Tin(B) markets (137.0 ECU vs. 115.3 ECU, two-sided t-test, 
p = .0562, N = 160, 96/64). The presence of insiders thus seems to psychologically 
impede the prediction ability of outsiders in the Tin(B) markets. This finding is 
consistent with Lovaglia et al. (1998), who found that a randomly assigned lower status 
impedes performance in a test of mental ability. 
Given that the maximum possible amount for prediction earnings is 600 ECU, if all 
predictions lie in a range of ±10% of the market price, prediction earnings of both 
trader types are quite bad and close to another, with a mean of 125.2 ECU, a standard 
deviation of 76.3 ECU, and a minimum and maximum of 0 ECU and 396 ECU over all 192 
traders, respectively. Nevertheless, although the difference in prediction earnings 
between in- and outsiders is not large, it indicates that the trading advantage of insiders 
is at least partially conveyed in a better ability to anticipate market prices. 
Result 6: Elicited price expectations and actual market prices are highly correlated. 
However, forecast quality (precision of beliefs) seems rather to be impeded by the presence 
of insiders. The provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on forecast quality. 
To test whether better predictors also earn higher total trading profits (total profits 
corrected for prediction earnings) we use a Spearman correlation test. Over all 196 
traders we find a highly significant connection between individual prediction quality 
and trading profits (𝜌 = .2717, p = .0001). As we would expect, better predictors have 
more success in the market. 
Additionally, we found men to make significantly higher earnings for predictions 
compared to women (139.5 vs. 118.5, two-sided t-test, p = .0432, N = 192, 113/79) and 
higher total trading profits, though here the difference is not significant (5800 vs. 5559, 
two-sided t-test, p = .4362, N = 192, 113/79). Alike, master students make significantly 
higher earnings for predictions compared to bachelor students (151.4 vs. 124.9, two-
sided t-test, p = .0319, N = 181, 42/139) and also earn higher total trading profits (6372 
vs. 5430, two-sided t-test, p = .0106, N = 181, 42/139). 
  
                                                        
28 When Tin+, Tin-, TinB+, and TinB- markets are considered separately (see Table A. 6 in Appendix A), we 
find insiders to be slightly better predictors and earn on average higher prediction earnings, however, the 
difference to outsiders is not significant. 




Figure 5: Average Predicted Market Prices 
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Table 12: Belief Regressions 
Dependent Variable 
Model 7 Model 8 
𝑃𝑚𝑡   (?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡 − 𝑃𝑚𝑡)/ 𝑃𝑚𝑡 
   
Constant (Nin+) 21.59 3.08 
 (15.35) (5.60) 
?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡   0.90***  
 (0.03)  
(?̅?𝑚𝑡−1
𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑚𝑡−1  -0.02 
  (0.05) 
Period  0.56 
  (0.36) 
L. Dividend 0.29** -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.04) 
NinB+ 52.77*** -3.82 
 (17.91) (4.76) 
NinB- 47.04** -9.22* 
 (19.04) (5.12) 
TinB+ 40.51** -12.88** 
 (19.45) (5.53) 
TinB- 3.21 -2.09 
 (13.43) (5.13) 
Nin- 12.47 -9.65* 
 (17.45) (5.21) 
Tin+ 71.08*** -22.26*** 
 (18.89) (5.56) 
Tin- -7.62 -10.34* 
 (13.08) (6.12) 
   
R² .8746 .1450 
N 315 247 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected 
standard errors and panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
32 markets as cross sections with a maximum of 15 observations over time 
(unbalanced). Only periods where trade took place are considered. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  





Our study investigates price formation in a multi-period asset market with uncertainty 
about market fundamentals. This novel framework combines the SSW environment with 
a “state-environment” investigated by, for example, Camerer and Weigelt (1991a). It 
represents a “more realistic” market, although we are aware that real-life markets are 
not only characterized by uncertainty but also by ambiguity. In this newly designed 
uncertain SSW environment, we investigate whether (1) the existence of traders who 
are informed about the true state and/or (2) the provision of Bayesian updates of the 
assets’ state-dependent fundamental values lead to better market performance. 
Our results differ from earlier studies in that we hardly find any bubbles under all 
treatment conditions, even though all subjects were inexperienced. Out of 32 markets 
only four reveal a bubble pattern. Our explanation is that possibly the two possible 
states exert a psychologically restraining effect on market prices and force participants 
to more carefully reflect on their trading decisions. 
We find markets with asymmetrically informed traders to exhibit smaller price 
deviations from fundamentals, implying higher market efficiency. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Sutter et al. (2012), and is most likely attributed to the 
fact that uninformed traders act in a more prudent way to bypass exploitation, when 
they are aware of the fact that some traders have an advantage (of whatever kind). 
The provision of BFVs has seemingly little to no effect. The mere assistance in the 
assessment of the state seems not to be sufficient to improve market performance. 
Concerning the trading behavior of in- and outsiders, we find that it differs at the 
beginning but converges during the course of the markets, indicating that state 
information is revealed over time. In accordance with the predictions of the PI- and RE-
models, we further find outsider limit buy/sell prices on average to be lower (higher) in 
the “good” (“bad”) state compared to the limit buy/sell prices of insiders. As a result, 
outsiders on average hold less (more) assets in “good”-state (“bad”-state) markets. Thus, 
informed traders are able to earn superior profits. Depending on the state, they buy 
cheaply from or sell expensively to outsiders and thus capitalize their superior position. 
With regard to elicited price expectations, we find forecasts and actual market prices to 
be highly correlated. The precision of forecasts, however, seems to be impeded by the 
presence of insiders, while the provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on forecast 
quality. 
We observe that the presence of insiders increases market efficiency. However, we have 
to be very cautious with this interpretation. We are not inclined to state that 
informational asymmetries are per se beneficial for market performance. In our 
experiment, the existence of insiders increases the information in the market. Increasing 
the level of information even more, we have conducted an additional experiment, in 
which we employed a standard SSW framework with a single state. Dividends again 
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could take values of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU, or 80 ECU, however, with equal and fix 
probabilities of 25 percent, respectively. Traders did not face any uncertainty about the 
state, and were in a sense all insiders. These markets, again, hardly showed any 
bubbles.29 Additionally they exhibited with -0.078 a smaller average RD than all our 
other treatments with two possible states (accounted for the state) and with 0.180 also 
the smallest average RAD. This seems plausible if we consider these markets as pure 
insider markets, since there are no traders with uncertainty about the state.30 
We may conclude that increased information in a market tends to lead to more market 
efficiency. However, we have to be aware of the fact that informational asymmetries in 
markets are not beneficial in all aspects. The higher market efficiency in our markets, 
where insiders were present and could trade on their information, is based on the 
expense of outsiders. Given the differences in the trading behavior, particularly in the 
beginning of the markets, insiders on average manage to shift their asset holdings to the 
detriment of outsiders. In addition, the presence of insiders seems to confuse outsiders 
given their significantly inferior market price forecast capability. Taken together, it is 
likely that deprived market participants in such trading environments would lose faith 
and trust in the securities’ markets and possibly withdraw all or part of their capital, 
rendering the market less liquid. 
Hence, to maintain the confidence in the fairness of financial markets, we rather support 
the position of proponents of insider trading regulation, requesting traders and other 
market agents possessing material nonpublic information to make reasonable efforts to 
achieve public dissemination of the relevant information on the broadest possible basis 
(CFA Institute Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, CFA Institute, 2010). 
We advocate all types of rules which are targeted towards faster and broader 
dissemination of information. 
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29 The general lack of bubbles might, besides the general difference of the structure of fundamentals, 
might be caused by the relatively small number of traders in our markets. This might decrease the 
incentives to speculate, in particular in combination with the call-auction trading mechanism, which tends 
to lead to a lower trading volume than continuous double-auction markets. Sutter et al. (2012) and 
Dufwenberg et al. (2005) observed bubbles with the same number of traders per market, however, by 
using double auctions; van Boening et al. (1993) and Haruvy et al. (2007) observed bubbles by using call 
auctions. 
30 Figure B. 1 in Appendix B shows the trajectory of individual market prices and Figure B. 2 the trajectory 
of the average price in this experiment. 
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Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Attitudes Toward Risk 
Table A. 1: Risk-Test 1 
Decision 
# 







1 1/10 of 50 , 9/10 of 40  1/10 of 96 , 9/10 of 2  29.6  -3 
2 2/10 of 50 , 8/10 of 40  2/10 of 96 , 8/10 of 2  21.2  -2 
3 3/10 of 50 , 7/10 of 40  3/10 of 96 , 7/10 of 2  12.8  -1 
4 4/10 of 50 , 6/10 of 40  4/10 of 96 , 6/10 of 2  4.4  0 
5 5/10 of 50 , 5/10 of 40  5/10 of 96 , 5/10 of 2  -4.0  1 
6 6/10 of 50 , 4/10 of 40  6/10 of 96 , 4/10 of 2  -12.4  2 
7 7/10 of 50 , 3/10 of 40  7/10 of 96 , 3/10 of 2  -20.8  3 
8 8/10 of 50 , 2/10 of 40  8/10 of 96 , 2/10 of 2  -29.2  4 
9 9/10 of 50 , 1/10 of 40  9/10 of 96 , 1/10 of 2  -37.6  5 
10 1 of 50 , 0 of 40  1 of 96 , 0 of 2  -46.0  5 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. Lottery A is considered as the “safe” choice and Lottery B as the “risky” choice.  
-5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = very risk-loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly risk-loving, 
0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly risk-averse, 2 = risk-averse, 3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = 1.750, market maximum (minimum) = 3.000 (0.500), subject maximum (minimum) = 5 (-3). 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in one market and the market price in the 1st 
period: 𝜌 = -0.0979, p = 0.5942 (negative relationship expected). 
 
Table A. 2: Risk-Test 2a 
Decision 
No. 










4/10 of 80 , 
3/10 of 40 , 
2/10 of 20 , 
1/10 of 10. 
20  29 -5 
2 25  24 -4 
3 30  19 -3 
4 35  14 -2 
5 40  9 -1 
6 45  4 0 
7 50  -1 1 
8 55  -6 2 
9 60  -11 3 
10 65  -16 4 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. -5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = very risk-
loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly risk-loving, 0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly risk-averse, 2 = risk-
averse, 3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = -0.813, market maximum (minimum) = 0.167 (-2.167), subject maximum 
(minimum) = 4 (-5). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in 
one market and the market price in the 1st period: 𝜌 = -0.0369, p = 0.8412 (negative relationship 
expected). 
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Table A. 3: Risk-Test 2b 
Decision 
# 










1/10 of 80 , 
2/10 of 40 , 
3/10 of 20 , 
4/10 of 10. 
5  21 -4 
2 10  16 -3 
3 15  11 -2 
4 20  6 -1 
5 25  1 0 
6 30  -4 1 
7 35  -9 2 
8 40  -14 3 
9 45  -19 4 
10 50  -24 5 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. -5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = very risk-
loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly risk-loving, 0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly risk-averse, 2 = risk-
averse, 3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = 0.427, market maximum (minimum) = 1.500 (-1.167), subject maximum 
(minimum) = 5 (-4). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in 





Table A. 4: Ex-post Questionnaire Question - Attitude Toward Risk 
















           
Notes: Market/subject mean = 4.646, market maximum (minimum) = 6.667 (2.667), subject maximum 
(minimum) = 10 (0). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in one market and the 
market price in the 1st period: 𝜌 = 0.0956, p = 0.6029 (positive relationship expected). 
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Trading Behavior of Insiders and Outsiders 
 
Table A. 5: First-period Comparisons of Insiders and Outsiders 
 Insider w/ Bayes (1st Per.) Insider w/o Bayes (1st Per.) 
 + - p-valuea + - p-valuea 
pD 338.9 147.4 .0397 524.3 340.0 .0235 
pS 609.8 301.0 .0541 761.0 607.5 .0279 
qD 12.6 13.5 .7116 12.4 5.3 .0262 
qS 4.4 6.2 .2245 8.6 4.4 .0626 
        Outsider w/ Bayes (1st Per.) Outsider w/o Bayes (1st Per.) 
 + - p-valueb + - p-valueb 
pD 361.6 446.4 .1257 290.7 355.7 .3250 
pS 581.8 609.5 .6807 517.1 602.8 .6921 
qD 10.7 10.6 .9293 13.3 8.8 .4297 
qS 5.0 6.6 .2744 6.1 5.6 .6287 
        w/ Bayes+ (1st Per.) w/ Bayes- (1st Per.) 
 Insider Outsider p-valuec Insider Outsider p-valuec 
pD 338.9 361.6 .6968 147.4 446.4 .0013 
pS 609.8 581.8 .6100 301.0 609.5 .0386 
qD 12.6 10.7 .7947 13.5 10.6 .8083 
qS 4.4 5.0 .6733 6.2 6.6 .9159 
        w/o Bayes+ (1st Per.) w/o Bayes- (1st Per.) 
 Insider Outsider p-valuec Insider Outsider p-valuec 
pD 524.3 290.7 .0180 340.0 355.7 .7830 
pS 761.0 517.1 .1896 607.5 602.8 .3560 
qD 12.4 13.3 .5238 5.3 8.8 .4484 
qS 8.6 6.1 .0871 4.4 5.6 .4296 
Notes: Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided: a N = 16 (8/8), b N = 32 (16/16), c N = 24 (8/16). 
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Table A. 6: Profits and Prediction Earnings of Insiders and Outsiders 












Profita 7568 8962 .0929 4369 4483 .6744 
Pred. Earningsa 133.1 172.9 .0460 137.3 136.3 .4005 












Profitb 7183 6527 .2582 4315 4235 .6242 
Pred. Earningsb 100.3 121.5 .4397 131.3 108.2 .5216 
        w/ Bayes+ w/ Bayes- 
 Insider Outsider p-value Insider Outsider p-value 
Profitc 7568 7183 .3913 4369 4315 .9025 
Pred. Earningsc 133.1 100.3 .3272 137.3 131.3 .8303 
        w/o Bayes+ w/o Bayes- 
 Insider Outsider p-value Insider Outsider p-value 
Profitc 8962 6527 .0059 4483 4235 .3913 
Pred. Earningsc 172.9 121.5 .1500 136.3 108.2 .2439 
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Limit Buy and Sell Prices 
 
Figure A. 1: Average Limit Buy Order Prices 
 
 
Figure A. 2: Average Limit Sell Order Prices 
  





Figure A. 3: Average Standard Deviations of Predicted Market Prices 
  




Results of Additional Experiments with Known Fundamentals (SSW) 
 
 
Figure B. 1: Individual Market Prices in the SSW Framework 
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Experimental Instructions (Risk Tests) 
 
Welcome! You participate in an experiment that consists of two parts. In Part I of the 
experiment, you first take part in a decision experiment in which you can earn money. How 
much you earn depends, in Part I, only on your personal decisions. In Part II, your earnings will 
also depend on the choices of others. Each participant makes its decisions in isolation from the 
others on her/his computer. We ask you not to talk to other participants. 
 
PART I 
Part I of the experiment consists of three tasks. In Task 1 you have to make 10 decisions, first. In 
each you must choose between two options, lottery X or lottery Y. Each lottery involves two 
payments, for which there are different probabilities of occurrence, in each case. The payoffs are 
given in a fictitious currency ECU (experimental currency units). At the end of Part I, the 
computer will select among your 10 decisions randomly one, for which you are paid according to 
your selected option. The resulting ECUs are converted according to a fixed exchange rate in €. 
In Task 2A and 2B, you have to make 10 decisions each, choosing between a lottery and a safe 
payment (in ECU). At the end of Part I, the computer will select from among these choices 
randomly one, each, for which you are paid in € according to your selected option, taking into 
account the exchange rate. 
 
AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
A calculator is available at the right side of each decision screen which you can open via a small 
calculator icon. Once you have made your decisions in all three tasks, you will receive your 
results on the screen including your payment in € for Part I of the experiment. 
 
PAYMENT 
Your proceeds (in ECU) from the three tasks of Part I are converted into €, whereat each ECU is 
worth €0.005. You will also receive a compensation for your appearance. The payout is 
conducted individually and anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
In order to start the experiment, you need to click on the <Next> button. After completion of Part 
I, we ask you to stay at your place in the cabin and wait for further instructions for Part II of the 
experiment. 
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Experimental Instructions (TinB) 
 
In Part II, the main part of the experiment, you will participate in a market experiment in which 
you can still earn money. How much you earn depends, in this part, on your decisions and, unlike 
in Part I, also on the decisions of other participants. Each participant makes its decisions in 
isolation from the others on her/his computer. We ask you not to talk to other participants. 
 
PART II 
You now participate in a market which runs 15 trading periods. At the beginning you will be 
randomly matched with five other persons to build a group of six, in which you remain 
throughout the 15 trading periods. You will not know the identity of your group members at any 
time, though. 
In this part, you assume the role of a trader on a stock market for assets of a single type. On this 
market, you have the opportunity to submit a buy and / or a sell offer in each of the 15 trading 
periods. However, you are not obliged to. 
At the beginning of the 15 periods, each group member is endowed with 10 assets and an initial 
trading capital of 10,000 ECU. This initial trading capital has to be repaid at the end of the 
experiment in full, again! 
 
THE VALUE OF AN ASSET 
Each asset has a lifespan of 15 trading periods. The so-called fundamental value of an asset is 
determined in each of the 15 periods as the sum of the, for all assets identical, dividends to be 
accrued in the future. After the last dividend payment at the end of the last period the asset is 
worthless. The dividend for an asset is randomly determined in each period by the computer 
and can take a value of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU or 80 ECU. 
There are two possible "states" with respect to the asset, State 1 ("good" state) and State 2 
("bad" state). Each state has the same probability of 50%. Given these probabilities, the 
computer randomly selects one of the two states before the first trading period. This state (State 
1 or State 2) withstands for the total market duration of 15 trading periods. 
Two randomly selected participants per group of six participants, whose identity remains secret, 
will be informed at the beginning of the market which state has actually been chosen and applies 
to all participants during the entire duration of the market. The other participants receive no 
information about the actually chosen state. The randomly drawn state determines the 
probabilities with which each of the possible values of the dividends of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU 
or 80 ECU are drawn. These probabilities and the expected dividend of one asset are presented 
in Table 1 for the two states. 
Since, in the two states, the probabilities of the possible dividend values and thus the expected 
dividend per period of an asset are different, also the fundamentals of an asset will develop in 
different ways over the course of the market. Table 2 shows the computation of the fundamental 
values in the periods 1 to 15 for the two possible states. 
  




 State 1 (“good”) 
[50%] 




10 ECU [10%] 10 ECU [40%] 
20 ECU [20%] 20 ECU [30%] 
40 ECU [30%] 40 ECU [20%] 
80 ECU [40%] 80 ECU [10%] 
Expected Dividend  
of an Asset per Period 




















according to Bayes 
1 735 (=15×49) 0.5 390 (=15×26) 0.5 
562.5 
(=0.5×735+0.5×390) 
2 686 (=14×49) p1,2 364 (=14×26) p2,2 p1,2×686+p2,2×364 
3 637 (=13×49) p1,3 338 (=13×26) p2,3 p1,3×637+p2,3×338 
4 588 (=12×49) p1,4 312 (=12×26) p2,4 p1,4×588+p2,4×312 
5 539 (=11×49) p1,5 286 (=11×26) p2,5 p1,5×539+p2,5×286 
6 490 (=10×49) p1,6 260 (=10×26) p2,6 p1,6×490+p2,6×260 
7 441 (=9×49) p1,7 234 (=9×26) p2,7 p1,7×441+p2,7×234 
8 392 (=8×49) p1,8 208 (=8×26) p2,8 p1,8×392+p2,8×208 
9 343 (=7×49) p1,9 182 (=7×26) p2,9 p1,9×343+p2,8×182 
10 294 (=6×49) p1,10 156 (=6×26) p2,10 p1,10×294+p2,10×156 
11 245 (=5×49) p1,11 130 (=5×26) p2,11 p1,11×245+p2,11×130 
12 196 (=4×49) p1,12 104 (=4×26) p2,12 p1,12×196+p2,12×104 
13 147 (=3×49) p1,13 78 (=3×26) p2,13 p1,13×147+p2,13×78 
14 98 (=2×49) p1,14 52 (=2×26) p2,14 p1,14×98+p2,14×52 
15 49 (=1×49) p1,15 26 (=1×26) p2,15 p1,15×49+p2,15×26 
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Since, in the game, you are not necessarily informed about which state has actually been drawn, 
you may only know the initial probability of 50% for each state, you are provided at the 
beginning of each period with recalculated probabilities for the two states according to the so-
called Bayesian method. These so-called conditional probabilities for the states take into account 
the, up to that time, randomly drawn dividends. Because the conditional probabilities cannot be 
specified in advance, they are denoted in Table 2 with 𝑝𝑖,𝑗. Thereby, 𝑖 𝜖 {1, 2} denotes the state 
and 𝑗 𝜖 {2, … , 15} denotes the period. In addition to the recalculated conditional probabilities 
you are provided, at the beginning of each period, with a fundamental value which is adapted to 
these conditional probabilities (fundamental value according to Bayes) on your screen. 
 
DECISIONS 
Before you can submit your buy and sell offers for the assets in each trading period, you are 
asked to forecast the resulting asset price in the market for all future periods. This market price 
is determined and announced to you at the end of each period. In particular, you enter in each 
period 𝑡 𝜖 {1 , . . . , 15 } a total of (16 − 𝑡) forecasts for the future periods. Because you can rethink 
your forecasts in each period, you have to submit for each period 𝑡 a total of 𝑡 forecasts in the 
course of the market. Depending on the forecast accuracy of your forecasts you receive a 
payment (in ECU) after each period. Table 3 gives an overview of the payments depending on 
the quality of forecasts. These payments can be received for each period 𝑡 a maximum of 𝑡 times. 
With the <Tabulator> button you can switch the entry fields for your decisions. All entries are 
completed by clicking on the <Submit Forecasts!> button. 
 
Table 3 
Accuracy of the Forecast 
Payment for each Correct 
Forecast 
Within ± 10% of the actual market price 5 ECU 
Within ± 10-20% of the actual market price 2 ECU 
Within ± 20-30% of the actual market price 1 ECU 
 
Trading in each period takes place as follows. Each trading period lasts a maximum of 240 
seconds. In the first 120 seconds, you first have the opportunity to submit an offer to buy by 
entering a "limit buy price" and the corresponding "limit buy quantity" in the appropriate fields 
on the screen. 
The limit buy price is the price you are willing to pay at most per asset. This means you buy at 
this or any lower price which is established on the market. Please enter in addition to your limit 
buy price your corresponding limit purchase quantity of assets you want to buy at a price lower 
than or equal to your limit buy price. If only a smaller amount of assets is available on the 
market for you, you get this smaller amount. In extreme cases, it is also possible that you get no 
assets. If you do not want to buy at any price but just want to keep your asset inventory, leave 
the entry fields empty. 
Please confirm your entries by clicking on the button <Confirm Buying Decision!>. Subsequently 
you switch to the screen for the submission of your selling offer.  
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In the second 120 seconds you have the opportunity to submit an offer to sell, by entering a 
“limit sell price” and the corresponding “limit sell quantity” in the appropriate fields on the 
screen. 
The limit sell price is the price you want to have at least per asset. This means you sell at this or 
any higher price which is established on the market. Please enter in addition to your limit sell 
price your corresponding limit sell quantity of assets you want to sell at a price higher than or 
equal to your limit sell price. If there is only a lower demand for your assets on the market, you 
sell this smaller amount. In extreme cases, it is also possible that you sell no assets. If you do not 
want to sell at any price but just want to keep your asset inventory, leave the entry fields empty. 
Please confirm your entries by clicking on the button <Confirm Selling Decision!>. When all 
participants have completed their decision to sell, the experiment continues. All buy and sell 
offers are aggregated, respectively. Out of this, the market price and the corresponding trading 
volume (the total quantity traded) are determined. All individual transactions that are possible 
under these conditions are conducted. If no transactions can take place, there is no market price. 
In this case, we denote the market price with 0. 
Transactions take place as long as there are traders who want to sell at a lower or the same price 
than traders are willing to pay. For the determination of the market price and trading volume all 
bids are aggregated, from the highest to the lowest bid, into a falling demand curve in price, and 
all selling offers are aggregated, from the lowest to the highest selling offer, into an increasing 
supply curve in price. The intersection of these two curves determines the (maximum possible) 
trading volume. The market price is determined as the average of the smallest limit buy price 
and the highest limit sell price for which a transaction just comes about. 
Please note that your inventory of assets and trading capital changes through trade after each 
period. The selling of assets reduces the asset and increases the trading capital inventory. The 
buying of assets increases the asset and reduces the trading capital inventory. In addition, the 
dividend income, of the assets held by you at the end of each period, increases the trading 
capital. 
When choosing your buying and selling offers, you must ensure that they are permissible. If you 
trade, you firstly can never sell more assets than you have in your own asset inventory in this 
period, secondly never buy more assets as is permitted by the available sum of the asset 
holdings of the other market participants in your group, and thirdly never buy more assets at a 
certain price as is permitted by your trading capital in this period. Fourthly, you must note that 
your limit sell price, at which you wish to sell assets, must be higher than your limit buy price, at 
which you wish to buy assets. Possible prices that may be entered are all integer numbers 
between 1 and 1500, as long as none of the rules above is violated. If you make an entry that 
violates these rules, this will be automatically indicated on the screen and you have to revise 
your input. However, in this case, you also have the opportunity to continue without entering an 
offer by leaving the entry fields empty. 
If you do not verify your buying and/or selling decision during the respective 120 seconds, the 
(possibly) entered decisions are not taken into account, i.e., you would not buy or sell anything 
in the respective decision stage!   




A calculator is available at the right side of each decision screen, which you can open via a small 
calculator icon. Additionally, you are provided in each period, in all decision stages, with all 
relevant information via a summary table on the screen. Just click on the button <Show Results 
of Previous Periods> which is located in the middle at the bottom of the screen. To return from 
this summary screen back into the respective decision stage, you have to click on the button 
<Back to…>, respectively. Furthermore, an overview of the results of the current period is 
displayed after each period on the screen. 
 
PAYMENT 
Your relevant income for the payout (in ECU) in Part II of the experiment is determined by your 
trading capital at the end of the last period minus the initial trading capital. The relevant income 
for the payout is calculated alternatively as the sum of your individual period profits. The period 
profit is calculated as follows: 
Period profit = Your asset holdings at the end of the period × Dividend per asset 
   in this period (= dividend income) 
  + Proceeds from the disposal of assets in this period 
  – Expenditures for purchased assets in this period 
  + Remuneration for the forecast(s) of the market price in this period 
 
Your relevant income for the payout (in ECU) from Part II is converted into €, whereat each ECU 
is worth €0.003. In addition, you will receive your payout from Part I and a show-up fee of €3. If 
your trading capital at the end of the last period of part II is not sufficient for the repayment of 
the initial trading capital, your relevant income for the payout in Part II is negative. This negative 
payment is deducted from your payout from Part I and your show-up fee. However, you cannot 
suffer a real loss, i.e., your minimum payout is zero. The payout is conducted individually and 
anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
We ask you now to go to the computer with your participation number. There you have to click 
on <Continue>. Then you will be provided with a number of questions regarding these 
instructions on your screen. If you have any questions, please address yourself to the 
experimenter. Only when all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment 
starts. 
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In international relations the provision of global public goods plays an extensive role. 
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, cross-border crime prevention and disease 
control are well-known examples. Since it is difficult to exclude non-contributing parties 
from the consumption of a public good, there exist incentives to free ride on the 
contributions of others, which lead to inefficiently low provision levels (Olson, 1965). 
The relatively small number of parties typically involved in the decision making on the 
provision of global public goods is marked by their heterogeneity in interests and 
resources. The interaction of industrialized, emerging and development countries, 
evidently involves a strong inequality in wealth. Besides these international interactions, 
wealth heterogeneity is also omnipresent on national scales. Income inequalities are on 
the rise in many, even highly developed, countries. Income inequality measured by the 
Gini coefficient, a standard measure that ranges from 0 (when everybody has the same 
income) to 1 (when all income belongs to one person), has on average risen by almost 
10 percent from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s in the OECD countries, latterly 
averaging 0.316. Inequality lies, for example, in Germany with 0.295 slightly below and 
in the United States with 0.378 above the average (OECD, 2011). The general question is 
how these international and national inequalities affect outcomes in situations that 
involve cooperation and consensus among heterogeneous parties. Our study contributes 
to answering this question and asks whether wealth heterogeneity is likely to affect 
outcomes related to the provision of public goods in an experimental-economics setting 
that involves wealth distributions that approximate the reported OECD average. 
From a theoretical point of view, Warr’s (1983) neutrality theorem states that the 
provision of a single public good is unaffected by a redistribution of wealth. Bergstrom 
et al. (1986) elaborate on this theorem, confirming that small redistributions will not 
change the equilibrium supply of a public good. However, this is true only as long as the 
set of contributors remains unchanged. They argue that large redistributions will change 
the set of contributors and thus the supply of a public good. Maurice et al. (2013) 
present a laboratory experiment on a (non-linear) Voluntary-Contributions Mechanism 
(VCM), investigating the effect of un-equalizing or equalizing redistributions of 
endowments. They observe no significant effect on the contribution level and interpret 
this result as an indication for the validity of Warr’s theorem. 
In the extensive literature on VCM experiments it has mostly been neglected that (the 
degree of) asymmetry in the endowments and/or interests in the provision of a public 
good could impact the voluntary contribution level. The bulk of experiments is based on 
the simple linear game introduced by Marwell and Ames (1979) and Isaac et al. (1984) 
and uses a symmetric parameterization, implying that each of the players has the same 
endowment and the same marginal return from the public good. Even though each 
player’s dominant strategy is to make zero contribution to the public good, experiment 
participants typically contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment 
(Ledyard, 1995). Many studies examine to what extent the actual contribution level 
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depends on various factors, including, for example, the marginal per-capita return 
(MPCR) from the public good (i.e., the individual value of one unit contributed to the 
public good relative to the value of its private consumption), the group size, or the 
interaction of both (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; Weimann et al., 2014). However there 
has been little attention to asymmetry. 
To fill this gap in the literature, our study investigates whether and how inequalities in 
endowments affect contribution levels, without making reference to redistribution as in 
Maurice et al. (2013). We present a (linear) VCM experiment, in which we compare, in a 
between-subject design, contributions under a symmetric, weakly asymmetric and 
strongly asymmetric allocation of endowments among four players with respective 
initial Gini coefficients of 0.000, 0.125, and 0.350. We assume that, independent of their 
endowments, all players in the public-good game have the same profit function, which 
implies the same return from the public good. The novelty in our setting is that in the 
strongly asymmetric situation, one player has no interest in achieving the social 
optimum, in which the sum of profits is maximized. This player’s equilibrium profit is 
higher than the individual profit in the social optimum. 
In our experiment, we observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution 
(with a Gini coefficient of 0.125) has no effect on the overall public-good provision and 
leads to the same contribution level as in the case of symmetry. In this weakly 
asymmetrical setting players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective 
endowment. In contrast, in the strongly asymmetric setting (with a Gini coefficient of 
0.350), where the super-rich player has a higher endowment than the three other 
players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other 
settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the 
others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment. We 
interpret the difference in the behavioral patterns between the weakly and strongly 
asymmetric settings as a shift in the contribution norm from relative to absolute 
equality of contributions. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we embed our study into the related 
literature. Section 3 presents the model and experimental design. In Section 4 we show 
the results. Section 5 concludes this paper with a discussion. 
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2. Related Literature 
 
Keser (2002) hypothesizes that cooperation is easier to achieve in the case of symmetry 
than asymmetry among the players: assuming that reciprocity is used as an instrument 
to achieve cooperation, the cooperative goal is most easily determined in the symmetric 
case, where equal contribution is an obvious requirement. It is not so clear, though, 
where and how players in an asymmetric situation are supposed to cooperate. This 
relates to an observation made by Selten et al. (1997). In a strategy experiment on an 
asymmetric duopoly, they identify decisions guided by ideal points defined in conflicting 
ways. It thus comes as no surprise that, applying similar settings, Mason et al. (1992) 
and Keser (2000) observe more cooperative outcomes in symmetric than in asymmetric 
oligopolies. 
There are only few studies investigating asymmetries in public-good experiments and 
their results are mixed. Fisher et al. (1995) conduct linear VCM experiments with 
heterogeneous demand for public goods. They observe that the contribution level in 
groups with two players with a high MPCR and two players with a low MPCR lies 
between the levels of homogeneous groups, in which all players either have a low or a 
high MPCR. They find a strong effect of an individual’s own MPCR on the contribution: 
even in heterogeneous groups, low-MPCR types contribute less than high-MPCR types. 
Investigating endowment heterogeneity in a linear VCM game, Hofmeyer et al. (2007) 
find that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on the group-
contribution level. Similarly, Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) observe that the contribution 
level is neither affected by the degree nor the skew of endowment inequality in a 
dynamic public-good game, where each round’s earnings are added to a player’s 
available endowment in the following round. In contrast, Cherry et al. (2005) observe 
that endowment heterogeneity in a one-shot linear VCM game decreases the 
contribution level relative to homogeneous endowments. Their experiment, though, is 
less controlled than the experiments in Hofmeyer et al. and in our study in that it does 
not keep constant the sum of endowments across the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
treatments. 
Hofmeyer et al. observe that low and high endowment players contribute the same 
fraction of their endowment. They call this the “fair-share rule”. In contrast, Buckley and 
Croson (2006) observe in their linear VCM experiment with heterogeneous endowments 
that the players less wealthy in endowment give the same absolute amount and thus 
more as a percentage of their endowment as the more wealthy players. They 
demonstrate that this result is contradicting the assumptions of inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and altruism (Becker, 1974). Inequity 
aversion would predict (in addition to full free riding and full contribution) a higher 
proportion of endowment contributed to the public good by the wealthier participants. 
Inequity aversion is thus contradicted also by the experiments by Hofmeyer et al. and by 
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us. Altruism would simply predict higher absolute contributions by the wealthier 
participants; the results by Hofmeyer et al. and our study are in accordance with this. 
Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) observe in a one-shot public-good experiment with 
heterogeneous endowments that the more endowment participants possess, the more 
they contribute and interpret it as “noblesse oblige”. They observe, however, that it 
plays a role whether endowments have been randomly allocated or the difference in 
endowments has been justified by (making the subjects believe in) the requirement to 
spend an unequal time in the experiment: the difference between the contributions of 
low-endowment and high-endowment players is larger in former than the latter case. 
The asymmetry in our experiment is based on a random allocation of heterogeneous 
endowments. We are aware that it can make a difference, whether endowments are 
randomly allocated or have to be earned in a laboratory task, although Cherry et al. 
(2005) observe that the origin of heterogeneous endowments does not have a 
significant effect on voluntary contributions in a one-shot public-good game. In 
bargaining and dictator games, earned endowments tend to lead to more inequitable 
outcomes than randomly allocated endowments (e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; 
Loomes and Burrows, 1994; Cherry et al., 2002). Nonetheless, we needed to make a 
choice for this study and have opted for random allocation of endowments, in order to 
maintain maximum control over their distribution. In a real-effort pregame, we could 
only have achieved this control through a tournament element, which might impact 
behavior in the public-good game in an uncontrolled way. 
The provision of public goods and the appropriation of common pool resources are two 
related instances of collective action. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) report field 
experiments on common pool resources, where the players are heterogeneous in their 
real-life status: Cardenas (2003) shows how the mixing of economic classes affects play 
in a CPR game. Groups composed of mostly poor people conserve common property 
better than groups that are mixed between poor people and more affluent local property 
owners. Likewise, Cardenas and Carpenter (2004) show that mixed groups of students 
from different countries perform noticeably worse than homogenous groups in a CPR 
game. These results suggest that the lower level of contributions that we observe in the 
strongly asymmetric setting of this study is likely to have some external validity. 
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3. The Experiment 
3.1 The Game 
 
In our public-good game n players form a group. Each player i (i = 1, …, n) is endowed 
with a fixed number of tokens, ei, which have to be allocated between two possible types 
of investment, a private and a public investment. The amount allocated to the private 
investment is denoted as xi, with 0 ≤ xi ≤ ei, and the amount allocated to the public 
investment is denoted as yi, with 0 ≤ yi ≤ ei. Since the entire endowment has to be 
allocated, xi + yi = ei has to be satisfied. 
The profit of each player i depends on his individual private investment and the sum of 
all public investments. Each token that he allocates to the private investment yields him 
an individual return of 𝛼, while each token that he allocates to the public investment 
yields himself and any other group member a return of 𝛽, with α > 𝛽 and n𝛽 > α. The 
profit function of player i can thus be written as: 
 
𝛱𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , ∑ 𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1




   
The game-theoretical solution of this game is straightforward. Due to the linear form of 
the profit function and a player’s individual return on private investment being larger 
than on the public investment (α > 𝛽), the game has an equilibrium in dominant 
strategies, where each player contributes the entire endowment to the private and 
nothing to the public investment (xi* = ei, yi* = 0). If this game is played over a finite 
number of T periods, the subgame-perfect equilibrium solution prescribes, based on 
backward induction, that in each period t (t = 1, …, T) each player contributes the entire 
endowment to the private and nothing to the public investment (xi,t* = ei, yi,t* = 0). 
Due to n𝛽 > α, the sum of profits of all n players is maximized if all tokens are allocated 
to the public investment. The group optimum in a repeated game is thus found, where all 
players allocate in each round their entire endowments to the public investment. The 
game-theoretical solution (subgame-perfect equilibrium) is thus collectively inefficient. 
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3.2 Experimental Design 
 
We conducted the computerized experiment in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral 
Economics at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany, between December 
2009 and March 2010. The lab consists of 24 computers in isolated booths, such that 
vision of someone else’s computer screen or verbal communication with other 
participants is impossible. In total, 108 students from various disciplines participated in 
the experiment. They were randomly selected from a subject pool of students who 
volunteered for participation in experiments on decision making, in which they can earn 
money. On average, a roughly equal number of female and male students participated in 
the experiment. According to subject availability, we conducted sessions with 12 or 16 
participants each. This implies that we collected three or four independent observations 
per session. The experiment software was based on z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The procedure was as follows. Before the experiment, the participants get together with 
the experimenter in a meeting room, where the experimenter distributes written 
instructions and reads them aloud to all participants. From this moment on, participants 
are neither allowed to communicate with each other nor to ask questions regarding the 
instructions in front of everybody else. Each of the participants gets randomly assigned a 
participation number, which corresponds to a computer terminal in the laboratory. 
After the reading of the instructions, the participants get seated at their respective 
computer terminals. First they have to go through a computerized questionnaire 
regarding the instructions. They have the opportunity to individually clarify with the 
experimenter any open questions they might have. Only when all participants have 
correctly answered to all questions of comprehension the experiment begins. 
The participants are randomly assigned to groups of four to play a four-player public-
good game (with n = 4). The group compositions stay unmodified during the entire 
experiment session, i.e., we use a so-called partners design (Andreoni, 1988). Subjects do 
not know the identity of the other participants with whom they interact. 
The parameters of the profit function are α = 2 and 𝛽 = 1. This implies that the marginal 
per-capita return (MPCR)1 of the investment in the public account is constant and 
amounts to 0.5. 
The game is to be played for T = 25 rounds, which is known to each participant. Each 
player in a group is assigned a player number from one to four, which is communicated 
to each player in private in the beginning of the experiment. In each round, each 
participant has to make an allocation decision in integers, i.e., only entire tokens can be 
allocated to the private or public investment. At the end of each round, each participant 
is informed of the contribution to the public investment made by each of the three other 
                                                        
1 The MPCR is defined as the ratio of the private value of one token invested into the public account to the 
private value of one token invested into the private account. 
III SOCIAL COSTS OF INEQUALITY – HETEROGENEOUS ENDOWMENTS IN PUBLIC-GOOD EXPERIMENTS 
72 
 
players in the group, identified by their player numbers but otherwise anonymous. The 
record of all previous rounds is also displayed on the screen. 
The participants are informed in the instructions that the total profit gained during the 
experiment and measured in Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) will be multiplied by a 
conversion factor of 0.01 € per ECU and anonymously paid after the experiment. The 
conversion factor is the same for each player. 
Table 1 presents the treatment design. We consider three different treatments: (1) 
homogeneous endowments of 15 (Sym treatment), (2) heterogeneous endowments of 
10, 15, 15, 20 (AsymWeak treatment) and (3) heterogeneous endowments of 8, 8, 8, 36 
(AsymStrong treatment). In all three treatments the total endowment of the four players 
is equal to 60. The AsymStrong treatment is specific in that player 4 has an endowment 
that is larger than the sum of the endowments of the three other players. Player 4 thus 
has no interest in achieving the group optimum, where the sum of profits is maximized. 
 
Table 1: Treatments 
Treatment 
Endowment  # of 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Total Observations 
Sym 15 15 15 15 60 7 
AsymWeak 10 15 15 20 60 10 
AsymStrong 8 8 8 36 60 10 
 
An experiment session lasted about 60 to 90 minutes, including the reading of the 
instructions, the questionnaire to make sure that every participant has understood the 
rules of the game, the experiment, an ex-post questionnaire and the pay-out. In addition 
to the money gained in the experiment, we paid a show-up fee of 3 €. The average payoff 
earned was 14.25 €. 
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4. Experimental Results 
 
To analyze our data, we use non-parametric statistics based on seven independent 
observations for the Sym and ten observations, each, for the AsymWeak and 
AsymStrong treatments. The analysis is based on the Stata Statistical Software, Release 
10. We denote the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test (also called rank-sum test) simply as 
U test and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test as signed-rank test. All tests are 
two-sided. 
The analysis will be geared at the testing of four hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The overall contribution level is independent of the endowment 
distribution. 
Hypothesis 2: All player types contribute the same proportion of their respective 
endowment (“fair-share rule”). 
The first two hypotheses are based on the respective results by Hofmeyer et al. (2007), 
whose experiment is very similar to ours. 
Hypothesis 3: Players use the reciprocity principle. 
Keser and van Winden (2000) interpret behavior in the public-good experiment in 
terms of “conditional cooperation, which is characterized by both forward-looking and 
reactive behavior”. In other words, they observe participants to use reciprocity as an 
instrument to achieve a cooperation goal. Forward-looking behavior shows, among 
others, in the so-called end-game effect (i.e., the break-down of cooperation toward the 
end of the game). 
Hypothesis 4: In the case of endowment heterogeneity, public-good provision leads to a 
reduction in the inequity of wealth. 
Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) point out that the provision of a public good is an indirect 
opportunity to reallocate wealth. In the extreme, if all players contribute all of their 
endowments to the public investment, they end up equally wealthy, independent of the 
distribution of their initial endowments. In that respect, any inequity in the endowments 
can be reduced by the provision of a public good. At the same time, if players make 
different contributions to the public investment, some differences in wealth will be 
created. This un-equalizing effect will necessarily be visible in the case of equal 
endowments, but it might be overcompensated by the equalizing effect due to the public 
good provided in the case of endowment heterogeneity. Since we expect significantly 
positive contributions in all treatments and thus important equalizing effects, we 
hypothesize that in the treatments with endowment heterogeneity, the inequality in 
final wealth will be smaller than the inequality in the endowments. 
These four hypotheses are to be addressed in the four subsections. 
  
III SOCIAL COSTS OF INEQUALITY – HETEROGENEOUS ENDOWMENTS IN PUBLIC-GOOD EXPERIMENTS 
74 
 
4.1 Group Contributions 
 
Figure 1 exhibits, for each of the three treatments, the average group contribution to the 
public investment in each of the 25 rounds. The contribution level in the AsymStrong 
treatment lies in each period clearly below the contribution levels in the other two 
treatments. On average over all 25 rounds, we observe a group contribution of 34.48 in 
Sym, 33.05 in AsymWeak and 22.02 in AsymStrong. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicates 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the three treatments (p = 
0.0012). Pair-wise comparisons (U tests) show that the group contribution in 
AsymWeak is not significantly different from the one in Sym (p = 0.7694). However, the 
group contribution in AsymStrong is significantly below the one in Sym (p = 0.0034) and 
in AsymWeak (p = 0.0011). Similarly, a comparison of the median values of individual 
contributions to the public investment (10 in Sym, 8 in AsymWeak, and 6 in 
AsymStrong) shows no statistically significant difference between Sym and AsymWeak 
(p = 0.3756). However, we observe statistically significant differences between Sym and 
AsymStrong (p = 0.0291) and between AsymWeak and AsymStrong (p = 0.0998). We 
conclude that the average and median contributions in the AsymStrong treatment are 
significantly lower than in the two other treatments. 
The standard deviations of group contributions (averages over the standard deviations 
of the independent groups) are 13.24 in Sym, 12.39 in AsymWeak and 10.39 in 
AsymStrong, implying variation coefficients of 38 percent (in Sym and Asymweak) and 
47 percent (in AsymStrong). Neither the Kruskal-Wallis test nor pairwise comparisons 
based on the U test show statistically significant differences, requiring significance at the 
10-percent level in two-sided testing (Kruskal-Wallis test: p = 0.2515; Sym vs. 
AsymWeak: p = 0.5582; Sym vs. AsymStrong: p = 0.1719; AsymWeak vs. AsymStrong: 
p = 0.1736). 
Regarding the dynamics in the game, Figure 1 exhibits, in all three treatments, a decline 
of the group contribution over time, including a relatively sharp decline in the final 
rounds—the so-called end-game effect (Selten and Stoecker, 1986). Comparing the 
average group contribution in periods 1-10 to the one in periods 11-20, we observe a 
statistically significant decline in the Sym treatment, but none in the others.2 From 
periods 11-20 to the final periods 21-25, we observe no difference in the Sym treatment 
but a significant decline in the average group contribution in the AsymWeak and 
AsymStrong treatments.3 
  
                                                        
2 The p-values of the signed-rank tests are 0.0180, 0.1688, and 0.1394 in Sym, AsymWeak and 
AsymStrong, respectively. 
3 The p-values of the signed-rank tests are 0.1282, 0.0051, and 0.0051 in Sym, AsymWeak and 
AsymStrong, respectively. The lack of significance for the end-game effect in the Sym treatment is due to 
one outlier out of seven. 




Figure 1: Group Contributions to the Public Investment 
 
In none of the three treatments do we observe a significant change in the standard 
deviation of the group contributions over time, when we compare (1) periods 1-10 with 
11-20 and (2) periods 11-20 with 21-25, requiring significance at the 10-percent level.4 
Result 1: There is no significant difference in the contribution level between the Sym and 
the AsymWeak treatments – a result consistent with Hypothesis 1 and the similar 
experiment by Hofmeyer et al. (2007). However, in the AsymStrong treatment we do 
observe a significantly lower contribution level than in the two other treatments. 
The lower contribution level in AsymStrong than in Sym could potentially be considered 
as a confirmation of the result by Cherry et al. (2005). However, to compare their one-
shot game in an adequate way with our repeated game, we consider either the very first 
period or the last period of the game. In neither period, considered individually, do we 
observe a significant difference among the three treatments.5 
  
                                                        
4 Signed-rank tests. Sym: p(1) = 0.8658 and p(2) = 0.4990; AsymWeak: p(1) = 0.0926 and p(2) = 0.7213;  
AsymStrong: p(1) = 0.4446 and p(2) = 0.6465. 
5 First round: Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.6912. Pairwise comparisons based on U tests, Sym and AsymWeak 
p = 0.4344, Sym and AsymStrong p = 0.4639, AsymWeak and AsymStrong p = 1.0000. 
Last round: Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.3575. Pairwise comparisons based on U tests, Sym and AsymWeak 
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4.2 Contributions by Player Types 
 
For a better understanding of what is going on in the asymmetric treatments, we analyze 
the contributions by the various player types, as defined by their endowments. We 
proceed with an examination of the AsymWeak treatment, first, and the AsymStrong 
treatment, second. 
In the AsymWeak treatment, we denote the player with an endowment of 10 as poor, the 
players with an endowment of 15 as wealthy and the player with an endowment of 20 as 
rich. The average contribution levels of the poor, wealthy and rich are, 6.31, 7.65 and 
11.44, respectively. This corresponds to a percentage of the endowment of 63.1, 51.0 
and 57.1, respectively for the poor, wealthy and rich (see also Figure 2 for the 
development over time). 
Comparing poor and wealthy group members, we observe no statistically significant 
difference, neither in the average contribution nor in the contribution as a share of the 
endowment (signed-rank tests, p-values of 0.2842 and 0.2411, respectively). 
Comparing poor and rich group members, we observe a significantly different (higher) 
contribution level of the rich (signed-rank test, p = 0.0218) but no significant difference 
in the contribution as a share of the endowment (signed-rank test, p = 0.6098). 
Comparing wealthy and rich group members, we observe a significantly different 
(higher) contribution level of the rich (signed-rank test, p = 0.0051) but no significant 
difference in the contribution as a share of the endowment (signed-rank test, 
p = 0.1386). 
Result 2a: In the AsymWeak treatment, the poor, wealthy and rich tend to contribute the 
same proportion of their respective endowment. This confirms Hypothesis 2 (fair-share 
rule) and replicates the result by Hofmeyer et al. (2007). 
In the AsymStrong treatment, we denote the players with an endowment of 8 as poor 
and the player with an endowment of 36 as rich. The average contribution levels of poor 
and rich players are 4.79 and 7.63, respectively. This corresponds to 59.9 and 21.2 
percent of the corresponding endowment (see also Figure 3 for the development over 
time). We observe that the contribution levels are not significantly different, requiring 
significance at the 10-percent level (signed-rank test, p = 0.1141). However, the poor 
contribute a significantly different (higher) percentage of their endowment than the rich 
(p = 0.0069). 
Result 2b: In the AsymStrong treatment, the rich player tends to contribute the same 
amount as the poor players and thus a much lower percentage of the individual 
endowment. This contradicts Hypothesis 2 (fair-share rule). 
We provide the following interpretation of this result, which would need confirmation in 
further studies. The AsymStrong treatment is based on a parameterization that exhibits 
a special characteristic, which is not typical in public-good experiments: the rich player 
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has no interest in achieving the group optimum as defined by the maximum of the sum 
of profits. The rich player’s Nash equilibrium profit is higher than the individual profit in 
the group optimum. Thus, the contribution of the same proportion of endowment seems 
not to be considered as “fair” any more. However, there exists another potential 
cooperative goal that appears to define fair contributions in the AsymStrong treatment: 
the group optimum under the constraint that each player contributes the same amount. 
We call this the “constrained optimum”. In the AsymStrong treatment the constrained 
optimum makes all players, including the rich player, better off than in the Nash 
equilibrium. 
This interpretation finds support in the observation that we can assign the independent 
AsymStrong groups to two, equally large categories. The first category comprises 
groups, in which the rich player starts with a high contribution (far above the 
endowment of a poor player) but drops the contribution, after a few periods, to the 
endowment level of a poor player and then stays there. The reason appears to be anger 
about the poor players not contributing their entire endowments. The second category 
comprises groups, in which, from the beginning, the rich player does not contribute 
more than the maximum amount that a poor player may contribute. 
The above results related to Hypothesis 2 find confirmation in random-effects 
regressions on the proportion of the endowment contributed to the public investment in 
AsymWeak (Model 1) and AsymStrong (Model 2). The regression results are presented 
in Table 2. In Asymweak, neither the dummy variable for the rich player (Rich) nor for 
the poor player (Poor) show a significantly positive or negative coefficient. In 
AsymStrong, the dummy variable for the rich player (Rich) shows a significantly 
negative coefficient. In both models, we observe a significantly negative end-game effect 
(Last5Periods) and a significantly negative overall time trend (Period). 
With respect to the individual contribution decisions, we recall that in linear public-good 
experiments their distribution typically has peaks at both zero and the contribution of 
one’s entire endowment. Table 3 exhibits the relative frequencies of individual 
contributions at these peaks in the three treatments. In the Sym treatment, 20 percent of 
the individual contributions are at zero and 30 percent at full contribution, roughly. This 
also holds for the wealthy players in AsymWeak having the same endowment as the 
players in Sym. The poor players in AsymWeak and AsymStrong show higher relative 
frequencies of full contribution, around 40 percent, while the rich players in AsymStrong 
hardly ever contribute their entire endowment to the public good. 
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Table 2: Proportion of the Endowment Contributed to the Public Investment 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 AsymWeak AsymStrong 
Period -0.0067*** -0.0089*** 
Last5Periods -0.1717*** -0.1422*** 
Rich 0.6919 -0.3873*** 
Poor 0.1207  
Intercept 0.6317*** 0.7438*** 
σu 0.223 0.123 
σe 0.300 0.324 
R² 0.095 0.254 
N 1000 1000 





Table 3: Relative Frequency of Individual Decisions, which were either Zero or Full 






Sym 18.1 29.4 
AsymWeak – Poor 18.0 41.2 
AsymWeak – Wealthy 21.2 28.6 
AsymWeak – Rich 18.0 28.4 
AsymStrong – Poor 20.7 37.9 
AsymStrong – Rich 23.6 1.6 
 
  





Keser and van Winden (2000) define reciprocity in a qualitative way: “If a subject intends 
to change his decision from one period to the next, he changes it in the direction of the 
other group members’ average contribution in the previous period. This means that he 
increases (decreases) his contribution if it was below (above) the average of the others.” (p. 
33). In the case of heterogeneous endowments, we need to distinguish between the 
considerations of absolute or relative contribution levels. We determine for each 
independent group of the same player type whether or not it reacts in the majority of 
cases in the predicted direction. Since almost all (groups of) players of type Sym, 
AsymWeak-poor, AsymWeak-wealthy, AsymWeak-rich, and AsymStrong-poor do react 
as predicted, we conclude that we have significant evidence of reciprocity both with 
respect to absolute and relative contributions. For the AsymStrong-rich player, however, 
we find significant evidence of reciprocity only with respect to absolute values. 
Since this is a very conservative way of testing, we examine reciprocity in OLS 
regressions on the difference between the proportion of one’s endowment contributed 
in the current and in the previous period (Model 3 for AsymWeak and Model 4 for 
Asymstrong). The results are presented in Table 4. 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 measures the 
lagged difference of one’s own proportion of the endowment contributed and the 
average proportion of endowment contributed by the others. The estimated coefficient 
of this variable is significantly negative in both treatments, which indicates the type of 
reciprocity defined above: ceteris paribus, if I have contributed a higher percentage than 
the others, I tend to decrease my contribution relative to the endowment, and vice versa. 
The estimates of Model 3 (AsymWeak) suggest, ceteris paribus, neither an increase nor a 
decrease in the percentage of endowment contributed by wealthy and rich players, but a 
significant increase by the poor players. Similarly, the estimates of Model 4 
(AsymStrong) suggest, ceteris paribus, an increase for the poor players, but a decrease 
for the rich ones.  
Result 3: In keeping with Hypothesis 3, we do observe reciprocity for all player types in 
our experiment. 
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Table 4: Changes in the Proportion of One’s Endowment Contributed to the Public 
Investment 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 AsymWeak AsymStrong 
Period -0.0044** -0.0014 
Last5Periods 0.0143 -0.0472 
LaggedDeviation -0.3975*** -0.5456*** 
Rich 0.0345 -0.3642*** 
Poor 0.0618**  
Intercept 0.0205 0.1582*** 
adjusted R² 0.204 0.284 
N 960 960 
Notes: OLS regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4 Profits and Gini Indices 
 
Table 5 exhibits the average profits realized per period. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows a 
significant difference between the average sum of profits per period in the three 
treatments (p = 0.0012). The comparison between Sym and AsymWeak shows no 
significant difference (U test, p = 0.7694). The comparisons between Sym and 
AsymStrong (p = 0.0034) and between AsymWeak and AsymStrong (p = 0.0011) show 
significant differences based on two-sided U tests. We conclude that the average sum of 
profits per period is significantly lower in AsymStrong than in the other two treatments. 
This directly relates to the differences in the group contribution levels observed above. 
The comparison of the average profit per period realized in Sym (where all group 
members are “wealthy” with an endowment of 15) and by the wealthy type in 
AsymWeak shows no significant difference (U test, p = 0.2828). 
The comparison of the endowment types within the AsymWeak treatment based on 
two-sided signed rank tests shows a significant difference between the poor and the 
wealthy (p = 0.0125), a significant difference between the poor and the rich (p = 0.0166) 
and a weakly significant difference between the wealthy and the rich (p = 0.0827). Also 
the comparison of the endowment types within the AsymStrong treatment shows a 
strongly significant difference between the poor and the rich (p = 0.0051). 
The two Asym treatments start with an inequality in wealth, i.e., an inequality in the 
endowments. After each decision round, the distribution of wealth might have changed, 
i.e., the distribution of profits might be different from the distribution of initial 
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endowments. To analyze the change in the inequality in wealth from the initial 
endowment distribution to the end of the experiment, we calculate Gini coefficients.6 
Table 6 presents the average Gini coefficients for the distribution of the players’ initial 
endowments and for the final distribution of players’ total profits accumulated over the 
25 rounds of the game within each group. For the sake of completeness, we do this for 
all three treatments. For the Sym treatment the initial-endowment Gini coefficient is 
zero and thus the coefficient may only stay the same or increase for the distribution of 
the final wealth. As discussed above, differences in the individual contributions may 
render the distribution of wealth less equal. The Gini coefficients for the initial 
endowment distributions in AsymWeak and AsymStrong might seem surprising given 
the numbers reported in the UN Human Development Report 2011 (UNDP, 2011). It 
provides Gini coefficients of 0.283 for Germany, or 0.585 for Colombia. 
We observe that, based on the Gini coefficients, the inequality decreases by 51 percent in 
the AsymWeak and by 31 percent in the AsymStrong treatment. These reductions in 
inequality are statistically significant (signed-rank tests, p = 0.0051). The reduction is 
significantly more important in AsymWeak than in AsymStrong (U test, p = 0.0696). 
Note that in the extreme, i.e., the provision of the public good at the social optimum, the 
Gini coefficient would be zero. In contrast, the equilibrium outcome of zero contribution 
would leave the initial Gini coefficient unchanged. In the Asym treatments, an increase of 
the Gini coefficient through public-good provision would be technically feasible. 
Result 4: In accordance with Hypothesis 4, we do observe a significant reduction in 
inequality in the experiments with heterogeneous endowments. The reduction is 
significantly more important under AsymWeak than under AsymStrong. 
  
                                                        
6 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion and it is commonly used as a measure of 
inequality of income or wealth. It is usually defined mathematically based on the Lorenz curve. It can be 
thought of as the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve and the total 
area under the line of equality. The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1. A low Gini coefficient indicates a 
more equal distribution, with 0 corresponding to complete equality, while higher Gini coefficients indicate 
more unequal distributions, with 1 corresponding to complete inequality. 
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Table 5: Average Period Profits 
 Sym  AsymWeak  AsymStrong  
Average Sum of Profits 
188.96 
(120; 240; 240)  
186.10 
(120; 240;200)  
164.03 
(120; 240; 182)  
Average Profit – Poor ---  
40.44 
(20; 60; 40)  
28.42 
(16; 60; 32)  
Average Profit – Wealthy 
47.24 
(30; 60; 60)  
47.75 
(30; 60; 50)  
---  
Average Profit – Rich ---  
50.17 
(40; 60; 60)  
78.75 
(72; 60; 88)  





Table 6: Gini Coefficients 








Sym 0.0000 0.0449 - 
AsymWeak 0.1250 0.0639 51.11 
AsymStrong 0.3500 0.2422 30.79* 
 
  





In the case of weak asymmetry in the distribution of players’ endowments in a public-
good game, we observe that the overall contribution level remains unchanged relative to 
a similar situation with a symmetric distribution of the same sum of endowments. Our 
experiment thus replicates the neutrality result by Hofmeyer et al. (2007), which gives 
hope for its robustness. However, our experiment also shows that a strong asymmetry in 
endowments may lead to significantly lower contributions. The asymmetry in our 
AsymStrong treatment is so important that this treatment differs from the typical VCM 
experiments in one crucial aspect: there exists a super-rich player that is not interested 
in achieving the social optimum. 
Our experimental results of the AsymWeak treatment confirm the observation by 
Hofmeyer et al. (2007) that cooperation is largely based on a “fair-share rule”, i.e., the 
principle that players contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment to 
the public investment. This is not what we observe in the strongly asymmetric 
treatment, though. The super-rich player tends to contribute an amount that is not 
significantly different from the average contribution of the poor players. 
This difference in the behavioral patterns between the AsymWeak and AsymStrong 
treatments indicates a potential norm shift that can be interpreted as follows. In the 
weakly asymmetric treatment, full contribution defines the ultimate cooperative goal for 
each of the three player types. We observe reciprocating behavior, in which contributing 
the same proportion of one’s endowment appears to play a larger role than contributing 
the same absolute amount. This suggests that there exists a behavioral norm based on 
the fair-share rule. However, in our strongly asymmetric treatment, the super-rich 
player has no interest in achieving the full-contribution social optimum, where the sum 
of all players’ profits would be maximized. The social optimum would imply equal profit 
for all players, and for the rich player a profit far below the Nash-equilibrium profit. 
While public-good provision in the case of heterogeneous endowments generally 
enhances social efficiency and involves an equalizing redistribution aspect, this aspect 
becomes—at some critical level of public-good provision below the social optimum—
unfavorable to the super-rich player in the AsymStrong treatment. The critical level of 
public-good provision can be identified by a “constrained social optimum”, i.e., the 
socially optimal solution under the restriction that everybody contributes the same 
amount. This implies that everybody contributes an amount equal to the poorest 
player’s endowment, which imposes an upper limit on the absolute contribution of the 
richer players. It is in every individual player’s interest to reach this constrained 
optimum. Thus, the behavioral norm in the AsymStrong treatment requires that 
everybody contributes the same absolute amount. 
Our result could surely be taken into account in the discussions and evaluations of global 
and national endeavors on public-good provision and can potentially partly explain why 
negotiations and other social interactions do not lead to the desired cooperative 
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outcomes. In the light of rising asymmetries within countries our research findings 
clearly convey a warning against this trend. Inequality has its price: In the case of strong 
asymmetries in the financial resources of the parties involved, the voluntary 
contributions mechanism might lead to outcomes that are far from being socially 
efficient. 
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Additional Data Tables 
 
Table A. 1: Average Group Contribution in Rounds 1-10, 11-20 and 21-25 
Treatment Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 Rounds 21-25 
 Average Std. Average Std. Average Std. 
Sym 39.66 9.37 35.47 9.47 22.14 12.49 
AsymWeak 38.70 7.41 34.00 9.48 19.86 10.74 
AsymStrong 27.02 12.67 21.68 8.51 12.68 8.77 
 
 
Table A. 2: Average Individual Contributions in Sym 
Group Player e = 15 
 Mean % e Median 
Sym1 7.53 50.2 10 
Sym2 7.27 48.5 5 
Sym3 13.77 91.8 15 
Sym4 9.82 65.5 15 
Sym5 7.35 49.0 8.5 
Sym6 7.35 49.0 9.5 
Sym7 7.25 48.3 5 
Average  8.62 57.5 9.71 
 
 
Table A. 3: Average Individual Contributions by Player Type in AsymWeak 
Group Player type e = 10 Player type e = 15 Player type e = 20 
 Mean % e Median Mean % e Median Mean % e Median 
AsymWeak1 4.00 40.0 3 6.12 40.8 5 9.36 46.8 0 
AsymWeak2 9.80 98.0 10 14.24 94.9 15 19.08 95.4 20 
AsymWeak3 5.72 57.2 5 6.90 46.0 5 11.48 57.4 12 
AsymWeak4 8.40 84.0 10 8.12 54.1 5 9.60 48.0 10 
AsymWeak5 1.44 14.4 0 5.00 33.3 4 14.16 70.8 17 
AsymWeak6 4.56 45.6 5 10.24 68.3 10 12.8 64.0 14 
AsymWeak7 9.32 93.2 10 4.58 30.5 5 7.24 36.2 8 
AsymWeak8 8.16 81.6 10 5.32 35.5 5 6.60 29.1 8 
AsymWeak9 6.88 68.8 8 6.76 45.1 6.5 9.84 43.3 10 
AsymWeak10 4.80 48.0 5 9.24 61.6 10 14.24 37.0 20 
Average 6.31 63.1 6.6 7.65 51.0 7.1 11.44 52.8 11.9 
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Table A. 4: Average Individual Contributions by Player Type in AsymStrong 
Group Player e = 8 Player e = 36 
 Mean % e Median Mean % e Median 
AsymStrong1 4.67 58.3 5 6.88 19.1 2 
AsymStrong2 6.08 76 8 2.24 6.2 0 
AsymStrong3 5.61 70.2 8 8 22.2 8 
AsymStrong4 5.63 70.3 8 3.6 10 4 
AsymStrong5 4.29 53.7 5 5.48 15.2 6 
AsymStrong6 4.89 61.2 5 19.88 55.2 20 
AsymStrong7 3.63 45.3 4 7.56 21 3 
AsymStrong8 4.09 51.2 4 5.88 16.3 6 
AsymStrong9 4.04 50.5 4 11.92 33.1 8 
AsymStrong10 5.01 62.7 6 4.88 13.5 6 
Average 4.79 59.9 5.7 7.63 21.2 6.3 
 
  




Experimental Instructions (AsymWeak) 
 
You participate in an economic decision experiment, in which you can earn money. How much 
each of you will earn depends on your personal decisions and those of other participants in the 
experiment. Each participant makes his decisions at a computer, isolated from the others. We 
ask you not to talk to other participants. 
The experiment consists of 25 rounds. In the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly 
matched with three other persons to build a group of four. You will remain in this group during 
the entire experiment. You will not know the identity of your group members at any time, 
though. 
Each group member is endowed in each round with a certain amount of tokens. Player 1 is 
endowed with 10 tokens per round. Players 2 and 3 are endowed with an amount of 15 tokens 
each. Player 4 is endowed with 20 tokens per round. The individual player numbers (and thus 




In each of the 25 rounds, each group member has to decide on how to allocate her/his tokens 
between two alternatives, called X and Y. The return of a token, in experimental currency units 
(ECU), is different for the two alternatives. The return of the allocation decision is determined as 
follows: 
Each token that you contribute to X yields a return of 2 ECU. If you contribute nothing to X, your 
return from X is zero.  
Each token that you contribute to Y, yields to you and to each of the other group members a 
return of 1 ECU. You may thus have a positive return from Y even if you don’t contribute 
anything to Y. 
 
Group Member Endowment (tokens) 
Player 1 10 
Player 2 15 
Player 3 15 
Player 4 20 
 
You may allocate your tokens to X or to Y only, but you may also allocate them among both 
alternatives. However, only entire tokens may be contributed. In the decision box on your screen 
you need to enter, for each alternative, the number of tokens that you want to allocate. If you do 
not want to contribute anything to X or Y, you need to type in a zero. The sum of the tokens 
contributed to X and Y must be always equal to your endowment of tokens. This means that the 
entire endowment has to be allocated among X and Y. With the <Tab> key you can switch among 
the entry fields. The entries have to be confirmed by clicking on <OK>. 
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Your individual return per round is the sum of your returns from X and Y and is calculated as 
follows: 
Return = 2  (your contribution to X) + (sum of tokens contributed to Y in your group). 
 
PAYMENT 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid based on your individual total profit over all 25 
rounds. Your individual total profit in ECU will be converted into € (1 ECU = 0.01 €) and paid to 




In each round, you will see an overview table on your screen which provides you with the 
results of all previous rounds that you have played. The results include the following 
information for each round: 
Your endowment, your mandatory minimum contribution to Y, your contribution to X, your 
contribution to Y, the individual contributions to Y of each of the other group members, your 
return from X, your return from Y, your round profit, and your total profit. 
If you want to see the results of earlier rounds, which are no longer visible in the table, please 
use the scroll function on the right side of the table. 
We ask you now to go to the computer with your participation number. There you have to click 
on <Continue>. You then will be given on your screen a number of questions regarding these 
instructions. If you have any questions please address yourself to the experimenter. Only when 
all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment starts. 
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When it comes to their funding, several public institutions, such as, for example, 
museums, theaters, and operas, rely on a two-tier model. They apply mandatory 
admission charges that may be voluntarily supplemented by charitable donations. Given 
that these institutions provide merit goods, their two-tier funding situation may be 
modeled in a public-good game, where mandatory levies are requested and additional 
contributions are possible. Such a model has been introduced by James Andreoni (1993) 
to investigate crowding-out effects of public intervention in a laboratory experiment. He 
observes that voluntary contributions are partially crowded out by a lump-sum “tax”. It 
still remains an open question, though, how such mandatory levies should be designed 
to maximize the revenues of public institutions, taking into account that agents possess 
unequal economic possibilities (wealth) and differ in their willingness to pay. 
An extensive experimental literature on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
finds that behavior in public-good games cannot solely be explained by standard 
economic preferences. Contributions, though declining over time, are generally higher 
than the Nash-equilibrium prediction. This is true whether the dominant strategy is to 
contribute nothing (e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1979, 1980) or whether it lies in the interior 
of the strategy space (e.g., Keser, 1996). Survey studies suggest that, when the dominant 
strategy is to contribute nothing and participants are equally endowed, initial 
contributions typically lie between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment but decay over 
time. In the last round about 70 percent of subjects contribute nothing (e.g., Davis and 
Holt, 1993; Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 2000). Although 
contributions are higher than theoretically predicted, they are at a considerable distance 
from the social optimum. There is ample evidence that subjects tend to coordinate their 
contributions by conditional cooperation, i.e., they begin cooperatively and reciprocate 
depending on the actions of others (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 
2001). How such cooperation is affected by an inequality in endowments (wealth) is, 
however, not yet well understood. John Ledyard’s conjecture that homogeneity in 
endowments has a positive effect on group contributions, or in other words, that 
heterogeneity has negative effects (Ledyard, 1995), has only partly been confirmed in 
the recent literature. Group contributions in weakly asymmetric environments tend to 
be equal to those in symmetric settings, where the same total endowment is allocated 
evenly over all group members. Thereby, players tend to follow a “fair-share” rule, 
where they coordinate on equal relative contributions of the endowment (Hofmeyr et 
al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014; Keser and Schmidt, 2014). The “fair-share” rule has its 
limitations, though. When the asymmetry in the endowments becomes so large that one 
of the players loses interest in the group optimum, the norm shifts from equal relative to 
equal absolute contributions and the group contribution level declines significantly 
(Keser et al., 2014). 
In this study, we consider an environment with heterogeneous endowments where the 
“fair-share” norm applies (the AsymWeak treatment of Keser et al. (2014)) and 
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investigate if and how this norm as well as the group contribution level may be 
influenced by minimum contribution requirements similar to the “taxes” in Andreoni 
(1993). In our experiment, we implement various minimum-contribution schedules 
(MCS) charging subjects with different endowments with different levies. These levies 
are compulsory minimum contributions. The staggering of our MCS is motivated by 
common tax structures to be found in real-life settings. We consider a treatment with a 
lump-sum “tax” (FixMin), requiring the same absolute minimum contributions from all 
players, a treatment with a flat “tax” rate (RelMin) that requires the same minimum 
contribution relative to their respective levels of endowment from all players, and a 
treatment with a progressive “tax” schedule (ProgMin), where the more wealthy players 
are requested to provide a higher minimum contribution relative to their endowment 
than the less wealthy ones. The AsymWeak treatment of Keser et al. (2014) serves as the 
baseline treatment (NoMin) without any minimum-contribution requirement.1 We do 
not see the mandatory levies in our study as taxes in the strict sense. Tax burdens 
impose tax levels, which are not intended to be overspent by taxpayers. Our minimum-
contribution schedules more closely resemble the mandatory admission charges 
mentioned above. We consider them as a policy tool to potentially impose norms. 
Despite the fact that in our experimental game there are no “standard economic” 
incentives for contributions above the compulsory minimum values, we expect our 
different minimum contribution schemes to exert “expressive power” (e.g., Cooter, 1998; 
Galbiati and Vertova, 2008), while driving contributions beyond the enforced minima 
due to incomplete crowding-out (Andreoni, 1993). Thereby, we anticipate that the 
miscellaneous schedules differently affect the sense of justice and the willingness to 
contribute among the group members. To investigate this, we define a measure of 
motivational crowding-out for our experimental setup. This measure relates to the 
classic crowding-out in the analysis of public policy (Andreoni, 1993; Andreoni and 
Payne, 2011) but it is different in that it considers the percentage of the freely 
disposable endowment that is contributed, rather than the absolute amount contributed. 
The motivational crowding-out measure indicates zero crowding-out if subjects that 
contribute, for example, 50 percent of their endowment in the absence of mandatory 
minimum contribution requirements will still contribute 50 percent of their freely 
disposable endowment (endowment beyond the mandatory contribution) in the 
presence of such requirements. Full motivational crowding-out implies contributions 
equal to the mandatory contribution levels. 
In the choice of the different minimum-contribution schedules, we pay attention to two 
features. Firstly, the total amount of minimum contributions is constant across all 
treatments. Secondly, minimum contributions for the individual player types are lower 
than the respective average contributions in the baseline treatment (without mandatory 
minimum contributions) and thus sum up to less than the (unenforced) average total 
                                                        
1 The differentiation of mandatory contribution levels in the treatments with the relative and the 
progressive MCS can be seen as a kind of third degree price discrimination, where the levies vary by 
wealth status. 
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group contribution in the baseline treatment.2 This is necessary, since we are not 
interested in increasing contributions to the public good by mandatory contributions 
that are high enough to exceed the amount that people would contribute voluntarily, 
anyway. We strive to investigate if and how different distributions of a given total 
mandatory levy may change individual and group contribution patterns. 
As discussed above, our study relates to two literature strands. The first one deals with 
the “expressive power” of law and is thus particularly relevant to the part of our study 
that deals with the impact of the various minimum contribution schemes on 
contribution norms. Law can be defined as an obligation, and, according to the 
expressive-power hypothesis, it might have psychological effects on individual 
preferences. In other words, actors might view an obligation as an internal value. Law 
can thus create a focal point by creating values (e.g., Cooter, 1998; Galbiati and Vertova, 
2008). The second literature strand deals with the impact of external interventions on 
intrinsic motivation with respect to crowding-out or crowding-in (e.g., Deci et al., 1999). 
Given the finding of incomplete crowding-out of voluntary contributions by minimum-
contribution requirements (Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002), we expect our tax 
systems to increase group contributions. Both literature strands are presented in more 
detail in Section 2. 
The main findings of our experiments can be summarized as follows. We find that 
mandatory minimum contributions do have a norm-giving character (expressive 
power). Group contribution levels are significantly higher in ProgMin than in NoMin and 
FixMin. On the individual level, we observe in all treatments that individuals with higher 
endowments make on average higher contributions than those with lower endowments. 
Furthermore, in RelMin, we replicate the “fair-share” rule observed in NoMin (Keser et 
al., 2014). In FixMin, we find relative contributions to be higher for the less than for the 
more wealthy players, but we observe the opposite in ProgMin. This suggests that the 
contribution norm can indeed be influenced through a deliberate intervention like a 
minimum contribution requirement. As a consequence, the progressive contribution 
schedule leads to a significant increase in average group contributions relative to the 
baseline treatment without minimum contribution requirements. While we observe 
motivational crowding-out in FixMin, we have no evidence for motivational crowding-
out in ProgMin and RelMin. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview 
over the related literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and derives 
testable hypotheses. Section 4 reviews these hypotheses in the face of the experimental 
results. Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.   
                                                        
2 To investigate crowding-out, Andreoni (1993) chooses a “tax” below the interior solution of the non-
linear public-good game. Our linear public good game does not have an interior Nash equilibrium but has 
a dominant strategy solution to contribute nothing. The outcome of the baseline treatment, however, lies 
in the interior of the strategy space and can be presented as a quantal response equilibrium under the 
assumption of altruism and error making (Anderson et al., 1998). 
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2. Related Literature 
 
We consider two ways how mandatory minimum contributions schedules could impact 
voluntary contributions to a public good. The first is derived from the literature on 
expressive law that hypothesizes that obligations have a potential to influence behavior. 
They may create focal points or norms, which channel individuals’ beliefs about the 
behavior of others and act as coordination devices (Cooter, 1998; Galbiati and Vertova, 
2008; McAdams and Nadler, 2005). Rational individuals internalize a norm (i.e., change 
their behavior) when commitment promises an advantage (Cooter, 1998). A norm set by 
the mandatory minimum contribution levels that is perceived as appropriate to enhance 
one’s profit is hence potentially able to increase individual and group contributions. 
Galbiati and Vertova (2008), for example, study expressive law with weakly incentivized 
non-binding obligations in a public-good game. These obligations are presented as 
minimum contributions that are not mandatory and thus leave the players’ decision 
spaces unaffected. However, participants know that they will be probabilistically 
audited and penalized or rewarded if they have under- or over-fulfilled their obligations. 
In a repeated linear public-good game with groups of six equally endowed subjects, 
Galbiati and Vertova test whether different obligation levels imply different levels of 
cooperation. They find that obligations in repeated interactions significantly affect the 
average level of individual contributions and the rate of decrease in cooperation over 
time. Higher obligations reduce the pace of the decline in average contributions. 
Unexpected changes in the level of minimum contributions have asymmetric effects on 
the level of cooperation: “a reduction does not alter the pattern of deterioration of 
cooperation over time, whereas an increase triggers a re-start in cooperation” (p. 148). In 
a follow-up study, Galbiati and Vertova (2014) disentangle the effects of obligations and 
incentives. They consider non-binding incentives (such that zero contribution to the 
public good still remains the dominant strategy for risk-neutral players) with a low and 
a high probability of an audit. They find obligations and non-binding incentives to be 
complementary, jointly supporting high levels of contribution. Incentives alone do not 
significantly increase contributions, while high obligations in the form of 
recommendations moderately increase them. 
In a similar study, using a repeated public-good game with groups of two identically 
endowed subjects, Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch (2013) find that obligations increase 
contributions in the first rounds. Contributions toward the end of the game, however, 
are not statistically distinguishable to the case without obligations. Individual 
contributions are affected by the own obligation but independently from the partners 
obligation. For a given obligation, behavior is not significantly different between 
symmetric and asymmetric obligation treatments. However, the fraction of non-
compliers is higher for subjects with higher inflicted obligation. Given that the decline in 
contributions is only significant for individuals with high obligations, subjects seem to 
incur non-monetary costs while disobeying obligations. People are not more likely to 
violate an obligation if it is perceived unfair. 
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The three studies above differ from our study in that the therein employed obligations, 
i.e., minimum contributions, are not binding. That means that in these studies 
participants face the same decision space whether obligations are imposed or not, i.e., 
under- or over-fulfillment of the obligation is possible. In our study the decision space is 
reduced by the minimum contribution requirements in the MCS treatments such that 
only over-fulfillment of the obligation is possible. 
The second potential impact channel of minimum contributions relates to the literature 
on the impact of external interventions on intrinsic motivation. According to Ryan and 
Deci (2000) “[i]ntrinsic motivation is defined as the doing of an activity for its inherent 
satisfaction rather than for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a 
person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external 
prods, pressures, or rewards” (p. 56). It is argued that, given a task that is performed 
voluntarily or for the sake of its own, any form of outside interference may affect the 
intrinsic motivation on which the initial action is based and thus change the amount of 
effort exerted in the task. Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation is reinforced, when the 
external intervention is perceived as controlling (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or when it has 
a negative effect on people’s feeling of self-determination, competence and self-esteem 
(Deci, 1971; Nyborg and Rege, 2003; Rotter, 1966). 
Titmuss (1970) was the first to establish the hypothesis that monetary rewards may 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. He came up with the example of blood donations, where 
present donors may reduce donations, if they perceive that their intrinsic motivation is 
not appreciated, when monetary incentives for their donations are offered. The result is 
what Condry and Chambers (1978) call “hidden costs of reward” as rewards tend to 
distract attention from the process of the task activity itself to the goal of getting a 
reward. This hypothesis was confirmed by Uptom (1973). Since Titmuss (1970) a large 
body of literature found indication for his hypothesis in a variety of other 
circumstances3. Note, however, that in contrast to the said, interventions, might also be 
perceived as supportive and promote self-esteem. If this is the case, they might even 
crowd in intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
In the case of the funding of a public good, a specific additional factor could play a crucial 
role: the perception of one’s moral responsibility for the provision of the good. If the 
government enforces minimum contribution levels, individuals may perceive a decay of 
their responsibility for the provision, leading to a crowding-out of (additional) voluntary 
contributions. If however, the intervention is able to communicate morally ideal 
contribution levels, which are perceived as symbolic, even a crowding-in is possible 
(Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg and Rege, 2003). 
Theoretical models on government intervention in the provision of public goods, for 
models with an interior equilibrium, predict complete crowding-out of private voluntary 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Deci (1971, 1972), Deci et al. (1999), Frey (1993, 1994, 1997a, 1997b), Frey et al. 
(1996), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Frey and Goette (1999), Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000a, 2000b), and Lepper et al. (1973). 
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by public contributions (e.g., Warr, 1982, 1983; Roberts, 1984, 1987; Bergstrom et al., 
1986; Bernheim, 1986). Indeed, crowding-out of voluntary public-good provision by 
governmental provision is found in several empirical studies. In the context of charitable 
giving Abrams and Schmitz (1978, 1984) find crowding-out of about 30 percent and that 
in addition to governmental charitable payments the need of the recipients plays a 
crucial role in the decision for private charitable donations. Payne (1998) observes 
crowding-out of about 50 percent of private donations to non-profit organizations 
(NGOs) with increased government funding. In a laboratory experiment, based on a 
public-good game with an interior equilibrium, Andreoni (1993) finds crowding-out of 
about 70 percent by mandatory contributions. In a similar study Chan et al. (2002) also 
find that crowding-out is incomplete and that enforced contributions significantly 
increase total contributions to the public good. 
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3. The Experiment 
3.1 The Game 
 
In our public-good game 𝑛 players form a group. Each player 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛) is endowed 
with a number of tokens, 𝑒𝑖, which have to be allocated between a private and a public 
investment. Let 𝑥𝑖  denote the amount allocated to the private investment and 𝑦𝑖 the 
amount allocated to the public investment by player 𝑖, with 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 0. The investments 
have to be in entire tokens and have to add up to the endowment. Furthermore, there is 
a minimum contribution requirement to the public investment 𝑐𝑖, with 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0. Thus, 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 ≤  𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖, and 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖. The profit of each player 𝑖 depends on his 
individual private investment and the sum of all public investments in his group. Each 
token that he allocates to the private investment yields him an individual return of 𝛼, 
while each token that he allocates to the public investment yields him and each other 
group member a return of 𝛽, with 𝛼 > 𝛽 and 𝑛𝛽 > 𝛼. The profit function of player 𝑖 can 
thus be written as: 
 
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖, ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1




   
Since a player’s individual return in the private investment is larger than in the public 
investment (𝛼 > 𝛽), the game has an equilibrium in dominant strategies, where each 
player contributes the required minimum to the public investment and all remaining 
tokens to his private investment (𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖, 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖). If this game is played over a 
finite number of 𝑇 rounds, the subgame perfect equilibrium solution prescribes, based 
on backward induction, that in each round 𝑡 ∈ (1, … , 𝑇) each player contributes the 
required minimum to the public investment and all remaining tokens to his private 
investment (𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑖). 
Given that 𝑛𝛽 > 𝛼, the sum of profits of all 𝑛 players is maximized if all tokens are 
allocated to the public investment. Hence, in the social optimum all players allocate in 
each round their entire endowment to the public investment. The game-theoretical 
solution (subgame-perfect equilibrium) is thus collectively inefficient. 
Given the evidence from earlier experiments on this kind of linear public-good game, 
where contributions, significantly deviate from the Nash equilibrium solution, also other 
equilibrium concepts are conceivable. For example, the so-called quantal response 
equilibrium, which is based on the assumption that subjects’ decisions are determined 
by altruism and decision-error, can explain why mean contributions deviate from the 
Nash equilibrium (Anderson et al., 1998). Based on the quantal response equilibrium 
concept, the crowding-out measure by Andreoni (1993), which is based on the 
assumption that the Nash equilibrium (before and after taxation) lies in the interior of 
the decision space and that the lump-sum tax is smaller than the equilibrium 
contribution, can also be used in the context of our study to evaluate the impact of our 
minimum contribution schedules on individual and group contributions.   





We conducted the computerized experiment in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral 
Economics at the University of Göttingen, Germany, based on the z-tree software package 
(Fischbacher, 2007).4 Participants were 160 bachelor and master students from various 
disciplines (mostly economics and business administration). Recruited via ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004), they had previously volunteered to participate in decision-making 
experiments. On average, a roughly equal number of female and male students 
participated in the experiments; the number of women and men approximately 
balanced during all sessions. According to subject availability, we conducted sessions 
with three to four groups each, implying three to four independent observations per 
session. In total 40 independent observations were collected in four different 
treatments. 
The procedure of the experiment was as follows. Upon arrival in the meeting room each 
participant got a randomly assigned participation number corresponding to a computer 
terminal in the lab. As soon as the required number of participants had shown up, the 
experimenter distributed written instructions (a translation of these is provided in 
Appendix B) and read them aloud to all participants. 
Participants were informed that they would be randomly assigned to groups which 
remain unchanged during the entire experimental session (partners design). 
Participants, however, did not get to know the identity of the participants with whom 
they interacted. Each player in a group was randomly assigned a player number from 
one to four, which was individually communicated at the beginning of the experiment 
and remained unchanged. Each player number was associated with a certain fixed 
endowment and minimum contribution requirement per round. At the end of each 
round, participants were informed about the contributions to the public investment by 
each of the other players in the group (identified by their player number but otherwise 
anonymous), the total group contribution, the profit for the current round, and the total 
profit so far. Moreover, all participants were provided with a history of all previous 
rounds, containing the same information, on the screen. 
After the reading of the instructions participants were seated at their respective 
computer terminals. Before the experiment started, we used computerized control 
questions with regard to the understanding of the instructions. The experiment did not 
start until all participants had provided correct answers to all questions. 
The participants were informed in the instructions that the profits gained in the course 
of the experiment were measured in Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) and that these 
profits were to be multiplied by a conversion factor of 0.01 € per ECU (which is the same 
for all players) for the final payment, in addition to a show-up fee of 3 €. The cash 
payment was conducted anonymously after the experiment. 
                                                        
4 The lab consists of 24 computers in isolated booths, such that vision of someone else’s computer screen 
or verbal communication with other participants is highly restricted. 
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An experimental session lasted on average around 75 minutes. The average payoff 
earned was about 15.50 € (including a 3 € show-up fee). 
 
3.3 Parameters and Treatments 
 
Participants are assigned to groups of four (𝑛 = 4), the game is played for 25 rounds 
(𝑇 =  25), and the parameters of the profit function are 𝛼 =  2 and 𝛽 =  1 (which 
implies a constant marginal per capita return (MPCR5) of 0.5 for the investment in the 
public account). Furthermore, participants are informed that Player 1 (Type 10) is 
endowed with 10 ECU, Players 2 and 3 (Type 15) are endowed with 15 ECU, each, and 
that Player 4 (Type 20) is endowed with 20 ECU. In each round, each participant has to 
make an allocation decision, conditioned on his minimum contribution requirement to 
the public good (𝑐𝑖). Minimum contribution requirements of all player types are 
common knowledge. 
Table 1 presents the individual minimum contribution requirements (𝑐𝑖) for the three 
player types in our four treatments: (1) NoMin, (2) FixMin, (3) RelMin, and (4) ProgMin. 
Under NoMin no participant is forced to contribute a mandatory levy; under FixMin 
every participant is forced to contribute a mandatory levy of 6 ECU; under RelMin each 
participant is forced to contribute a mandatory levy of 40 percent of her/his 
endowment; and under ProgMin each Type 10 player has to contribute 2 ECU, each Type 
15 player has to contribute 6 ECU, and each Type 20 player has to contribute 10 ECU. 
The amounts of 2 ECU, 6 ECU, and 10 ECU in ProgMin correspond to progressive MCS 
rates of 20, 40, and 50 percent, for the three player types. The FixMin treatment is in 
principle a regressive MCS system, in that poorer individuals have to contribute 
relatively more of their endowment. The amounts of 6 ECU correspond to a regressive 
MCS regime with rates of 60, 40, and 30 percent for the three player types, respectively. 
In all treatments the total endowment of the four players is equal to 60 and in all MCS 
treatments the total mandatory levy is equal to 24. 
  
                                                        
5 The MPCR is defined as the ratio of the private value of one token invested into the public investment to 
the private value of one token invested into the private investment. 
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To facilitate the illustration of the results in the following section our analysis focuses on 
two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Minimum contribution requirements incompletely crowd out voluntary 
contributions implying that we observe higher group contributions in the MCS treatments 
than in NoMin. 
Andreoni (1993) and Chan et al. (2002) measure crowding-out by (?̅?0 + 𝐶 − ?̅?𝐶) 𝐶⁄ , 
where ?̅?0 is the average group contribution to the public good in NoMin, 𝐶 is the sum of 
minimum contributions of all group members, and ?̅?𝐶  is the average group contribution 
to the public good in the respective MCS treatment. Thus, crowding-out is 0 percent if 
?̅?𝐶 = ?̅?0 + 𝐶 and it is 100 percent if ?̅?0 = ?̅?𝐶. Based on this measure, they find that 
crowding-out is incomplete and, thus, that their public policy interventions by enforced 
minimum contributions significantly increase total contributions to the public good. 
Therefore, we expect that the three minimum contribution schedules increase group 
contributions above the level of NoMin, but not by the full amount of the contribution 
requirements. 
Hypothesis 2: Players follow a simple “fair-share” rule of equal relative contributions of 
the endowment in RelMin but not in FixMin and ProgMin. 
Keser et al. (2014) have shown that players in NoMin tend to coordinate their 
contributions by using the simple “fair-share” rule, where they contribute equal 
amounts relative to the endowment. Since in RelMin mandatory contributions are 
staggered relative to the endowment, we expect contributions to follow this rule as well. 
However, we expect that Type 10 players contribute a higher (lower) share of their 
endowment than both other types in FixMin (ProgMin), and that Type 20 players 
contribute a higher (lower) share of their endowment than both other types in ProgMin 
(FixMin). In other words, we expect the proportional mandatory contributions in 
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RelMin, the regressive mandatory contributions in FixMin, and the progressive 
mandatory contributions in ProgMin, respectively, to exert their “intended” influence by 
pushing individual contributions in the direction in which the minimum contribution 
requirements are staggered. We derive support for this conjecture from the literature on 
expressive law. This literature suggests that mandatory minimum contributions 
schedules may exert “expressive power” through the imposed obligations by expressing 
certain levels of “fair contribution” (Galbiati and Vertova, 2008; Riedel and Schildberg-
Hörisch, 2013). 
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4. Experimental Results 
 
Beyond the analysis of group contributions in Subsection 4.1 (Hypothesis 1) and 
individual contributions in subsection 4.2 (Hypothesis 2), we shall investigate 
reciprocity in Subsection 4.3 and profits in Subsection 4.4. All nonparametric tests 
presented in the following subsections are two-sided. We shall denote the Mann-
Whitney U test as U test and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test as signed-
rank test. 
 
4.1 Group Contributions 
 
Figure 1 presents the development of the average group contributions to the public 
investment (?̅?𝑡) in the four treatments over the 25 rounds. As can be seen, the ProgMin 
treatment exhibits the highest contributions.6 Due to the large end-game effect in NoMin 
(in approximately the last five rounds), which is impeded by the minimum contribution 
requirements in the MCS treatments, we report only figures for rounds 1 to 20 in the 
forthcoming analysis. For this game interval, average group contributions are 36.4 in 
NoMin, 38.7 in FixMin, 40.2 in RelMin, and 44.7 in ProgMin.7 This indicates that the 
mandatory contributions only partially crowd out voluntary contributions. Following 
Andreoni (1993), crowding-out is 90.2 percent in FixMin, 83.8 percent in RelMin and as 
little as 65.0 percent in ProgMin. Pairwise treatment comparisons, based on U tests, 
show that average group contributions in ProgMin are significantly higher than those in 
NoMin (p = .0343) and FixMin (p = .0963); no other pairwise comparison shows a 
statistically significant difference. 
It is important to mention that group contributions in ProgMin do not start from the 
beginning on a higher level than in the other two MCS treatments. They rather rise 
during the first rounds of the game and then remain nearly constant until the end-game. 
In the first round, we find that average group contributions do not differ between the 
MCS treatments, with respective figures of 39.0, 36.5, and 38.5 in FixMin, RelMin, and 
ProgMin. The average first-round contribution in NoMin is 30.8; it is significantly lower 
than in FixMin (p = .0884) and in ProgMin (p = .0487), when compared by U tests.8 
Result 1: Group contribution levels are significantly higher in ProgMin than in NoMin and 
FixMin. For ProgMin, this confirms Hypothesis 1 that crowding-out is incomplete. 
  
                                                        
6 Over rounds 1-25, the mean group contributions are 43.5 in ProgMin compared to 33.1 in NoMin, 37.7 in 
FixMin, and 39.8 in RelMin. The respective average standard deviations are 7.5, 12.4, 5.9, and 6.1. 
7 Average standard deviations of total group contributions for rounds 1-20 are 9.9, 5.3, 5.4, and 6.8 for 
NoMin, FixMin, RelMin, and ProgMin respectively. 
8 Average standard deviations of total group contributions for round 1 are 9.0, 7.4, 6.9, and 7.9 for NoMin, 
FixMin, RelMin, and ProgMin respectively. 




Figure 1: Average Group Contributions per Round (by Treatment) 
 
Net relative group contributions and motivational crowding-out: To compare 
voluntary contributions in the NoMin treatment to the contributions in the MCS 
treatments, while taking into account the different sizes of strategy sets in these two 
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𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 captures, for round 𝑡, the group contribution above the sum of mandatory 
contributions (group contribution minus sum of mandatory contributions) relative to 
the net endowment of the group (group endowment minus sum of mandatory 
contributions). This measure ranges from zero to one. It is zero, when only the 
mandatory levies are contributed (which are zero in the case of NoMin) and one, when 
the entire net endowment is contributed. 
This measure allows a more flawless comparison of the treatments in our study since it 
takes into account that players with different endowments and different minimum 
contribution requirements have different strategy sets. Based on this measure we define 
a “motivational crowding-out or crowding-in” of voluntary contributions, which is 
different from the classic definition of crowding-out by public policy (Andreoni, 1993). If 
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their freely disposable endowments (net endowments) than the groups in the NoMin 
treatment, we interpret this observation as motivational crowding-out (crowding-in) of 
contributions by the minimum contribution requirements. Motivational crowding-out is, 
in contrast to the classic crowding-out, not measured token by token but in percent of 
the endowment that is at free disposal. While we define that net relative group 
contributions at the same level as in the NoMin treatment imply zero motivational 
crowding-out, full motivational crowding-out is defined by zero net relative group 
contributions. Both definitions are different from the classic definitions in Andreoni 
(1993). 
Figure 2 shows the development of the average net relative group contributions in the 
four treatments. Visual inspection suggests two distinct contribution levels over rounds 
1 to 20: NoMin and ProgMin show average contributions of 60.6 percent and 57.6 
percent, respectively, while FixMin and RelMin show average contributions of 40.8 
percent and 45.1 percent, respectively.9, 10 Pairwise comparisons, based on U tests, 
indicate significant differences between NoMin and FixMin as well as ProgMin and 
FixMin (p = .0963, for both comparisons). Thus, we find on average small and 
statistically insignificant motivational crowding-out of 4.9 percent in ProgMin and 
higher but still statistically insignificant motivational crowding-out of 25.5 percent in 
RelMin. Only the motivational crowding-out of 32.6 percent in FixMin is statistically 
significant. 
Result 2: Motivational crowding-out of group contribution is statistically significant in 
FixMin. There is no significant motivational crowding-out in ProgMin and RelMin. 
 
                                                        
9 The corresponding average standard deviations of 𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡  for rounds 1-20 are .1645, .1478, .1503, and 
.1885, for NoMin, FixMin, RelMin, and ProgMin respectively. 
10 The overall negative time trend is moderate and seems to be, except for the first periods, not different 
between the treatments. 




Figure 2: Average Net Group Contributions (by Treatment) 
 
4.2 Contributions by Player Types 
4.2.1 Comparison within Treatments 
 
To compare the contributions of the different player types within each treatment, 
differences in the end-game effects for the player types play a minor role. We thus 
consider averages over rounds 1 to 25 in this analysis.  
Figure A.1 in Appendix A presents the development of average contributions of the three 
player types (Type 10, Type 15, and Type 20) in the four treatments over the 25 
rounds.11 We find the non-surprising tendency for more abundantly endowed players to 
contribute more in absolute terms. Table A. 1 in Appendix A shows that, with the 
exception of two comparisons, all pairwise comparisons, based on signed-rank tests, 
show significant differences with p ≤ .0593. 
Given the asymmetry in endowments, we consider two “relative contribution measures” 
to compare the contributions of the poor (Type 10), wealthy (Type15), and rich (Type 
20) players. The first measure goes back to the fair-share rule in Hofmeyr et al. (2007) 
and Keser et al. (2014); it measures the absolute contributions of the player types 
relative to their individual endowment (relative contribution). Figure A. 2 in Appendix A 
presents the development of average relative contributions for the three player types in 
                                                        
11 For Type 10 (player 1) and Type 20 (player 4) the averages are based on ten players for each average, 
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the four treatments. As can be seen, there are no significant differences in the average 
relative contributions between the player types both in NoMin (AsymWeak treatment of 
Keser et al. (2014)) and RelMin. For RelMin, where the mandatory contributions push 
contributions toward the “fair-share” rule with equal relative contributions, this result is 
highly plausible. In FixMin average relative contributions significantly differ between 
the player types such that relative contributions to the public good decrease with the 
endowment level. For ProgMin, on the other hand, the contribution hierarchy is 
reversed such that the wealthier players contribute relatively more. Table A. 2 in 
Appendix A provides the p-values of the pairwise comparisons of contributions by 
player type in the four treatments (signed-rank tests). These widely confirm the 
previous statement: all differences in NoMin and RelMin are insignificant, and (almost) 
all differences in FixMin and ProgMin are significant (p ≤ .0745, the unique exception is 
the difference between Types 15 and 20 in ProgMin that is not statistically significant). 
We may conclude that the proportional mandatory contributions in RelMin, the 
regressive mandatory contributions in FixMin, and the progressive mandatory 
contributions in ProgMin, respectively, exert their “intended” influence. RelMin leads to 
equal relative contributions, FixMin to higher relative contributions by the less wealthy 
players, and ProgMin to higher relative contributions by the more wealthy players. 
Result 3: In RelMin players follow the simple “fair-share” rule of equal relative 
contributions of the endowment. However, this rule does not apply in FixMin and ProgMin: 
average relative contributions are higher for the less wealthy players in the regressive 
FixMin treatment and higher for the more wealthy players in the progressive ProgMin 
treatment. These results confirm Hypothesis 2. 
The second relative-contribution measure, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡, essentially calculates 𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 on an 






   
where 𝑐𝑖 is treatment dependent. It captures for each player type 𝑖 the average 
individual contribution net of the mandatory contribution (absolute contribution minus 
mandatory contribution) relative to the net endowment (individual endowment minus 
mandatory contribution). 
Figure A. 3 in Appendix A presents the development of average 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 for the three player 
types in the four treatments. Table A. 3 in Appendix A shows the p-values of the pairwise 
comparisons based on signed-rank tests. As can be seen, there is only one difference that 
is statistically significant (p = .0745, Type 10 players contribute significantly more than 
Type 20 players in FixMin). None of the remaining comparisons yields statistical 
significance. We conclude that players tend to follow a modified “net fair-share” rule of 
equal relative contributions of the disposable endowment in FixMin and ProgMin. The 
“net fair-share” rule also applies in NoMin and RelMin, since it coincides with the 
original “fair-share” rule. 
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Result 4: Players follow in all treatments a “net fair-share” rule of equal contributions 
relative to the decision space. 
 
4.2.2 Comparison between Treatments 
 
So far, we have focused our analysis on the differences between the player types within 
each of the four treatments. For a deeper understanding of the mechanics that might be 
at work in the various treatments, i.e., how the norms might be set by the different MCS 
regimes, we compare the behavior of each player type across the four treatments. If we 
observe differences in behavior, these differences could ultimately lead to differences in 
group contributions between the treatments. Due to the strong end-game effect in 
NoMin, which is impeded by the minimum contribution requirements in the MCS 
treatments, we again report only averages over rounds 1 to 20 in this analysis. 
Figure 3 depicts that, on average, relative contributions (and thus also absolute 
contributions) of Type 10 are highest in FixMin, where also the mandatory minimum 
contribution relative to the endowment is highest for this player type. The trajectories in 
the other treatments are not clearly distinguishable. Contributions of Type 15 are clearly 
highest in ProgMin and lowest in NoMin; the trajectories in FixMin and RelMin lie in 
between. Contributions of Type 20 are highest in ProgMin and lowest in FixMin. NoMin 
shows a clear decline that, toward the end of the game, even undercuts the level of 
FixMin. Contributions in RelMin lie between those in FixMin and ProgMin. 
Considering contributions in the first round, we find that, on average, Type 10 players 
contribute 6.3, 7.2, 6.4, and 5.7; Type 15 players 6.9, 9.4, 9.3, and 9.7; and Type 20 
players 10.7, 13, 11.6, and 13.5 in NoMin, FixMin, RelMin, and ProgMin, respectively. For 
Types 10 and 20, the differences between the treatments are never statistically 
significant. For Type 15, differences are significant between NoMin and all three MCS 
treatments (p ≤ .0698, U tests); comparisons between the MCS treatments yield no 
significant differences. 
  




Figure 3: Average Relative Contributions (by Treatment) 
 
For contributions in rounds 1 to 20, Table A. 4 in Appendix A shows the p-values of the 
pairwise comparisons of average absolute [and net] contributions for the three player 
types (U tests). As can be seen, Type 10 players contribute on average most in FixMin 
and least in ProgMin and NoMin; contributions in RelMin lie in between. However, only 
the difference between ProgMin and FixMin is statistically significant (p = .0257). Type 
15 players contribute in all MCS treatments on average more than in NoMin but only the 
difference between ProgMin and NoMin is significant (p = .0232). Although differences 
between the MCS treatments are not significant, the average figures indicate that 
contributions are highest in ProgMin, followed by RelMin, and then FixMin. Type 20 
players contribute on average least in FixMin and most in ProgMin; contributions in 
NoMin and RelMin lie in between. Contributions in ProgMin are thereby significantly 
higher than in all other treatments (p ≤ .0696), between which there is no statistically 
significant difference. For Type 20 we observe motivational crowding-out in FixMin and 
RelMin (p ≤ .0696, for both). For no other player type do we observe motivational 
crowding-out. To conclude, for player types 15 and 20 but not for player type 10, 
ProgMin leads to the highest contributions to the public good. Given that Type 10 
players have a lower leverage on group contributions than Type 15 and Type 20 players, 
this explains why we observe the highest group contribution level in ProgMin, which is 
significantly higher than in NoMin. 
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Result 5: Type 10 and Type 20 players contribute most, when they are facing relatively 
high mandatory contributions (FixMin and ProgMin, respectively) and contribute least, 
when they are facing relatively low mandatory contributions (ProgMin and FixMin, 
respectively). Type 15 players contribute most in ProgMin and least in NoMin. 
One might argue that contributions in the MCS treatments increase merely due to the 
enforced increase in the contributions of uncooperative subjects, while the cooperative 
subjects’ contributions might have remained the same. To test for this eventuality, we 
use a simple approach. For each player type and treatment, we order average 
contributions from the lowest to the highest, and divide this ordering by half. We can 
thus distinguish between more and less cooperative subjects and compare the behavior 
of the more cooperative subjects’ in the various treatments. The average contributions 
are presented in Table A. 5 in Appendix A. Tests for differences across the treatments, 
based on U tests, confirm for both Type 15 and 20 players that the increase in 
contributions in ProgMin is not solely driven by the higher contributions of 
uncooperative subjects.12 
Additionally, we find that in ProgMin lower-bound contributions of Type 15 players 
(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 = 6), for which mandatory contributions are equal in all MCS treatments, 
exhibit with 19.8 percent the lowest proportion of all MCS treatments (p ≤ .0030, U 
tests). In NoMin, we observe 38.3 percent of contributions of six or below. Furthermore, 
we also find that in ProgMin Type 15 and 20 players display the highest proportion of 
full contributions (𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 = 15 and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 = 20, respectively) compared to all other 
treatments (p ≤ .0225, U tests); for Type 10 players differences in the proportions of full 
contributions between the treatments are insignificant. The respective figures for lower-
bound and full contributions are presented in Table A. 6 in Appendix A. 
The results concerning contributions by cooperative players and concerning lower 
bound and full contributions indicate that the ProgMin treatment leads to a norm shift, 
not just to higher group contributions due to a higher constraint for the wealthier 
players. 
  
                                                        
12 Cooperative Type 15 players significantly contribute more in ProgMin than in RelMin and FixMin 
(p ≤ .0413); all other differences are not significant. Cooperative Type 20 players contribute significantly 
more in ProgMin than in NoMin and FixMin (p = .0413, for both comparisons); all other differences are not 
significant. For Type 10 players, contributions of cooperative players are not significantly different 
between all treatments.  





As known from the literature (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 
2001), subjects behave reciprocally and make contributions that depend on the actions 
of others. Keser and van Winden (2000) argue that players, if they change their 
contribution from one round to the next, tend to increase (decrease) their contribution, 
if in the previous round their contribution was below (above) the average of the group. 
Given the different endowments of player types in our experiment, we examine 
reciprocity in terms of changes in relative contributions. In other words, we examine 
how players react if their own relative contribution has been lower (higher) than the 
average of the relative contributions of the other group members in the previous round. 
Table 2 presents the results of a regression on the reaction of the individual relative 
contribution to the average relative contribution of the other group members in the 
previous round. The dependent variable is the individual change of the relative 
contribution to the public investment from the previous to the current round (∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑙). 
The major explanatory variable is the lagged difference between the relative 
contribution of the player and the average relative contribution of the other group 
members (𝐿. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓2𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠). Additionally, we control for player-type and treatment 
effects by using dummy variables (and interactions), considering Type 10 and NoMin as 
the respective reference group. 
Table 2 indicates that 𝐿. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓2𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 is significantly negative and thus provides 
clear evidence for reciprocity. Another important finding concerns the ProgMin 
treatment and potentially explains why it shows the highest group contribution level. On 
the one hand, we observe that Type 10 players behave most reciprocally (the interaction 
term ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers is significantly negative) and, on the other hand, that 
Type 15 and Type 20 players behave least reciprocally (the interaction terms Type 15 × 
ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers and Type 20 × ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers are 
significantly positive). These findings are consistent with our previous results. As it 
seems, Type 15 and Type 20 players choose their contributions in this treatment 
“irrespective” of the contributions by Type 10 players. The two wealthier types seem to 
accept the low contributions by Type 10 players and “simply follow” the contribution 
norms set by the ProgMin schedule. This may, at least partially, explain why 
contributions of both player types in ProgMin are highest in this treatment, despite the 
fact that Type 10 players exhibit their lowest contributions of all treatments. 
Additionally, we find that the change in relative contributions is becoming more 
negative during the course of the game (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 is significantly negative). 
Result 6: Players generally behave reciprocally. In ProgMin, Type 10 players behave more 
and Type 15 and 20 players less reciprocally. 
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Table 2: Regression for Comparisons of Reciprocity 
Dependent variable: ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑙 
   
Constant  .0378 (.0251) 
L.Diff2MeanOthers -.3268*** (.0552) 
Round -.0021*** (.0007) 
Type 15 -.0390 (.0291) 
Type 20 -.0043 (.0295) 
FixMin .0437 (.0288) 
RelMin .0201 (.0294) 
ProgMin -.0855** (.0340) 
Type 15 × FixMin -.0267 (.0343) 
Type 15 × RelMin -.0001 (.0352) 
Type 15 × ProgMin .1312*** (.0389) 
Type 20 × FixMin -.1372*** (.0387) 
Type 20 × RelMin -.0417 (.0367) 
Type 20 × ProgMin .0981** (.0398) 
Type 15 × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.1285* (.0703) 
Type 20 × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.0313 (.0823) 
FixMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers .0601 (.0765) 
RelMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.0355 (.0800) 
ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.2083** (.0849) 
Type 15 × FixMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers .0072 (.0991) 
Type 15 × RelMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.0576 (.1030) 
Type 15 × ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers .1995* (.1078) 
Type 20 × FixMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.1446 (.1244) 
Type 20 × RelMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers -.0840 (.1183) 
Type 20 × ProgMin × L.Diff2MeanOthers .3226*** (.1151) 
   
R² .2346 
N 3040 
Notes: OLS-regressions with robust variance estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
4.4 Profits and Gini Indices 
 
Table 3 illustrates the average profits per round over rounds 1 to 20 for the three player 
types and the resulting average group profits in the four treatments. Pairwise 
comparisons, using U tests, show that solely the differences in average group profits 
between ProgMin and NoMin (p = .0343), and ProgMin and FixMin (p = .0963) are 
significant. 
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Table 3: Average Profits per Round 
 NoMin FixMin RelMin ProgMin 
Type 10 43.30 42.30 45.60 52.23 
Type 15 49.33 49.03 50.31 52.04 
Type 20 50.75 57.07 54.27 53.19 
Group profit  192.70 197.41 200.48 209.49 
Notes: Averages for rounds 1 to 20. Social optimum sum of profits per round = 240. Equilibrium sum of 
profits per round = 120, 168, 168, 168. Equilibrium profit per round for Type 1 = 20, 32, 36, 40; 
equilibrium profit per round for Type 2 = 30, 42, 42, 42; equilibrium profit per round for Type 3 = 40, 
52, 48, 44 (NoMin, FixMin, RelMin, ProgMin). Social optimum profit per round = 60 (for all types). 
 
Comparisons for the player types between treatments based on U tests show that Type 
10 players earn on average significantly more in ProgMin than in all other treatments, 
between which there are no significant differences (p ≤ .0343). For Type 15 players, 
profits in ProgMin are significantly higher than in NoMin (p = .0989) and FixMin 
(p = .0498); for the other differences, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
significant difference. For Type 20 players, profits in FixMin are significantly higher than 
in NoMin and ProgMin (p ≤ .0172); all other differences are statistically insignificant. 
Given that players in all four treatments start with different endowments, and that 
contributions to the public investment tend to result in an equalization of total profits 
through a redistribution of wealth, we analyze, based on the Gini index, the differences 
in inequality between the initial distribution of endowments, the distribution of total 
profits in equilibrium, and the actual distribution of total profits over rounds 1 to 20 in 
the four treatments. Table 4 displays the respective figures. 
Average total profit Gini indices are smaller than Nash-equilibrium Gini indices for 
NoMin (p = .0051) and FixMin (p = .0284), using MPSR tests; for RelMin the difference is 
almost significant (p = .1141). For ProgMin, on the other hand, total profit Gini indices 
are significantly higher than Gini indices in equilibrium (p = .0218). 
Furthermore, the comparison of average total profit Gini indices discloses that ProgMin 
exhibits significantly smaller Gini indices than all other treatments. Based on U tests, we 
find significant differences between NoMin and ProgMin, and FixMin and RelMin 
(p = .0284, respectively), and also between FixMin and ProgMin, and RelMin and 
ProgMin (p = .0065, respectively). 
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Table 4: Gini indices 
Treatment 
Gini index for 
endowments 
[net of MCs] 
(1) 












NoMin .1250 [.1250] .1250 .0561 -55.1/-0.0/-55.1 
FixMin .1250 [.2083] .0893 .0674 -46.1/-28.6/-24.5 
RelMin .1250 [.1250] .0536 .0471 -62.3/-57.1/-12.1 
ProgMin .1250 [.0417] .0179 .0279 -77.7/-85.7/+55.9 
Notes: Gini indices for total profits over rounds 1 to 20.  
 
Result 7: ProgMin leads to the lowest inequality in total profits of all treatments. 
Although, the inequality in total profits is larger than in equilibrium, the average group 
profit in ProgMin is the highest of all treatments. 
  





We investigate whether and how cooperation and the previously observed “fair-share” 
norm in public-good experiments with asymmetrically endowed players are influenced 
by enforced minimum-contribution schedules. We consider schedules, where all players 
face the same absolute minimum contribution irrespective of their endowment (FixMin), 
where all players face the same minimum contribution relative to the endowment 
(RelMin), and where a player with a higher endowment faces a higher minimum 
contribution relative to the endowment than a player with a lower endowment 
(ProgMin). Our mandatory minimum-contribution schedules relate to the literature on 
tax fairness or “vertical equity”. In taxpayer surveys, Gerbing (1988) and Roberts and 
Hite (1994) find evidence of a preference for progressive tax rates. For upper-income 
taxpayers, however, Gerbing finds that they perceive flat tax rates as more fair. In the 
context of a public-good game, where participants can vote for several minimum 
contribution schemes, which are intended to provide a jointly agreed minimum group 
provision level, Gallier et al. (2014) find that the scheme which equalizes payoffs 
(similar to ProgMin) is mostly chosen by less wealthy players, while rich players mostly 
chose the scheme which equalizes contributions (similar to FixMin). Given this evidence 
and the pervasive calls for fairer tax systems implying tax breaks for lower and middle 
income classes together with tax increases for upper income classes, it is possible that 
an as fairer perceived distribution of mandatory minimum contributions (as, for 
example, in ProgMin) exerts a positive effect on individual and consequently total group 
contributions. 
The results of our experiment suggest the potential of mandatory minimum 
contributions to exert expressive power. We observe them to exert a norm-giving 
character. They seem to communicate relations of fair contributions by the different 
player types and thus might increase group contributions relative to the situation 
without minimum-contribution requirements. It turns out that this is particularly true 
for our ProgMin treatment, which is likely perceived as the most fair among all 
mandatory contribution systems considered. ProgMin is the only treatment, where the 
crowding-out of voluntary contributions to the public good by mandatory contributions 
is significantly incomplete, when we use the measure by Andreoni (1993). For RelMin 
and FixMin the crowding-out is close to complete. When we consider motivational 
crowding-out as defined in this paper, it is statistically significant only in FixMin. 
ProgMin exhibits hardly any motivational crowding-out. 
On the individual level, we find support for the “fair-share” rule in RelMin. This rule 
cannot be detected in FixMin and ProgMin due to the norms set through the (inverted) 
progressivity in both treatments. In the regressive FixMin treatment average relative 
contributions are higher for less wealthy players and in ProgMin average relative 
contributions are higher for more wealthy players. As we see, the “fair-share” norm can 
be eroded through a deliberate intervention. In particular, in ProgMin, the norm of what 
is a player’s fair share is adapted in the “intended” direction. Players in FixMin and 
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ProgMin seem to coordinate on a modified fair-share rule of equal contributions relative 
to the decision space, which we call the “net fair-share” rule. Average relative 
contributions to the available decision space are equal for all player types in FixMin and 
ProgMin. 
Type 15 players, for which mandatory contributions are the same in all three MCS 
treatments, contribute most in ProgMin and least in NoMin. The other two player types 
contribute more, when they are facing relatively high mandatory contributions (FixMin 
for Type 10 and ProgMin for Type 20) and contribute less, when they are facing 
relatively low mandatory contributions (ProgMin for Type 10 and FixMin for Type 20). 
We also find Type 10 players to behave most and Type 15 and Type 20 players to 
behave least reciprocally in ProgMin. As it seems, Type 15 and Type 20 players choose 
their contributions in this treatment “irrespective” of the lower contributions by Type 
10 players. This may, at least partially, explain why contributions of both player types in 
ProgMin are the highest of all treatments, despite the fact that Type 10 players exhibit 
their lowest contributions of all treatments. Thus, the observation that group 
contributions are significantly higher in ProgMin than in the other three treatments can 
potentially be explained by the acceptance of the norm of progressive contributions 
among the Type 15 and Type 20 players in this treatment, rendering their contributions 
unconditional on the contributions by Type 10 players. Furthermore, we find that 
ProgMin exhibits the lowest inequality in total profits of all our treatments in terms of 
the Gini index. 
In spite of these strong results, we advise caution generalizing our findings, in particular 
with respect to public policy. The response of contributions in a public-good game with 
heterogeneous endowments to mandatory minimum contributions may not be the same 
as the response of real economic factors as, for example, labor supply on an intervention 
in this sphere (Lindsey, 1987). In our experiment, heterogeneous endowments were 
randomly allocated to all participants in a group. Thus, participants neither had to 
supply their endowments by themselves nor to work for them. Even though neither 
Clark (2002) nor Cherry et al. (2005) find that these origins of the endowments, 
compared to cases where participants are provided with windfall endowments, have an 
effect in their public-good experiments, we believe that at least some caution is advised 
concerning possible effects of the endowment origin. This might be particularly true, 
when the asymmetry in the endowment distribution becomes more important. For 
example, Cherry et al. (2002) find an effect of endowment origin on behavior in a 
dictator-game setting. If endowments had to be earned, our mandatory contributions 
could likely exert similar effects as taxes and lead to a decline in the work effort, which 
would be in keeping with the Laffer curve hypothesis. Note, however, that for almost all 
types (with the exception of Type 10 in FixMin and Type 20 in ProgMin) our tax rates 
are well below the empirically observed tax-revenue-maximizing rates of 50 to 60 
percent (e.g., Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003). Although our study is able to show 
that the progressive minimum-contribution schedule performed best in our public-good 
setting in terms of overall contribution rates, we are not able to predict, which degree of 
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progression would work best in a public-good environment, where endowments must 
be earned. 
With respect to our initial example of public institutions, which rely on two-tier 
financing models based on mandatory admission charges plus voluntarily charitable 
donations and/or employ third degree price discrimination by setting admission fees 
that vary by status (e.g., regular tickets and reduced tickets for children, students, 
retirees, unemployed etc.), the increase in average group contributions in ProgMin 
compared to NoMin and FixMin suggests that progressive tariff structures can indeed be 
used to improve the financing of such institutions. 
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Additional Tables and Figures 
  




Figure A. 1: Average Absolute Contributions by Player Type 
 
Table A. 1: Comparisons of Average Absolute Contributions between Player Types 
(p-values of two-sided signed-rank tests) 

















- .2845 .0218 
Type 10 
(8.03) 
- .0593 .0284 
Type 15 
(7.65) 
- - .0051 
Type 15 
(9.54) 
- - .2411 
Type 20 
(11.44) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(10.56) 
- - - 
        

















- .0166 .0069 
Type 10 
(6.07) 
- .0051 .0051 
Type 15 
(9.82) 
- - .0069 
Type 15 
(11.00) 
- - .0051 
Type 20 
(12.92) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(15.48) 
- - - 
Notes: Comparisons and average contributions involve rounds 1 to 25. Averages for the player types are 
given in parentheses. 
  




Figure A. 2: Average Relative Contributions by Player Type 
 
Table A. 2: Comparisons of Average Relative Contributions between Player Types  
(p-values of two-sided signed-rank tests) 

















- .2411 .6465 
Type 10 
(.8032) 
- .0166 .0093 
Type 15 
(.5101) 
- - .1394 
Type 15 
(.6359) 
- - .0593 
Type 20 
(.5720) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(.5280) 
- - - 
        

















- .1394 .2845 
Type 10 
(.6068) 
- .0593 .0745 
Type 15 
(.6549) 
- - .2411 
Type 15 
(.7332) 
- - .3329 
Type 20 
(.6460) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(.7740) 
- - - 
Notes: Comparisons and average contributions involve rounds 1 to 25. Averages for the player types are 
given in parentheses. 
  




Figure A. 3: Average Net Contributions by Player Type 
 
Table A. 3: Comparisons of Average Net Contributions between Player Types  
(p-values of two-sided signed-rank tests) 

















- .2411 .6465 
Type 10 
(.5080) 
- .1394 .0745 
Type 15 
(.5101) 
- - .1394 
Type 15 
(.3931) 
- - .5076 
Type 20 
(.5720) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(.3257) 
- - - 
        

















- .1394 .2845 
Type 10 
(.5085) 
- .5076 .7213 
Type 15 
(.4249) 
- - .2411 
Type 15 
(.5553) 
- - .9594 
Type 20 
(.4100) 
- - - 
Type 20 
(.5480) 
- - - 
Notes: Comparisons and average contributions involve rounds 1 to 25. Averages for the player types are 
given in parentheses. 
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Table A. 4: By Type: Comparisons of Average Absolute [and Average Net] Contributions 
between Treatments (p-values of two-sided U tests) 
Type 10 













RelMin - - - 
.2725 
[.9097] 
ProgMin - - - - 
  Type 15 













RelMin - - - 
.1123 
[.1124] 
ProgMin - - - - 
  Type 20 













RelMin - - - 
.0696 
[.1988] 
ProgMin - - - - 
Note: Average contributions over rounds 1 to 20 in NoMin, FixMin, RelMin, ProgMin: Type10: ?̅?𝑖: 6.53, 
8.21, 7.32, 6.26; ?̅?𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑡: .6525, .5513, .5533, .5325. Type 15: ?̅?𝑖: 8.51, 9.84, 9.97, 11.35; ?̅?𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑡: .5675, .4267, 
.4408, .5947. Type 20: ?̅?𝑖: 12.80, 10.82, 12.99, 15.78; ?̅?𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑡: .6400, .3443, .4154, .5780. 
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Table A. 5: Comparisons of Contributions by Cooperative and Uncooperative Players 
within Treatments 
  NoMin FixMin RelMin ProgMin 
 
Type 10 
U 4.4 7.4 6.0 4.6 
C 8.6 9.0 8.7 7.9 
 
Type 15 
U 5.6 7.7 8.1 9.5 
C 11.4 12.0 11.8 13.2 
 
Type 20 
U 10.0 7.7 10.3 13.5 
C 15.6 13.9 15.6 18.1 
Notes: Average contribution figures involve rounds 1 to 20. U = Uncooperative players, C = Cooperative 
players. For Type 10 and 20 there are per definition respectively 5 U and 5 C players per treatment and for 




Table A. 6: Relative Frequency of Individual Decisions at the Lower-Bound or Full 
Contribution to the Public Investment 




   
NoMin – Type 10 15.0 [39.5; 25.0; 17.5] 41.5 
NoMin – Type 15 14.3 [38.3; 38.3; 38.3] 32.3 
NoMin – Type 20 10.0 [19.0; 23.0; 27.0] 32.0 
FixMin – Type 10 32.0 44.0 
FixMin – Type 15 33.3 24.8 
FixMin – Type 20 28.0 17.5 
RelMin – Type 10 20.5 37.0 
RelMin – Type 15 28.8 18.8 
RelMin – Type 20 18.0 17.5 
ProgMin – Type 10 25.5 36.5 
ProgMin – Type 15 19.8 40.0 
ProgMin – Type 20 25.0 43.5 
   
Notes: All figures involve rounds 1 to 20. Lower bound contributions are 0 in NoMin for all player types; 6 
in FixMin for all player types; 4, 6, and 8 in RelMin; and 2, 6, and 10 in ProgMin for Type 10, Type 15, and 
Type 20 players, respectively. Figures in [] respectively show the percentage of contributions that were 
below the minimum contributions in FixMin, RelMin, and ProgMin for the three player types. 
 
  




Experimental Instructions (ProgMin) 
 
You participate in an economic decision experiment, in which you can earn money. How much 
each of you will earn depends on your personal decisions and those of other participants in the 
experiment. Each participant makes his decisions at a computer, isolated from the others. We 
ask you not to talk to other participants. 
The experiment consists of 25 rounds. In the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly 
matched with three other persons to build a group of four. You will remain in this group during 
the entire experiment. You will not know the identity of your group members at any time, 
though. 
Each group member is endowed in each round with a certain amount of tokens. Player 1 is 
endowed with 10 tokens per round. Players 2 and 3 are endowed with an amount of 15 tokens 
each. Player 4 is endowed with 20 tokens per round. The individual player numbers (and thus 




In each of the 25 rounds, each group member has to decide on how to allocate her/his tokens 
between two alternatives, called X and Y. The return of a token, in experimental currency units 
(ECU), is different for the two alternatives. The return of the allocation decision is determined as 
follows: 
Each token that you contribute to X yields a return of 2 ECU. If you contribute nothing to X, your 
return from X is zero.  
Each token that you contribute to Y, yields to you and to each of the other group members a 
return of 1 ECU. You may thus have a positive return from Y even if you don’t contribute 
anything to Y. 
During the allocation of your tokens, you must note that you are required to contribute a 
minimum contribution to Y. This minimum contribution is 2 tokens for Player 1, 6 tokens for 
Players 2 and 3 each, and 10 tokens for Player 4. 
 
Group Member Endowment (tokens) Mandatory Contribution to Y 
Player 1 10 2 
Player 2 15 6 
Player 3 15 6 
Player 4 20 10 
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You may allocate your tokens, above the minimum contribution to Y, to X or to Y only, but you 
may also allocate them among both alternatives. However, only entire tokens may be 
contributed. In the decision box on your screen you need to enter, for each alternative, the 
number of tokens that you want to allocate. If you do not want to contribute anything to X, you 
need to type in a zero. The sum of the tokens contributed to X and Y must be always equal to 
your endowment. This means that the entire token endowment has to be allocated among X and 
Y. With the <Tab> key you can switch among the entry fields. The entries have to be confirmed 
by clicking on <OK>. 
Your individual return per round is the sum of your returns from X and Y and is calculated as 
follows: 
Return = 2  (your contribution to X) + (sum of tokens contributed to Y in your group). 
 
PAYMENT 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid based on your individual total profit over all 25 
rounds. Your individual total profit in ECU will be converted into € (1 ECU = 0.01 €) and paid to 




In each round, you will see an overview table on your screen which provides you with the 
results of all previous rounds that you have played. The results include the following 
information for each round: 
Your endowment, your mandatory minimum contribution to Y, your contribution to X, your 
contribution to Y, the individual contributions to Y of each of the other group members, your 
return from X, your return from Y, your round profit, and your total profit. 
If you want to see the results of earlier rounds, which are no longer visible in the table, please 
use the scroll function on the right side of the table. 
We ask you now to go to the computer with your participation number. There you have to click 
on <Continue>. You then will be given on your screen a number of questions regarding these 
instructions. If you have any questions please address yourself to the experimenter. Only when 
all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment starts. 
 
V RECOMMENDED MINIMUM CONTRIBUTIONS IN A PUBLIC-GOOD GAME WITH HETEROGENEOUS ENDOWMENTS 
130 
 




RECOMMENDED MINIMUM CONTRIBUTIONS IN A PUBLIC-GOOD 
GAME WITH HETEROGENEOUS ENDOWMENTS 
 
with Claudia Keser 
 
 
Abstract: We investigate whether the recommendation of minimum contributions in a public-
good experiment with heterogeneous endowments impacts behavior in the same way as 
mandatory minimum contributions. Keser et al. (2014b) have observed that the latter, when 
they are progressive, (1) increase group contributions to a level significantly above the 
contributions in a baseline treatment without minimum contributions and (2) modify the “fair-
share” norm of equal relative contributions. Similar progressive minimum contributions 
presented as recommendations in our experiment do not show the same effect. 
 
JEL-Classification: C92, D63, H41 
Keywords: Experimental economics, public goods, heterogeneous endowments, recommended 
minimum contributions, norms 
  





In a linear public-good experiment with an asymmetric distribution of endowments, 
Keser et al. (2014b) demonstrate that mandatory minimum contributions may be used 
to increase group contributions to the public good.1 A progressive minimum-
contribution schedule, which imposes higher obligations on players with higher 
endowments, is found to be particularly effective. It shows a norm-giving character, 
inducing the rich players to give a higher share of their endowment than the poor 
players. 
Similarly, in symmetric linear public-good experiments, Galbiati and Vertova (2008) and 
Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch (2013) show that “weakly incentivized” obligations 
prescribing minimum contributions (of 20 or 80 percent of the endowment) are 
effective in influencing individual contribution decisions. Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch 
(2013) show that this is true even for asymmetric obligations. The argument provided 
by the authors of both studies is that obligations have an expressive function (see, e.g., 
Kahan, 1997; Cooter, 1998; McAdams, 2000; McAdams and Nadler, 2005), which 
attaches an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation (see, e.g., Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2011). Thus, obligations can affect individual behavior even if they are backed by 
weak monetary incentives only. In both studies, incentives are provided by a 
probabilistic penalty (reward) if an individual contributes less (more) than the 
minimum requested. They are considered as non-binding since, assuming risk-
neutrality, they are too small to make contributing to the public good profitable. 
Such weakly incentivized non-binding obligations are a less stringent policy tool than 
mandatory minimum contributions and they seem to work effectively in symmetric 
linear public-good settings. Furthermore, Galbiati and Vertova (2014) suggest that 
obligations (recommendations to contribute at least 80 percent of the endowment) even 
work without monetary incentives. Based on this promising evidence of “expressive 
law”, the question that we address in this paper is whether, in the setting with 
heterogeneous endowments (Keser et al., 2014a; 2014b), simply recommending 
minimum contributions is sufficient to impact the contribution norm. We focus on the 
most promising, progressive minimum-contribution schedule and test whether, 
presented as a pure recommendation, it is similarly able to impact the norm among 
heterogeneously endowed agents and increase average group contributions, as does the 
mandatory progressive minimum-contribution schedule in Keser et al. (2014b). 
Evidence in support of our conjecture can be found in Dale and Morgan (2010). In a 
public-good experiment with equally endowed subjects, they find that a moderate 
recommendation significantly increases group contributions, while suggesting the 
                                                        
1 The minimum contributions are for all player types lower than average voluntary contributions to the 
public good in the baseline treatment without enforced minimum contributions. Consequently, they sum 
up to less than the observed average group contribution in the baseline treatment, where zero 
contribution is the dominant strategy for all players. This guarantees that the dominant strategy solution 
with mandatory minimum contributions does not imply an increase in the contribution level per se. 
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contribution of the entire endowment does not. Similarly, a “moral message”, in the 
middle of an experiment with strangers re-matching, may lead to a temporary increase 
in contributions (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014). In step-level public-good experiments, Marks 
et al. (1999) and Croson and Marks (2001) find that recommended contributions 
facilitate coordination and thus significantly increase the relative frequency of 
successful provisions of the public good, when valuations of the public good are 
heterogeneous. For the homogeneous case, however, recommendations make no 
difference. In real-life charitable projects, moderate recommendations can positively 
impact the frequency of donations (Cialdini and Schroeder, 1976; Brockner et al., 1984; 
Weyant and Smith, 1987; Fraser et al., 1988), whereas high recommendations can 
increase the average size of contributions (Doob and McLaughlin, 1989). 
The explanation given by the “expressive law” literature for the potential impact on 
behavior is that obligations create focal points or norms, which channel individuals’ 
beliefs about the behavior of others and act as coordination devices. Similarly, Dal Bó 
and Dal Bó (2014) provide a twofold explanation for the (temporary) effect of moral 
messages. The first is a “preference effect”, which states that moral messages influence 
the level or relationship of contributions deemed to be morally right. The second is an 
“expectation effect”, which states that moral messages affect players’ expectations about 
the contributions of others in an optimistically fashion. These explanations give hope 
that, in our setting, progressive recommendations on minimum contributions are 
conceivably able to increase group contributions by setting a norm of fair contributions 
among heterogeneously endowed players, implying that the richer players contribute a 
higher share of the endowment than the poorer players. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental 
design and procedures. Section 3 provides the experimental results. Section 4 gives a 
summary and concludes. 
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2. The Experiment 
2.1 The Game 
 
Our baseline public-good game has been introduced in Keser et al. (2014a) as the 
AsymWeak treatment. Each of four players (𝑖 = 1, … , 4) is endowed with an exogenously 
given number of tokens 𝑒𝑖, with 𝑒1 = 10, 𝑒2 = 𝑒3 = 15, 𝑒4 = 20. The four players decide 
independently on the allocation of their individual token endowment between a private 
and a public investment. Let 𝑥𝑖  denote the amount allocated to the private investment 
and 𝑦𝑖 the amount allocated to the public investment by player 𝑖, with 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 0. The 
investments have to be in entire tokens and to add up to the individual endowment. 
Thus, 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖, 0 ≤  𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖 , and 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖. 
The profit 𝜋𝑖  of each player 𝑖 depends on this player’s private investment and the sum of 
public investments in the group. Each token that a player allocates to the private 
investment yields an individual return of 2 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), while 
each token allocated to the public investment yields a return of 1 ECU to each of the four 
group members. The profit of player 𝑖 is thus given by 
 




   
Since each player’s individual return of a token invested in the private investment is 
larger than in the public investment, the game has an equilibrium in dominant 
strategies, where each player contributes the entire endowment to the private 
investment (𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑒𝑖; 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 0). 
The game is played over 25 rounds. The subgame-perfect equilibrium solution 
prescribes, based on backward induction, that in each round each player plays the 
dominant strategy and contributes zero to the public investment. 
However, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is collectively inefficient. Given that the 
group return of a token allocated to the public investment is 4 ECU and thus larger than 
the individual return of 2 ECU of the same token allocated to the private investment, the 
group optimum would request all players to allocate in each round all of their 
endowments to the public investment.  
In the following we call this baseline game the NoMin/Rec treatment and consider two 
additional treatments. In ProgMin, we impose mandatory minimum contributions 
(𝑐𝑖 > 0) to the public investment; specifically, 𝑐1 = 2, 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 6, 𝑐4 = 10. This 
treatment corresponds to the progressive minimum-contribution schedule in Keser et 
al. (2014b). Since the minimum contributions are mandatory, they constrain the 
individual allocation decisions for each player 𝑖 by 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 ≤  𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑖, and 
𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖. The dominant strategy solution thus prescribes, for each player 𝑖, to 
contribute the required minimum contribution to the public investment and allocate all 
remaining tokens to the private investment (𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖; 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖). 
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ProgRec is our novel treatment. In ProgRec, we make minimum-contribution 
recommendations (𝑟𝑖 > 0). Similarly to ProgMin, they are 𝑟1 = 2, 𝑟2 = 𝑟3 = 6, 𝑟4 = 10. 
In this treatment the minimum contributions are not mandatory and thus leave the 
strategy space as well as the equilibrium prediction of the baseline treatment 
unaffected. 
In all three treatments, all of the above information, including the minimum-
contribution requirements or recommendations of all player types, is common 
knowledge. Table 1 summarizes the treatments. We distinguish between Type 10 (poor), 
Type 15 (wealthy) and Type 20 (rich) players, corresponding to their respective 
endowment. The amounts of the minimum contributions, mandatory or recommended, 
are progressive and correspond to rates of 20 percent for the poor, 40 percent for the 
wealthy, and 50 percent for the rich players. No explicit rationale is given to explain the 
amounts of minimum contributions to the participants. In ProgRec, however, we 
mention that the recommended values account for the fact that players with a higher 
endowment potentially can contribute more to the public investment. To amplify the 
moral substance of the recommendation, we additionally include a philosophical saying 
of the Chinese philosopher and poet Lao-tze: “He who knows he has enough is rich”. 
 
Table 1: Treatment Overview 
Treatment 
Minimum Contributions 
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2.2 The Procedures 
 
We conducted the computerized experiment in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral 
Economics at the University of Göttingen, Germany, based on the z-Tree software 
package (Fischbacher, 2007).2 In total, 120 bachelor and master students from various 
disciplines (mostly economics and business administration) participated in the three 
treatments of this study. The NoMin/Rec treatment corresponds to the AsymWeak 
treatment in Keser et al. (2014a) and the ProgMin treatment corresponds to the 
treatment with the same label in Keser et al. (2014b). Participants were student 
volunteers recruited for a decision-making experiment via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). A 
roughly equal number of female and male students participated in all sessions. 
According to subject availability, we conducted sessions with three to five groups each, 
implying three to five independent observations per session. We collected 10 
independent observations of each treatment, 30 in total. 
The procedure of the experiment was as follows. The experimenter distributed written 
instructions (a translation of these is provided in the Appendix) and read them aloud to 
all participants. Participants were informed that they are randomly assigned to groups 
of four that remained unchanged during the entire experimental session (partners 
design). Participants, however, did not get to know the identity of the participants with 
whom they interacted. Each player in a group was randomly assigned a player number 
from one to four, which was individually communicated at the beginning of the 
experiment and remained unchanged. Each player number was associated with an 
endowment and, if applicable, with a minimum-contribution requirement or 
recommendation (see Table 1 above). At the end of each round, participants were 
informed about the individual contribution to the public investment by each of the three 
other players in the group (identified solely by their player number). 
After the reading of the instructions, participants had to answer to a number of 
questions controlling for the understanding of the instructions. The experiment did not 
start until all participants had correctly answered to all questions. 
The participants were informed in the instructions that the profits gained in the course 
of the experiment are measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and that these 
will be multiplied by a conversion factor of 0.01 € per ECU for the final payment, in 
addition to a show-up fee of 3 €. The cash payment was conducted anonymously after 
the experiment. An experimental session lasted on average around 75 minutes. The 
average payoff earned was about 15.00 € (including the 3 € show-up fee). 
  
                                                        
2 The lab consists of 24 computers in isolated booths, such that vision of someone else’s computer screen 
and verbal communication with other participants is highly restricted. 
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3. Experimental Results 
 
All nonparametric tests presented below are two-sided. We require significance at the 
10-percent level. We denote the Mann-Whitney U test as U test and the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test as signed-rank test. 
 
3.1 Group Contributions 
 
Figure 1 presents, for each of the three treatments, the development of the average 
group contributions to the public investment over the 25 rounds. As can be seen, with a 
mean of 43.5, ProgMin exhibits the highest group contributions, while contributions in 
NoMin/Rec and ProgRec, with respective means of 33.1 and 31.1, proceed close to each 
other on a lower level.3 Pairwise treatment comparisons of average group contributions 
over all 25 rounds, based on U tests, show that contributions in ProgMin are significantly 
larger than in NoMin/Rec (p = .0101) and ProgRec (p = .0233). Group contributions in 
NoMin/Rec and ProgRec are statistically indistinguishable. 
Result 1: The recommendations in ProgRec are not able to increase the group 
contribution level. 
 
3.1 Contributions by Player Types 
3.1.1 Comparison within Treatments 
 
Considering average absolute contributions, we know from Keser et al. (2014b), that in 
NoMin/Rec and ProgMin the richer players contribute significantly more than the poorer 
ones. We find that this is also true in ProgRec (p ≤ .0469, signed-rank tests). 
Keser et al. (2014b) also show that average relative contributions, i.e., contributions 
relative to the endowment, are equal for all three player types in NoMin/Rec (“fair-
share” norm), but significantly higher for richer players in ProgMin such that the “fair-
share” norm is breached. In ProgRec, we observe Type 10 players to contribute on 
average a significantly lower share of the endowment than Type 15 players (p = .0593); 
all other differences are insignificant, though. The “fair-share” norm thus seems to be 
not significantly affected by the recommendations in ProgRec. In contrast to ProgMin, 
individual relative contributions in ProgRec still follow the simple “fair-share” norm as 
in NoMin/Rec.   
                                                        
3 Average standard deviations of total group contributions for rounds 1-25 are 12.4, 7.5, and 8.5 for 
NoMin/Rec, ProgMin, and ProgRec respectively. 




Figure 1: Average Group Contributions per Round (by Treatment) 
 
Result 2: The recommendations in ProgRec do not impact the relative contribution 
pattern; the “fair-share” norm is not breached. This indicates that the recommendations do 
not exert norm-giving character. 
 
3.1.2 Comparison between Treatments 
 
Figure 2 shows, by player type, the relative contributions in the three treatments. As can 
be seen, (relative) contributions of Type 10 players are on average lower in ProgRec 
than in the two other treatments; however, only the difference from NoMin/Rec is 
statistically significant (p = .0963, U test). This suggests that the previously observed, 
significantly lower average group contribution in ProgRec than in ProgMin must be 
primarily caused by lower contributions of Type 15 and Type 20 players. 
This presumption finds support in Figure 2. Contributions of Type 15 and Type 20 
players follow similar trajectories in NoMin/Rec and ProgRec which, however, are both 
lower on average than in ProgMin. Average contributions of both player types are 
indeed significantly lower in NoMin/Rec and ProgRec than in ProgMin (p ≤ .0413, U 
tests). The recommendations in ProgRec have, relative to NoMin/Rec, only insignificant 
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Figure 2: Average Relative Contributions by Treatment and Player Type 
 
Result 3: The recommended minimum contributions in ProgRec do not increase 
contributions of the richer players (Type 15 and Type 20) above the level observed in 
NoMin/Rec, as do the mandatory minimum contributions in ProgMin. 
To identify probable effects of recommended minimum contributions on contributions 
at the margin, we compare zero and full contributions of all player types between 
NoMin/Rec and ProgRec. The respective figures are shown in Table 2. We find that zero 
contributions are significantly more frequent in NoMin/Rec than in ProgRec for Type 10 
and Type 15 players (p ≤ .0001, U tests); for Type 20 players this is almost significant 
(p = .1076, U test). However, we also find that full contributions are significantly more 
seldom in ProgRec compared to NoMin/Rec for all three player types (p ≤ .0987, U tests). 
Result 4: On the one hand, recommendations exert a positive effect in reducing zero 
contributions in comparison to NoMin/Rec but, on the other hand, they exert a negative 
effect on full contributions. 
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Table 2: Relative Frequency of Individual Decisions which were either Zero or Full 
Contribution to the Public Investment 




NoMin/Rec – Type 10 18.0  41.2 
NoMin/Rec – Type 15 21.2  28.6 
NoMin/Rec – Type 20 18.0  28.4 
ProgRec – Type 10 6.8  22.4 
ProgRec – Type 15 9.2  24.0 
ProgRec – Type 20 12.8  14.0 
 
  





Recommendations in our experiment do not exert norm-giving power. Group 
contributions are not statistically different from those observed in the baseline 
treatment but significantly smaller than in the treatment with mandatory minimum 
contributions. In contrast to the latter, recommendations have no impact on the “fair-
share” norm: the different player types tend to contribute, on average, the same portion 
of their endowment to the public good. Additionally, for none of the three player types 
do the recommendations show a positive impact on the contribution level. In contrast, 
the poor players contribute significantly less than in the baseline treatment. It follows 
that, for all player types, contributions are significantly lower than those in the 
treatment with mandatory minimum contributions. Furthermore, recommendations, on 
the one hand, exert a positive effect in reducing zero contributions in comparison to the 
baseline treatment, but, on the other hand, they exert a negative effect on full 
contributions. 
Our results suggest that mere recommendations might not be an adequate policy tool for 
influencing the contribution norm and/or increasing the overall contribution level in 
heterogeneous public-good settings. It appears that some incentives are necessary. More 
research is needed in this direction. 
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Experimental Instructions (ProgRec) 
 
You participate in an economic decision experiment, in which you can earn money. How much 
each of you will earn depends on your personal decisions and those of other participants in the 
experiment. Each participant makes his decisions at a computer, isolated from the others. We 
ask you not to talk to other participants. 
The experiment consists of 25 rounds. In the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly 
matched with three other persons to build a group of four. You will remain in this group during 
the entire experiment. You will not know the identity of your group members at any time, 
though. 
Each group member is endowed in each round with a certain amount of tokens. Player 1 is 
endowed with 10 tokens per round. Players 2 and 3 are endowed with an amount of 15 tokens 
each. Player 4 is endowed with 20 tokens per round. The individual player numbers (and thus 




In each of the 25 rounds, each group member has to decide on how to allocate her/his tokens 
between two alternatives, called X and Y. The return of a token, in experimental currency units 
(ECU), is different for the two alternatives. The return of the allocation decision is determined as 
follows: 
Each token that you contribute to X yields a return of 2 ECU. If you contribute nothing to X, your 
return from X is zero.  
Each token that you contribute to Y, yields to you and to each of the other group members a 
return of 1 ECU. You may thus have a positive return from Y even if you don’t contribute 
anything to Y. 
For the allocation of your tokens, we provide you, depending on your endowment, with 
recommended values for the contribution to Y which, however, are not binding. The 
recommended values account for the fact that players with a higher endowment can potentially 
contribute more to the alternative Y. The recommended minimum contribution is two tokens for 
Player 1, six tokens for Players 2 and 3, respectively, and ten tokens for Player 4. Please adhere 
to the recommended minimum contributions. 
 
Group Member Endowment (ECU) 
Recommended Minimum 
Contribution to Y 
Player 1 10 2 
Player 2 15 6 
Player 3 15 6 
Player 4 20 10 
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You may allocate your tokens, above the minimum contribution to Y, to X or to Y only, but you 
may also allocate them among both alternatives. However, only entire tokens may be 
contributed. In the decision box on your screen you need to enter, for each alternative, the 
number of tokens that you want to allocate. If you do not want to contribute anything to X or Y, 
you need to type in a zero. The sum of the tokens contributed to X and Y must be always equal to 
your endowment. This means that the entire token endowment has to be allocated among X and 
Y. With the <Tab> key you can switch among the entry fields. The entries have to be confirmed 
by clicking on <OK>. 
Your individual return per round is the sum of your returns from X and Y and is calculated as 
follows: 
Return = 2  (your contribution to X) + (sum of tokens contributed to Y in your group). 
 
PAYMENT 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid based on your individual total profit over all 25 
rounds. Your individual total profit in ECU will be converted into € (1 ECU=0.01 €) and paid to 




In each round, you will see an overview table on your screen which provides you with the 
results of all previous rounds that you have played. The results include the following 
information for each round: 
Your endowment, your recommended minimum contribution to Y, your contribution to X, your 
contribution to Y, the individual contributions to Y of each of the other group members, your 
return from X, your return from Y, your round profit, and your total profit. 
If you want to see the results of earlier rounds, which are no longer visible in the table, please 
use the scroll function on the right side of the table. 
We ask you now to go to the computer with your participation number. There you have to click 
on <Continue>. You then will be given on your screen a number of questions regarding these 
instructions. If you have any questions please address yourself to the experimenter. Only when 
all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment starts. 
 
He who knows he has enough is rich. (Lao-tze) 
